Susilo's fate: Big win or slim defeat

Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, Jakarta

If the presidential election had been held in mid-April, few would have bet against Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono sweeping toward victory. In fact, in recent times even, his chances of winning over the incumbent were still high. But, since the highs of April, Susilo's popularity has sunk faster than a man in quicksand.

Two separate surveys from the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) and the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), for example, found, in early-mid August, 60 percent of respondents opted for the challenger. However, the most noteworthy finding is not Susilo's lead over Megawati -- who's support level is only half of Susilo's -- but the fact that the margin between the two is steadily narrowing.

It is, therefore, perplexing to see the lackluster performance and seeming aloofness of the Susilo-Jusuf Kalla campaign team in influencing public perception in this critical period. Their counterparts in the Megawati-Hasyim Muzadi camp are making all the right moves. A public-relations blitz has progressively improved Megawati's image, while at the same time, political empathy for Susilo has petered off. The formation of a coalition also guarantees Megawati greater support.

Data from opinion polls supports the trend: the incumbent is getting stronger, while the challenger gets weaker. A comparison of data from surveys conducted a month earlier show the gap narrowing to between 8 to 14 percent. If the trend continues, by next week Susilo would have lost between 16 to 28 percentage points in the last two months.

The first round of the election showed us that voter behavior is extremely malleable. There were sizable shifts in the final week before the election, with late deciders playing a crucial role. This tells us that public-relations campaigns, whether overt or veiled, have the capacity to sway voters in an election where platforms don't really matter.

In an attempt to make sense of the progress -- or lack thereof -- of the Susilo camp, we can deduce that they may suffer the same syndrome that affected the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P) prior to the April 5 legislative election: Over confidence.

But the significant "defeat" the PDI-P endured was probably the best thing that could have happened, in terms of Megawati's presidential bid. It opened their eyes and forced them to reexamine their campaign approach. As someone who has built a reputation, over the last two years, of being a woman of little action, Megawati is now out to grab voters' attention with all means at her disposal. Susilo's camp, on the other hand, seems lulled by a false sense of security generated by the palpable margin as they depart from a higher political vantage point.

There is also a question mark hanging over the talents of Susilo's camp in exploiting the opportunities available to them. In the past three months, they have not acquitted themselves well. Their organizational performance has been below par, with little initiative or political shrewdness to consistently keep Susilo's bid in the radar of mainstream voters. They have probably lost votes, rather than won them in the last three months.

Such is the restricted reach of Susilo's campaign network that they are unlikely to be able to organize enough volunteers to oversee the some 500,000 voting stations across the country.

The Democratic Party -- of which Susilo is the leader -- is, by and large, detached from any real grassroots network. Its senior members are comprised primarily of elderly former People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) members, who are passim in terms of political cunning. Susilo himself has been coy in delegating authority to initiate campaign strategies. The situation is only aggravated further by news from sources within Susilo's camp that depleting campaign coffers have increasingly restricted their movements.

One aspect, which could be a decisive factor in the next two weeks, is the power of the Indonesian Military (TNI). The TNI could, once again, call on members of its greater family, that expansive "unofficial" network, to solicit support for the challenger. The TNI's "greater family" is not an official endorsement of the active TNI structure, but comprises retired officers, dependents, associates and the kith and kin of military personnel spread across the archipelago.

They were a major force behind the Democratic Party's success in the April election. Less so in the first round of the presidential election, because more than one former military man was nominated. The runoff can be regarded as a case of the military vs the police, with the latter firmly on Megawati's side. It is this "underground" network that Susilo's camp will be counting on to offset the door-to-door campaigning of the PDI- P/Golkar.

This combination of sheer popularity and the informal TNI network are pillars of Susilo's bid come Sept. 20. It is certainly sufficient backing for a big victory, if the electorate does not shift significantly in the next fortnight. But it bodes ominously if, as the trend indicates, the margin between the incumbent and challenger closes by another 8 to 14 percentage points by mid-September.

A close race would be favorable for the incumbent, given the PDI-P's and Golkar's control of regional infrastructure. It is not impossible, given this situation, that a close tally could end up swaying in the incumbent's favor.

That is why, if a large margin of victory is not assured, it is imperative for the Susilo-Kalla camp to ensure the swift counting of votes, immediate verification and the announcement of exit polls within 24 hours of the polls closing. Failure to do so, and over-dependence on the existing election infrastructure, could ultimately result in a slim defeat.

The author is a staff writer of The Jakarta Post.