Stalled Diplomacy: What Are the Next Steps?
The latest developments in the Iran-US-Israel conflict indicate that this war has yet to reach a clear endpoint. Ongoing diplomatic efforts in Islamabad proceed alongside unrelenting military dynamics.
The option of escalation remains open, either through increased military pressure from the US or asymmetric responses from Iran. In this context, what is occurring is not a shift towards peace, but rather a phase where military pressure and political negotiations occur simultaneously, without firm directional certainty.
Direct negotiations between Washington and Tehran—the first high-level contacts in decades—continue, but in a highly difficult atmosphere. Positional differences remain sharp, especially regarding nuclear issues, sanctions, and arrangements for the Strait of Hormuz. Even after dozens of hours of talks, the two sides have failed to bridge these fundamental gaps, although each still leaves room for continued dialogue.
Behind this ongoing diplomatic process, the demands of both parties explain why compromise is so difficult. The US demands firm commitments from Iran to halt nuclear weapons development. In response, Tehran demands the lifting of sanctions, war compensation, the release of frozen assets, recognition of its right to uranium enrichment, and maintenance of its missile programme. Iran also asserts its strategic position in the Strait of Hormuz, including potential traffic regulation and transit fees. This combination of demands makes the negotiating space extremely narrow.
The Pakistan-mediated ceasefire from the outset resembles more of a “pause without a solution.” In the field, violations continue: attacks in Lebanon persist, threats to the Strait of Hormuz do not subside, and each side interprets the agreement differently. In other words, this is not peace, but a delay of escalation.
In this context, analysis from The Economist (11–17 April 2026 edition) is highly relevant. The magazine describes this conflict as a foolish war—a war that tactically demonstrates strength but fails strategically. Iran has indeed suffered significant damage, but the regime remains intact and its core capacity has not been eliminated. In other words, the war’s primary objectives have not been achieved.
This situation is also reflected in the briefing section of the same magazine, which assesses that there is no clear winner in this conflict. The US and Israel demonstrate military superiority, but have not been able to convert it into definitive political outcomes. Iran, though weakened, retains the ability to endure and even create new pressures, particularly through threats to the Strait of Hormuz.
This is precisely where the strategic paradox emerges. Rather than decisively weakening Iran, this war gives Tehran new leverage over the global energy system. The ability to disrupt vital routes like the Strait of Hormuz keeps Iran relevant in global calculations, even under pressure. The impact is already felt in energy price volatility and global market uncertainty.
On the other hand, Gulf states are beginning to question the reliability of the US as a security guarantor. If this war was intended to strengthen deterrence, the result is ambiguous. Trust is not fully restored, and space for alternative approaches is opening up—whether in the form of self-reliance or accommodation, or a combination of both.
Self-reliance refers to efforts by Gulf states to strengthen their own defences, while accommodation denotes a more pragmatic approach to easing tensions with Iran. These options show that the war’s strategic effects could potentially backfire.
Another equally important dimension is the erosion of legitimacy. Harsh rhetoric and dominant use of force have eroded America’s moral authority. As The Economist reminds us, US power has historically rested on a combination of military capacity and global legitimacy. When one weakens, overall effectiveness is affected.
This war also reveals the limits of the “might is right” approach. Military power can create pressure, but does not automatically produce political solutions. In Iran’s case, such pressure could even strengthen incentives to maintain—or even accelerate—nuclear options as a deterrence tool (Waltz, 1981; Jervis, 1978).
In conditions where negotiations continue amid uncertainty, several future possibilities remain open, though all are tentative. First, talks could continue without quick breakthroughs. In many cases, negotiations amid conflict require a long time because each side seeks to improve its bargaining position before making concessions (Zartman, 2001).
Second, there is the possibility of coercive bargaining, where limited military pressure is used to influence the negotiations. In this scenario, minor escalations could occur not to win the war, but to strengthen positions at the negotiating table (Schelling, 1966; Fearon, 1995).
Third, the conflict could evolve into a prolonged low-intensity confrontation. This pattern combines ongoing negotiations with parallel military and economic pressures, as often seen in modern conflicts that do not yield decisive victories (Freedman, 2013; Kaldor, 2012).
Fourth, there is always the possibility of diplomatic failure leading to renewed escalation. However, in the current context, all parties seem aware that full escalation would bring far greater costs, both economically and politically.
Thus, the direction of the current conflict is no longer determined s