Teten Masduki

Teten Masduki Coordinator Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW) Jakarta

Since the formal collapse of Soeharto's authoritarian government, the pattern of corruption shifted from one conducted in an oligarchic manner to a "multiparty" pattern occurring within and across all major parties and sectors. In the last five years this has become the major impediment to the progress of reform in various fields. Recovery and improvement in the economy, legal system, civil service bureaucracy and in the political system have been greatly affected.

The coalition government of President Megawati Soekarnoputri is marked by the strengthening influence of money in the process of politics and public administration -- and compromises among elite circles for political and economic power sharing. This period has enabled the old economic and political forces of the New Order's "kleptocracy", in the words of political analysts, to build new relations of political and business patronage. Thus old political and economic structures and values, including corrupt political behavior have been further preserved without change.

Corruption is no longer even a "sexy" political issue among current political leaders who were vying for popularity under former presidents B.J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid.

The reported irregularities in budget spending for military barracks during the early stages of Megawati's administration remains unresolved. The demand by a handful of legislators to form a disciplinary council at the House of Representatives (DPR) for graft felon and current Speaker Akbar Tandjung's suspension has never materialized, despite the court finding him guilty of misappropriating State Logistics Agency (Bulog) money.

Meanwhile, the move by the Public Officials' Wealth Audit Agency (KPKPN) to officially report to the police Attorney General MA Rahman for financial asset irregularities which smack of corruption, has failed to secure political support from the President or the DPR. Indeed, Megawati has stood firm in demanding that Rahman stay on as her Attorney General despite the evidence and allegations against him. The same situation also prevails in cases of the sale of assets of the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) and the divestment or privatization of state-owned enterprises.

The granting of release and discharge (R&D) to indebted bankers through Presidential Instruction No.8/2002 constitutes the climax of the manifestation of political protection or patronage for tycoons made popular by the New Order. The instruction has wide implications particularly in terms of corruption eradication. It also indicates the retention of an economic policy with greater priority given to the super wealthy. This R&D policy is a political commodity which will likely become an instrument of corruption for the relevant officials and politicians.

The transition toward regional autonomy, which has transferred much administrative and financial power to the local leaders without the strengthening of public participation, has also become a source of "collective corruption". The drafting and implementation of regional budgets, regent elections, presentation of accountability reports and formulation of regional regulations have become easy targets for regional officials and politicians to enrich themselves.

Hardly any election of regional heads or the planning of the local budget has proceeded without public protests because bribery often clouds such events. Regional autonomy, which was designed to enhance public services and welfare through a decentralization of power, is now doing just the opposite.

Under Megawati, the nation has also had to face increasingly dismal law enforcement. Attorney General MA Rahman, who should be at the forefront of corruption eradication, is instead starting to look like a key player in allowing corruption to continue, based the aforementioned KPKPN case, which has been put deep on the back burners.

Bribery, or possibly extortion, allegedly involving judges with the South Jakarta District Court was again uncovered this year. As political protection may no longer be effective, the judicial institution will become a target of delinquent fat cats and corrupt officials trying to buy "legal certainty" to evade justice and stay out of prison.

In this reform period we need the political will of the national leadership -- the President, the Minister of Justice and the Supreme Court Chairman -- to conduct a judicial purge.

The prosecution office needs a clean and professional attorney general who is also a strong and visionary figure, so as to be capable of launching an internal reform for its purge and empowerment. The Supreme Court Chairman and Minister of Justice have enough legal instruments to penalize judges who are fond of commercializing their verdicts.

But the opportunity, the power and the public support to put our legal sector in order have come to no avail. So far only the judges in the case of Manulife have been suspended by a presidential decree due to indications of a dishonest decision -- and this only happened because of international pressure.

The establishment of the Commission on Eradication of Corruption Crimes (KPK) by Law No.30/2002 with its unusual authority to substitute prosecution and police institutions that fail to function, has offered new hope.

Yet the eventual dissolution of KPKPN in its initial phase by the legislature, raises fears over the independence of KPK, which can also be disbanded by the DPR and the government if it begins to disturb their interests.

Furthermore, the combination of the KPKPN function of auditing public officials' wealth with that of the KPK is not complemented by the necessary stipulations in Law No. 30/2002; especially those on the obligation of officials to report their wealth to KPK, penalties for their failure to report or for submitting false reports, access to financial and banking institutions, and the principle of sharing the burden of proof in the process of prosecution.

Therefore, it is impossible to expect significant efforts from the top (the government and DPR) regarding corruption eradication, which should become a national commitment, at least as reflected in the decrees of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) (No.IX/1998 and No.VIII/2001).

Even when bribes have constituted the main activity and income of people's representatives, and political decisions in the legislature, budgeting and control functions have been made commodities, the House and political parties have changed into a fierce corruption machine that can kill the entire system of government control and law enforcement.

Public administration has been dominated by a "kleptocracy" and corruption has become the only way to power, so that its elimination is even more unthinkable. Corruption is no longer a crime of power that legally or socially bears high risks -- just lavish financial and political benefits for its perpetrators. Today's creed is that the bigger the abused funds, the more difficult it is to send its culprits to prison.

Eradicating corruption now is nearly hopeless without any political and economic structural change, which can only be expected from the younger generation.

The experience in many countries with successful eradication of systematic corruption shows the determinant factor of strong political figures and these leaders' commitment to make their people prosper. Here, the reverse is true, where politicians are the leading actors of corruption at the expense of the nation's people.

2. Pro15 -- After dictatorship 2 X 30 After dictatorship in Iraq: What can the world learn?

Ralf Dahrendorf Sociologist Project Syndicate London

The war in Iraq had barely begun when the minds of those who conceived the invasion turned to what should happen after the victory over Saddam Hussein's regime -- a victory everyone assumed to be inevitable. Politicians and experts have sought to draw comparisons with recent examples like Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, East Timor, but also with more remote and fundamental cases.

After all, what is expected in Iraq is the fall of a highly ideological dictatorship. Is there anything we can learn from the last examples of this kind, from the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, or the end of the Third Reich in Germany in 1945 and the process of "de-Nazification" that followed?

The risks of such comparisons are almost too obvious for words. Every case has its own defining features. Regarding the demise of communism, the experiences of, say, Poland and Romania are profoundly different. As we cross even more profound cultural boundaries, comparisons become still less relevant. Yet there are a few issues that are common to the unraveling of most ideological dictatorships.

One such issue has to do with memory, and dealing with the past. This is connected with a practical question: Who is in a position to build a new country on the ruins of the old regime?

It is rare for a counter-elite to emerge quickly, much less for an elite-in-waiting to take over. In Germany in the 1950s, there were many complaints about old Nazis reappearing in a democratic guise and occupying important positions. Many of us fought against the apparent "restoration" of the old regime.

In Eastern Europe, the old leaders initially disappeared from the scene, but not for long. Ex-communists were often reincarnated politically as social democrats. Those who had been in the resistance-like Vaclav Havel in Prague-found this hard to take. Yet these communist apparatchiks were not the same people they had been. Circumstances had changed and the people with them.

This has a great deal to do with methods of dealing with the past. Post-1945 Germany and post-1989 Poland are examples of countries that moved forward without much attention to the past. Intellectuals complained that too little time and energy was spent on "mastering" the past. They had good reasons to complain.

Indeed, after a decade or so, the need to draw clear lines and tell all, including the painful stories, became overwhelming. But the most successful postcommunist countries moved forward first and coped with the past later. Those who could not lift their eyes from the horrors of the past made less progress.

A second general issue has to do with priorities. There is a natural tendency -- especially in Anglo-Saxon countries -- to regard elections as the most effective institutional remedy for countries emerging from ideological dictatorships. To be sure, elections are important; but by themselves they do not solve problems. Indeed, if they disappoint, the very principles on which they are based-democracy and civil liberties-will be discredited.

I am a strong, almost old-fashioned believer in parliamentary democracy, but when it comes to situations like postwar Iraq, two other imperatives are equally pressing. One is the need to establish an effective administration to make certain that new policies of tolerance and market economics are actually implemented. In East European countries, this was a major problem, and it is only through accession negotiations with the European Union that such administrative reform has been assured.

The second imperative is the rule of law. The law has a different place in different cultures, and it presents special problems in Islamic countries. However, it is crucial that every effort be made to educate and install an impartial and incorruptible judiciary. Judges must not only be honest, but must be seen to be so and, as such, trusted. The process of establishing the rule of law has been difficult and has remained incomplete in most post-dictatorial countries; yet it will be a key to successful recovery in Iraq as well.

One of the key points emphasized in my 1990 book, Reflections on the Revolution in Europe, is also valid for Iraq. The road from the collapse of a dictatorial regime backed by ideology to a more liberal order leads through a valley of tears. Things are likely to get worse before they get better.

This is notably the case in economic terms. Even post-War Germany's acclaimed, miracle-working Economics Minister, Ludwig Erhard, was deeply unpopular in the early 1950s, because it appeared as if only a few were getting rich, while most West Germans remained poor or got poorer.

For a certain period in the process of recovery, it is simply necessary for people to keep their nerve. Poland is a recent example of a country that achieved this feat. It requires plausible leadership and the reasonable hope that things will get better before long.

If this time of transition goes wrong, the alternative is renewed turmoil and the victory of fundamentalists of one kind or another. The warning "Beware of the valley of tears!" is thus the one that must be taken most seriously by those responsible for rebuilding an Iraq scarred by the terrors of dictatorship and the ravages of war.

The writer is a member of the British House of Lords, a former Rector of the London School of Economics and also a former Warden of St. Anthony's College, Oxford.