Territorial structure, functions and role of TNI
Territorial structure, functions and role of TNI
Kusnanto Anggoro, Jakarta
There are quite a few positive sides to the territorial
structure of the Indonesian Military (TNI), as ID Nugroho and
Netty Dharma Somba wrote in this newspaper on Aug. 6.
True, on the positive side, an example can be made of how the
presence of the TNI throughout the country can contribute
positively to the lives of locals. One should not dispute that
besides monitoring borders with neighboring countries, TNI
personnel may be tasked with providing health services, teaching
and other services for local residents.
Nevertheless, it should be clear from the very beginning that
the primary role of the military can only be for waging war, in
which the military may fulfill combat, intelligence or
territorial responsibilities.
The last two are meant only to strengthen the combat
capability of the military. The territorial function, in this
regard, has little to do with the community, other than, perhaps,
providing military training to reservists.
The positive sides of the territorial structure that Nugroho
and Netty identified are part of the secondary role of the
military. These roles include stability operations, humanitarian
assistance, search and rescue, and other services to the
community.
None of these strengthen the combat capability of the military
and, more importantly, fall into the category of support to
civilian government.
It is important to note that territorial structure must not be
confused with territorial functions. The territorial structure
relates to modes of force deployment, command organization and
logistical support that enables the TNI to perform its military
tasks, such as successful military operations.
The military regional command is just one of the possible
structures in defending state territory and sovereignty as well
as safeguarding the nation.
Geographic realities, threat assessment and technology are
factors that must be taken into account in designing the nerve
and bone of future territorial structure.
Meanwhile, territorial functions relate to the preparation and
use of national wealth as defense resources and, in the end, of
course, military assets (such as soldiers, weaponry and
logistics).
One cannot have a successful military operation without the
support of good roads, airports and sea ports and patriotic
citizens. However, the military institutions should have no
direct control over any of these.
It is the role of civilian institutions to transform a
reasonable part of national resources into defense resources, and
finally into military resources. In this context, the Department
of Defense should decide how much, when, and where defense
resources be developed from national resources.
The role of the armed forces in this context is limited to
making recommendations to the minister of defense on required
capability.
The territorial function, as we know it today, has less to do
with territorial structure. The military will still be able to
conduct its secondary role, even if the government opts to
transform the existing territorial command into a different
(territorial) structure.
At the same time, an abusive territorial function of the
military may still prevail unless we have clear regulations on
how, when and where to use the military.
As I mentioned in a discourse (The Jakarta Post Aug. 6), the
TNI bill provides no significant foundation to develop a
professional armed force.
The absence of a strategic defense review, lack of authority
for the defense ministry and a rigid orthodoxy in the current
military leadership may even hamper enhancement of the military's
competence.
As a legal instrument, the bill fails to clarify the
unresolved complexity that emerges from MPR Decree No. VII/2000
and the defense bill.
More importantly, formulations of "territorial functions" as a
role of the armed forces stem from an erroneous conception.
Article 8, for example, considers such a function a distinct
task, alongside military operations for war and military
operations other than war.
The article reflects not only a misconception about the
primary and secondary roles, but also mixes up the roles and
tasks of the military.
It is just like a journalist saying that his role is
reporting, writing and interviewing.
The "territorial function" should be part of either
"operations for war" or "other than war". Within the context of
"operation for war", the territorial function could be derived
into more specific tasks and there is a possibility for the
military to use local potential to strengthen its combat and
intelligence capability.
Nevertheless, this "military-related territorial function"
would still require authorization from the government.
Within the context of military operations "other than war",
tasks of the military may include fighting armed insurgencies and
separatists, combating terrorism, rescuing noncombatants from war
zones, supporting civilian agencies in the "war on drugs,"
rendering humanitarian assistance, as well as disaster relief,
peacekeeping operations and a myriad other tasks.
The essence of this is that support relates to "nonmilitary-
related" territorial function. The problem is that there is no
clue what the bill means by "territorial function".
Other regulations do not help. MPR Decree No. VI/2000 (Article
4) and the Defense Act 2002 (Article 10C) includes civic mission,
support to the police forces and civilian government, search and
rescue and humanitarian assistance.
These are erroneous classifications. It would be a lot simpler
to define it either as a supporting task for stability,
humanitarian and welfare objectives; or for civilian government,
police and community; or other more clearly defined categories.
In such an erroneous category, the use of "civic mission" may
remind people of a meddling role of the military in the everyday
lives of the people.
Indeed, the bill does acknowledge that the military can engage
in territorial functions on the call of civilian institutions.
Unfortunately, the regulations are insufficient to place this
function under democratic civilian control. Relations between
military institutions and civilian institutions, including the
police forces, remain problematic. Basically, the military
retains its privilege and remains independent of democratic
control.
In any event, the secondary role of the military must not
undermine the capacity of either the civilian or military
institutions. It should not contradict democracy and security.
The military argues that civilians should no longer worry
about the military's involvement in politics. Nevertheless,
disciplinary measures remain a serious problem in the military.
One must be cautious in transforming the territorial command.
We may not be able to do so unless the government is prepared to
allocate more to defense.
Nevertheless, we can abolish the territorial function without
much damage to the operational capability of the military. With
better planning, abolishing the territorial function would
improve force structure.
Part of the routine budget could be reallocated to development
and maintenance and/or be redistributed within the routine budget
to provide a better salary for soldiers.
The writer is a senior researcher at the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies and a lecturer in the postgraduate studies
program, University of Indonesia, Jakarta. The suggestions and
thoughts of Ponny Retno Astuti on this article are greatly
appreciated.