Terrorism is a fact of life in Indonesia

Terrorism is a fact of life in Indonesia

Wimar Witoelar, Columnist, Guardian News Service, Jakarta,
wimar@witoelar.com

Osama bin laden's al-Qaeda network has been blamed for the
Bali bomb attacks by the United States, Australia and
surprisingly even Indonesia itself. President Bush said he
assumed the attack was the work of al-Qaeda, while Australia's
foreign minister, Alexander Downer, said it was likely the
Islamist group Jemaah Islamiyah was responsible.

We must admire the confidence of faraway world leaders in
identifying the culprits even before the investigation has
started. But then the Indonesian defense minister Matori Abdul
Djalil outdid them all by insisting the bomb blasts were "related
to al-Qaeda with the cooperation of local terrorists".

However, nobody else in government confirmed his claim. And
the National Police spokesman said the defense minister's
statement was probably based on logic, not on facts.

So perhaps we should use logic to identify other masterminds
of the Bali bomb. Never for a moment even thinking to stand in
the way of Bush's war on terrorism, I am happy for al-Qaeda to
top the list of suspects. But if we are serious about dealing
with the Bali tragedy, we must look at groups beyond Bush's
horizon.

Oct. 12, 2002 is a black day for Indonesia because Bali is the
part of Indonesia that is friendliest to outsiders. But the
bombing is not by any means the first act of terror suffered by
Indonesia. Previous incidents brought more casualties, but did
not dominate the world's news pages because the victims were
locals.

Terrorism has been an unpleasant reality for Indonesia for
decades. Gen. Soeharto's regime was based on state terrorism for
30 years. Without the free press we have now in Indonesia, and
with a world committed to the investment climate Soeharto
nurtured, the locations of murderous campaigns such as Aceh,
Lampung and Tanjung Priok never became household words. East
Timor was known mainly because of Australian involvement, now
history.

In the 1970s, Soeharto thought the communist danger required
the military and Muslim extremists to work together. This led to
the establishment of Jemaah Islamiyah, now mentioned as the local
arm of al-Qaeda. The military hardliners continued to support
radical Islamist militia off and on throughout the years, working
in networks on "special operations".

When Soeharto fell, his military hardliners had to move their
base outside the state, but their networks remained. They became
known as the "dark forces", consisting of rogue elements within
and outside the military. The May riots of 1998 demonstrated
their power, resulting in more than a thousand deaths. The
Banyuwangi killings took hundreds of lives and the ethnic
conflict in Kalimantan produced gruesome deaths. The conflict in
Ambon took many hundreds of lives. As the only victims were
Indonesians and al-Qaeda was not headline stuff then, the world
looked away. But the terror went on, always aimed at
destabilizing the nation.

Then came the Bali bomb, a year after the U.S. war on terror
began to highlight every event in the light of U.S. suspicion of
al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda elements are probably involved in one way or
another. Terror thrives on publicity, and the media is providing
15 minutes of fame to every terrorist group. Bush has made al-
Qaeda a world brand. It makes it easy for them to franchise
terror worldwide as McDonald's franchises Big Macs. But in
Indonesia, local terrorists are more significant than the
international brand-holders. They have the motive to discredit
the effort to democratize and make people long for a return of a
Soeharto-type regime.

The burden now rests firmly on the Megawati government to be
tough on terrorism. The problem is that the government has been
soft not only on terrorism but also in other areas, such as law
enforcement and corruption. A convicted criminal continues to
head the parliament.

Military hotheads not only shoot dissenters, but also attack
the police. Privatization fuels corruption. A messy state is
sliding into a failed state.

The world thinks President Megawati hesitates in acting
against terrorism to maintain a balance with Muslim political
groups. This does not make sense, because the major Muslim groups
are opposed to terrorism. In fact, the Bali disaster ironically
provides an opportunity for the government to gain legitimacy by
acting against terror.

For that she will have the support not only of Bush (as long
as she looks for al-Qaeda), but most Indonesians, as long as she
uses the momentum to get rid of violence and corruption. Bush can
then go on to the next terrorist haven and Indonesians can try to
put back together the pieces of our nation.