Susilo's fate: Big win or slim defeat

Susilo's fate: Big win or slim defeat

Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, Jakarta

If the presidential election had been held in mid-April, few
would have bet against Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono sweeping toward
victory. In fact, in recent times even, his chances of winning
over the incumbent were still high. But, since the highs of
April, Susilo's popularity has sunk faster than a man in
quicksand.

Two separate surveys from the Indonesian Survey Institute
(LSI) and the International Foundation for Election Systems
(IFES), for example, found, in early-mid August, 60 percent of
respondents opted for the challenger. However, the most
noteworthy finding is not Susilo's lead over Megawati -- who's
support level is only half of Susilo's -- but the fact that the
margin between the two is steadily narrowing.

It is, therefore, perplexing to see the lackluster performance
and seeming aloofness of the Susilo-Jusuf Kalla campaign team in
influencing public perception in this critical period. Their
counterparts in the Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi camp are making all
the right moves. A public-relations blitz has progressively
improved Megawati's image, while at the same time, political
empathy for Susilo has petered off. The formation of a coalition
also guarantees Megawati greater support.

Data from opinion polls supports the trend: the incumbent is
getting stronger, while the challenger gets weaker. A comparison
of data from surveys conducted a month earlier show the gap
narrowing to between 8 to 14 percent. If the trend continues, by
next week Susilo would have lost between 16 to 28 percentage
points in the last two months.

The first round of the election showed us that voter behavior
is extremely malleable. There were sizable shifts in the final
week before the election, with late deciders playing a crucial
role. This tells us that public-relations campaigns, whether
overt or veiled, have the capacity to sway voters in an election
where platforms don't really matter.

In an attempt to make sense of the progress -- or lack thereof
-- of the Susilo camp, we can deduce that they may suffer the
same syndrome that affected the Indonesian Democratic Party of
Struggle (PDI-P) prior to the April 5 legislative election: Over
confidence.

But the significant "defeat" the PDI-P endured was probably
the best thing that could have happened, in terms of Megawati's
presidential bid. It opened their eyes and forced them to
reexamine their campaign approach. As someone who has built a
reputation, over the last two years, of being a woman of little
action, Megawati is now out to grab voters' attention with all
means at her disposal. Susilo's camp, on the other hand, seems
lulled by a false sense of security generated by the palpable
margin as they depart from a higher political vantage point.

There is also a question mark hanging over the talents of
Susilo's camp in exploiting the opportunities available to them.
In the past three months, they have not acquitted themselves
well. Their organizational performance has been below par, with
little initiative or political shrewdness to consistently keep
Susilo's bid in the radar of mainstream voters. They have
probably lost votes, rather than won them in the last three
months.

Such is the restricted reach of Susilo's campaign network that
they are unlikely to be able to organize enough volunteers to
oversee the some 500,000 voting stations across the country.

The Democratic Party -- of which Susilo is the leader -- is,
by and large, detached from any real grassroots network. Its
senior members are comprised primarily of elderly former People's
Consultative Assembly (MPR) members, who are passim in terms of
political cunning. Susilo himself has been coy in delegating
authority to initiate campaign strategies. The situation is only
aggravated further by news from sources within Susilo's camp that
depleting campaign coffers have increasingly restricted their
movements.

One aspect, which could be a decisive factor in the next two
weeks, is the power of the Indonesian Military (TNI). The TNI
could, once again, call on members of its greater family, that
expansive "unofficial" network, to solicit support for the
challenger. The TNI's "greater family" is not an official
endorsement of the active TNI structure, but comprises retired
officers, dependents, associates and the kith and kin of military
personnel spread across the archipelago.

They were a major force behind the Democratic Party's success
in the April election. Less so in the first round of the
presidential election, because more than one former military man
was nominated. The runoff can be regarded as a case of the
military vs the police, with the latter firmly on Megawati's
side. It is this "underground" network that Susilo's camp will be
counting on to offset the door-to-door campaigning of the PDI-
P/Golkar.

This combination of sheer popularity and the informal TNI
network are pillars of Susilo's bid come Sept. 20. It is
certainly sufficient backing for a big victory, if the electorate
does not shift significantly in the next fortnight. But it bodes
ominously if, as the trend indicates, the margin between the
incumbent and challenger closes by another 8 to 14 percentage
points by mid-September.

A close race would be favorable for the incumbent, given the
PDI-P's and Golkar's control of regional infrastructure. It is
not impossible, given this situation, that a close tally could
end up swaying in the incumbent's favor.

That is why, if a large margin of victory is not assured, it
is imperative for the Susilo-Kalla camp to ensure the swift
counting of votes, immediate verification and the announcement of
exit polls within 24 hours of the polls closing. Failure to do
so, and over-dependence on the existing election infrastructure,
could ultimately result in a slim defeat.

The author is a staff writer of The Jakarta Post.