The Helsinki deal on Aceh: An arrangement likely to work<\/p>\n
Aboeprijadi Santoso, Helsinki<\/p>\n
After a total of 25 days of negotiating, the Helsinki talks on
\nAceh have reached a historic phase. For the first time, Indonesia
\nis about to end its war with a separatist rebellion through a
\npolitical settlement. Although the full details have yet to be
\ndisclosed, the deal, if successfully implemented, will be a
\nmilestone.<\/p>\n
Three myths seem to have hampered a clear understanding of the
\ntalks on Aceh in Helsinki.<\/p>\n
The first is the claim -- to ease public acceptance of the
\npeace talks -- that these were just a series of \"informal talks\".<\/p>\n
Since any deal reached should be upheld by the parties,
\nobviously it could hardly be informal-- not least for the Crisis
\nManagement Initiative (CMI) chief, Martti Ahtisaari, who acted as
\nfacilitator. Indeed, a ceremony on Aug. 15 will bind Indonesia
\nand the GAM (Free Aceh Movement) and, separately, between them
\nand the European Union (EU) and ASEAN in two formal agreements.<\/p>\n
The second myth is the view that the talks made Aceh an
\ninternational issue. In fact, it has long been an international
\nissue because of past human rights abuses and the tsunami.
\nWhether Aceh could become another East Timor is beside the point.<\/p>\n
The third and most widespread myth is the confusion about a
\n\"local political party\". Is it a party GAM wanted for itself, a
\nnumber of local parties, or a party or parties Jakarta offered on
\nits own terms? Crucially, which of these will be genuinely
\ndemocratic, for example; fully addressing the aspirations of the
\nAcehnese?<\/p>\n
The Indonesian delegates initially came with a firm rejection
\nof GAM's demand for local parties and a bid offering GAM to
\nnominate its candidates for local chiefs to be supported by 10 of
\nthe existing national parties in the next Aceh elections. GAM
\nrejected that, calling it, \"not transparent, and by special
\nappointment\".<\/p>\n
As Jakarta proposed an \"Aceh-based national party\", the
\natmosphere improved, but the talks almost became deadlocked. A
\nsource close to the negotiations said, the insertion of the word
\n\"national\" in a faxed message from Jakarta had caused much
\ntrouble. GAM resisted the conditions for political parties as
\nstipulated by Law No. 31\/2002. It took about 7 hours to discuss
\nit at the July 16 session and lasted for 12 hours with 5 breaks
\nand several calls to Jakarta. The latter was \"the longest and
\ntoughest session we had\", RI chief delegate Hamid Awaluddin said.<\/p>\n
Underlying the differences were the centralistic versus local
\napproach to the matter. Indonesia had apparently taken for
\ngranted GAM's February compromise to give up its demand for
\nindependence, ignoring, it seems, what should have since become
\nobvious -- that political participation was one of GAM's key
\npriorities. GAM wanted to have more parties for Aceh, while
\nJakarta -- and most of the media for that matter -- read it as
\nGAM simply wanting a party for itself.<\/p>\n
What is at stake here, Martti Ahtisaari told Radio
\nNetherlands, is a principle of democracy. \"No one argued, not
\nleast GAM, (to) want to have a political party of their own. The
\nquestion was principled: anyone who wants to participate will
\nhave to be facilitated. There are existing parties already in
\nAceh and new ones will definitely come forward,\" the CMI chief
\nexplained.<\/p>\n
Thus, for GAM to accept the nomination of GAM candidates by
\nJakarta-based parties, they said, is \"to corrupt a supposedly
\ndemocratic process\". It would appear that GAM has suddenly
\nchanged from a rebel movement to a champion of democracy. But it
\nhas also been understood that it should be possible for Indonesia
\nto introduce local parties without contradicting her Constitution
\nthat is based on the philosophy of the unitary state.<\/p>\n
Both sides finally reformulated and made Jakarta's proposal
\nacceptable. The deal -- agreeing in principle that Aceh will have
\nlocal political parties -- needs to be ratified by the Indonesian
\nnational legislature within a period of 18 months. Based on this
\npledge, both parties put their initials on the eight-page
\nMemorandum of Understanding. It is the price Jakarta paid for
\nGAM's setting aside its independence demand.<\/p>\n
The other basic commitment is the withdrawal of Indonesia's
\nnon-organic troops and paramilitary police, in addition to the
\ncollection and destruction of GAM's weapons within four months,
\nfrom September to December. Former GAM members will be offered
\namnesty and reintegrated into Acehnese society.<\/p>\n
The accord thus stands on key commitments on political
\nparticipation and security arrangements. For two parties,
\nburdened by a mutual distrust after three decades of war, the two
\ncommitments constitute a big promise.<\/p>\n
Clearly the proof in the pudding will be in the eating.
\nPromises are hard to sell in post-war Aceh. Provoked incidents
\nlike those in Langsa and Takengon in 2003 contributed to the
\nfailure of an accord. Observers, with East Timor violence in 1999
\nin mind, recall the difficulties for troops to retreat if and
\nwhen at the same time they feel they have been cheated.<\/p>\n
But, the tsunami has made many people press for the peace that
\nso many locals have longed for no matter who has finally \"won\"
\nthe war. And the Army has been instructed to restrain itself. The
\nEU-ASEAN monitoring team, marking Europe's first peace mission in
\nAsia, will have to watch and manage the development on the
\nground.<\/p>\n
If the deal works, as it seems likely, it will be the first
\ntime in years that an internal armed conflict is resolved by a
\npeaceful settlement. Since most rebellions, with much less
\npopular support and arms -- from the RMS in Maluku (1950), the
\nDarul Islam (1950s), the PRRI-Permesta (late 1950s) to the OPM in
\nPapua (since 1965) - were crushed by force, Aceh's experience
\nshould be a huge lesson for Indonesia.<\/p>\n
The accord will have implications for party oligarchies and
\nsome military businesses. It could push post-Soeharto reforms to
\nforge ahead and revive Indonesia's 1950s local democracy, even
\nthough federalism remains taboo.<\/p>\n
The writer is a journalist with Radio Netherlands.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/the-helsinki-deal-on-aceh-an-arrangement-likely-to-work-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }