Teten Masduki
\nCoordinator
\nIndonesia Corruption Watch
\n(ICW)
\nJakarta<\/p>\n
Since the formal collapse of Soeharto's authoritarian
\ngovernment, the pattern of corruption shifted from one conducted
\nin an oligarchic manner to a "multiparty" pattern occurring
\nwithin and across all major parties and sectors. In the last five
\nyears this has become the major impediment to the progress of
\nreform in various fields. Recovery and improvement in the
\neconomy, legal system, civil service bureaucracy and in the
\npolitical system have been greatly affected.<\/p>\n
The coalition government of President Megawati Soekarnoputri
\nis marked by the strengthening influence of money in the process
\nof politics and public administration -- and compromises among
\nelite circles for political and economic power sharing. This
\nperiod has enabled the old economic and political forces of the
\nNew Order's "kleptocracy", in the words of political analysts, to
\nbuild new relations of political and business patronage. Thus old
\npolitical and economic structures and values, including corrupt
\npolitical behavior have been further preserved without change.<\/p>\n
Corruption is no longer even a "sexy" political issue among
\ncurrent political leaders who were vying for popularity under
\nformer presidents B.J. Habibie and Abdurrahman Wahid.<\/p>\n
The reported irregularities in budget spending for military
\nbarracks during the early stages of Megawati's administration
\nremains unresolved. The demand by a handful of legislators to
\nform a disciplinary council at the House of Representatives (DPR)
\nfor graft felon and current Speaker Akbar Tandjung's suspension
\nhas never materialized, despite the court finding him guilty of
\nmisappropriating State Logistics Agency (Bulog) money.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, the move by the Public Officials' Wealth Audit
\nAgency (KPKPN) to officially report to the police Attorney
\nGeneral MA Rahman for financial asset irregularities which smack
\nof corruption, has failed to secure political support from the
\nPresident or the DPR. Indeed, Megawati has stood firm in
\ndemanding that Rahman stay on as her Attorney General despite the
\nevidence and allegations against him. The same situation also
\nprevails in cases of the sale of assets of the Indonesian Bank
\nRestructuring Agency (IBRA) and the divestment or privatization
\nof state-owned enterprises.<\/p>\n
The granting of release and discharge (R&D) to indebted
\nbankers through Presidential Instruction No.8\/2002 constitutes
\nthe climax of the manifestation of political protection or
\npatronage for tycoons made popular by the New Order. The
\ninstruction has wide implications particularly in terms of
\ncorruption eradication. It also indicates the retention of an
\neconomic policy with greater priority given to the super wealthy.
\nThis R&D policy is a political commodity which will likely become
\nan instrument of corruption for the relevant officials and
\npoliticians.<\/p>\n
The transition toward regional autonomy, which has transferred
\nmuch administrative and financial power to the local leaders
\nwithout the strengthening of public participation, has also
\nbecome a source of "collective corruption". The drafting and
\nimplementation of regional budgets, regent elections,
\npresentation of accountability reports and formulation of
\nregional regulations have become easy targets for regional
\nofficials and politicians to enrich themselves.<\/p>\n
Hardly any election of regional heads or the planning of the
\nlocal budget has proceeded without public protests because
\nbribery often clouds such events. Regional autonomy, which was
\ndesigned to enhance public services and welfare through a
\ndecentralization of power, is now doing just the opposite.<\/p>\n
Under Megawati, the nation has also had to face increasingly
\ndismal law enforcement. Attorney General MA Rahman, who should be
\nat the forefront of corruption eradication, is instead starting
\nto look like a key player in allowing corruption to continue,
\nbased the aforementioned KPKPN case, which has been put deep on
\nthe back burners.<\/p>\n
Bribery, or possibly extortion, allegedly involving judges
\nwith the South Jakarta District Court was again uncovered this
\nyear. As political protection may no longer be effective, the
\njudicial institution will become a target of delinquent fat cats
\nand corrupt officials trying to buy "legal certainty" to evade
\njustice and stay out of prison.<\/p>\n
In this reform period we need the political will of the
\nnational leadership -- the President, the Minister of Justice and
\nthe Supreme Court Chairman -- to conduct a judicial purge.<\/p>\n
The prosecution office needs a clean and professional attorney
\ngeneral who is also a strong and visionary figure, so as to be
\ncapable of launching an internal reform for its purge and
\nempowerment. The Supreme Court Chairman and Minister of Justice
\nhave enough legal instruments to penalize judges who are fond of
\ncommercializing their verdicts.<\/p>\n
But the opportunity, the power and the public support to put
\nour legal sector in order have come to no avail. So far only the
\njudges in the case of Manulife have been suspended by a
\npresidential decree due to indications of a dishonest decision --
\nand this only happened because of international pressure.<\/p>\n
The establishment of the Commission on Eradication of
\nCorruption Crimes (KPK) by Law No.30\/2002 with its unusual
\nauthority to substitute prosecution and police institutions that
\nfail to function, has offered new hope.<\/p>\n
Yet the eventual dissolution of KPKPN in its initial phase by
\nthe legislature, raises fears over the independence of KPK, which
\ncan also be disbanded by the DPR and the government if it begins
\nto disturb their interests.<\/p>\n
Furthermore, the combination of the KPKPN function of auditing
\npublic officials' wealth with that of the KPK is not complemented
\nby the necessary stipulations in Law No. 30\/2002; especially
\nthose on the obligation of officials to report their wealth to
\nKPK, penalties for their failure to report or for submitting
\nfalse reports, access to financial and banking institutions, and
\nthe principle of sharing the burden of proof in the process of
\nprosecution.<\/p>\n
Therefore, it is impossible to expect significant efforts from
\nthe top (the government and DPR) regarding corruption
\neradication, which should become a national commitment, at least
\nas reflected in the decrees of the People's Consultative Assembly
\n(MPR) (No.IX\/1998 and No.VIII\/2001).<\/p>\n
Even when bribes have constituted the main activity and income
\nof people's representatives, and political decisions in the
\nlegislature, budgeting and control functions have been made
\ncommodities, the House and political parties have changed into a
\nfierce corruption machine that can kill the entire system of
\ngovernment control and law enforcement.<\/p>\n
Public administration has been dominated by a "kleptocracy"
\nand corruption has become the only way to power, so that its
\nelimination is even more unthinkable. Corruption is no longer a
\ncrime of power that legally or socially bears high risks -- just
\nlavish financial and political benefits for its perpetrators.
\nToday's creed is that the bigger the abused funds, the more
\ndifficult it is to send its culprits to prison.<\/p>\n
Eradicating corruption now is nearly hopeless without any
\npolitical and economic structural change, which can only be
\nexpected from the younger generation.<\/p>\n
The experience in many countries with successful eradication
\nof systematic corruption shows the determinant factor of strong
\npolitical figures and these leaders' commitment to make their
\npeople prosper. Here, the reverse is true, where politicians are
\nthe leading actors of corruption at the expense of the nation's
\npeople.<\/p>\n
2. Pro15 -- After dictatorship
\n2 X 30<\/p>\n
After dictatorship in Iraq:
\nWhat can the world learn?<\/p>\n
Ralf Dahrendorf
\nSociologist
\nProject Syndicate
\nLondon<\/p>\n
The war in Iraq had barely begun when the minds of those who
\nconceived the invasion turned to what should happen after the
\nvictory over Saddam Hussein's regime -- a victory everyone
\nassumed to be inevitable. Politicians and experts have sought to
\ndraw comparisons with recent examples like Afghanistan, Sierra
\nLeone, East Timor, but also with more remote and fundamental
\ncases.<\/p>\n
After all, what is expected in Iraq is the fall of a highly
\nideological dictatorship. Is there anything we can learn from the
\nlast examples of this kind, from the collapse of communism in
\nEastern Europe in 1989, or the end of the Third Reich in Germany
\nin 1945 and the process of "de-Nazification" that followed?<\/p>\n
The risks of such comparisons are almost too obvious for
\nwords. Every case has its own defining features. Regarding the
\ndemise of communism, the experiences of, say, Poland and Romania
\nare profoundly different. As we cross even more profound cultural
\nboundaries, comparisons become still less relevant. Yet there are
\na few issues that are common to the unraveling of most
\nideological dictatorships.<\/p>\n
One such issue has to do with memory, and dealing with the
\npast. This is connected with a practical question: Who is in a
\nposition to build a new country on the ruins of the old regime?<\/p>\n
It is rare for a counter-elite to emerge quickly, much less
\nfor an elite-in-waiting to take over. In Germany in the 1950s,
\nthere were many complaints about old Nazis reappearing in a
\ndemocratic guise and occupying important positions. Many of us
\nfought against the apparent "restoration" of the old regime.<\/p>\n
In Eastern Europe, the old leaders initially disappeared from
\nthe scene, but not for long. Ex-communists were often
\nreincarnated politically as social democrats. Those who had been
\nin the resistance-like Vaclav Havel in Prague-found this hard to
\ntake. Yet these communist apparatchiks were not the same people
\nthey had been. Circumstances had changed and the people with
\nthem.<\/p>\n
This has a great deal to do with methods of dealing with the
\npast. Post-1945 Germany and post-1989 Poland are examples of
\ncountries that moved forward without much attention to the past.
\nIntellectuals complained that too little time and energy was
\nspent on "mastering" the past. They had good reasons to complain.<\/p>\n
Indeed, after a decade or so, the need to draw clear lines and
\ntell all, including the painful stories, became overwhelming. But
\nthe most successful postcommunist countries moved forward first
\nand coped with the past later. Those who could not lift their
\neyes from the horrors of the past made less progress.<\/p>\n
A second general issue has to do with priorities. There is a
\nnatural tendency -- especially in Anglo-Saxon countries -- to
\nregard elections as the most effective institutional remedy for
\ncountries emerging from ideological dictatorships. To be sure,
\nelections are important; but by themselves they do not solve
\nproblems. Indeed, if they disappoint, the very principles on
\nwhich they are based-democracy and civil liberties-will be
\ndiscredited.<\/p>\n
I am a strong, almost old-fashioned believer in parliamentary
\ndemocracy, but when it comes to situations like postwar Iraq, two
\nother imperatives are equally pressing. One is the need to
\nestablish an effective administration to make certain that new
\npolicies of tolerance and market economics are actually
\nimplemented. In East European countries, this was a major
\nproblem, and it is only through accession negotiations with the
\nEuropean Union that such administrative reform has been assured.<\/p>\n
The second imperative is the rule of law. The law has a
\ndifferent place in different cultures, and it presents special
\nproblems in Islamic countries. However, it is crucial that every
\neffort be made to educate and install an impartial and
\nincorruptible judiciary. Judges must not only be honest, but must
\nbe seen to be so and, as such, trusted. The process of
\nestablishing the rule of law has been difficult and has remained
\nincomplete in most post-dictatorial countries; yet it will be a
\nkey to successful recovery in Iraq as well.<\/p>\n
One of the key points emphasized in my 1990 book, Reflections
\non the Revolution in Europe, is also valid for Iraq. The road
\nfrom the collapse of a dictatorial regime backed by ideology to a
\nmore liberal order leads through a valley of tears. Things are
\nlikely to get worse before they get better.<\/p>\n
This is notably the case in economic terms. Even post-War
\nGermany's acclaimed, miracle-working Economics Minister, Ludwig
\nErhard, was deeply unpopular in the early 1950s, because it
\nappeared as if only a few were getting rich, while most West
\nGermans remained poor or got poorer.<\/p>\n
For a certain period in the process of recovery, it is simply
\nnecessary for people to keep their nerve. Poland is a recent
\nexample of a country that achieved this feat. It requires
\nplausible leadership and the reasonable hope that things will get
\nbetter before long.<\/p>\n
If this time of transition goes wrong, the alternative is
\nrenewed turmoil and the victory of fundamentalists of one kind or
\nanother. The warning "Beware of the valley of tears!" is thus the
\none that must be taken most seriously by those responsible for
\nrebuilding an Iraq scarred by the terrors of dictatorship and the
\nravages of war.<\/p>\n
The writer is a member of the British House of Lords, a former
\nRector of the London School of Economics and also a former Warden
\nof St. Anthony's College, Oxford.<\/p>",
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