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Spratly dispute needs democratic settlement (2)

Spratly dispute needs democratic settlement (2)

The following article is based on a paper presented at the annual meeting of the Southeast Asian Program on Ocean Law (SEAPOL) in Bangkok on Dec. 13, 1994 by Dr. Hasyim Djalal. This is the second of two articles.

JAKARTA (JP): To Indonesia, peace, stability and cooperation in the South China Sea is important for its development. Indonesia has just begun its second long term development program for the next twenty five years. To achieve this, in addition to the requirement of domestic stability, Indonesia has also to develop an atmosphere of peace, stability and cooperation in its surroundings. The South China Sea is one of the areas in which that peace and stability could be endangered.

When taking the initiative to launch the South China Sea workshop, I actually wanted to advance the workshop process through a two-pronged approach. First, by seeking areas where cooperation involving all the South China Sea countries or participants could be developed, and secondly, by seeking ways to prevent potential conflicts in the area from developing into armed conflicts and, if possible, to try to create through confidence-building measures an atmosphere that is conducive to the solution of the conflicting claims. Indonesia did not intend to solve the problems or mediate in solving them. We have not been asked to do so by any one. All that it tries to do is to develop a conducive atmosphere that would facilitate the possible solution of the conflicts.

The second workshop took place in Bandung in 1991. The workshop laid the foundation for the second prong of the approach, namely to agree on non-use of force in settling the dispute and the commitment to solve the potential disputes by peaceful means and negotiation. That was an important document which was later developed into as ASEAN Declaration in Manila in 1992, and was later welcomed and endorsed by the countries around the South China Sea as well as by the non-South China Sea states, particularly the United States, Japan, Australia and the European Union.

With regard to the first prong, namely developing areas for cooperation, Indonesia attempted to identify the possible areas of cooperation in various fields, particularly in:

a. Shipping, navigation and communication

b. Environmental, ecology and scientific research

c. Management of the resources.

Political and security issues as well as territorial and jurisdictional matters and institutional mechanism for cooperation were also discussed. Spratly and Paracel issues were discussed in a cooperative way and every effort was made to prevent the discussion on the Spratly and Paracel issues from entering into the determination of the legality of the claims themselves since these would create more confrontation than cooperation, at least for this stage. In fact, as it later turned out, the participation from China and Taiwan did not quite like to have this topic at all.

The third workshop in Yogyakarta in 1992 began to identify a number of potential areas for cooperation in various fields. The discussion had entered specifics and there was agreement already that some Technical Working Groups would have to be organized in order to study the various proposals more closely and identify what concrete project proposals could be drafted in which all South China Sea Workshop participants could be involved. Two groups were established, namely on Resources Assessment and Ways of Development and on Marine Scientific Research. The first group on resources assessment and ways of development was convened in Jakarta in July 1993 and studied the possibility for cooperation in four areas, namely in fisheries, hydrocarbon, non-hydrocarbon and non-mineral resources. To further coordinate activities the groups have appointed three coordinators, namely the participants from Thailand on fisheries, including the study on the stock assessment in the South China Sea, the participant from Vietnam on the non-living, non-hydrocarbon resources, and the participant from Indonesia on the hydrocarbon resources. All three coordinators would cooperate with the respective focal points that would be appointed in each participating country. The groups also recommended investigation of the feasibility for setting up a marine reserve or marine park in an area to be defined within the multiple claims area, namely in the Spratly Islands group.

The group on Marine Scientific Research has met three times: In Manila, Surabaya and Singapore. It has suggested three areas for cooperation, namely on the study of biodiversity, on sea level and tide monitoring, and on data base, information exchange and net-working. The group also requested three countries to take the lead in preparing the relevant papers on the topics, namely China for data base, Indonesia for sea level and Vietnam for biodiversity. In Singapore, the group has been able to finalize a project proposal dealing with biodiversity studies and is continuing to finalize the project proposals for the other two subjects, namely on data base, information exchange and net working, and on the sea level and tide monitoring.

The fourth workshop in Surabaya in 1993 discussed some of these project proposals as suggested by the group. The workshop also continued discussions on other topics, including the Spratlys and the Paracels. The Surabaya workshop decided to invite participants from Kampuchea, and that "non-South China Sea states and other regional or global organization would also be invited, as necessary, to be involved and to participate in the realization of specific projects of cooperation." The workshop also decided to convene a special group on the protection of the marine environment. This group met in Hangzhou, China, on Oct. 6-8, 1994 and has also formulated some suggestions for cooperation in the environmental area. The Surabaya workshop also considered the possibility of holding a separate group on safety of navigation, shipping and communication. The workshop is still seeking ways on how best to convene this important group. The Surabaya workshop also discussed the possibility of holding a group meeting on legal matters, and asked the participant from Thailand to host it.

The fifth workshop was held in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, on Oct. 26-28, 1994. While continuing discussion on the various topics relating to the South China Sea, including the Spratly issues, the workshop approved, for the first time, a specific collaborative study on biodiversity in the South China Sea and authorized me as the organizer to sound out non-South China Sea states and organizations to contribute to such a study, by extending scientific and technical assistance, experts or financial contributions. The project proposal is now being conveyed to various potential donors. The Bukittinggi Workshop also authorized the convening of the fourth group on Marine Scientific Research in Vietnam in 1995 in order to finalize the other two project proposals, namely on data base, information exchange and net-working, and on sea level and tide monitoring. The Workshop also authorized the convening of the group on legal matters in Thailand in 1995.

With regard to the second prong, namely to seek ways to avoid potential conflicts, for the first time the Bukittinggi workshop discussed confidence building measures within the context of the Spratly and Paracel issues. There are a number of confidence building measures that had been identified in previous workshops which could be attempted in the South China Sea area. In fact, the agreement to cooperate on specific fields, such as on the study of biodiversity, sea level and tide monitoring and others, is regarded by some as already a significant confidence building measure in itself. Therefore, while other participants are quite willing to discuss specific confidence building measures within the context of tension reduction and conflict prevention, there are also others who opposed such discussion. The Bukittinggi workshop, however, began to discuss one specific measure, namely the "non-expansion of existing military presence in the area". The discussion was lively, but productive.

With regard to the prospect for settlement, I have a feeling that there is a good and strong and political will to cooperate actively in less contentious areas for mutual benefit, such as specific cooperation to study biodiversity, sea level and tide monitoring, resources assessment, data base, information exchange and net-working, and even the effort to promote safety of navigation, shipping and communication. This is the first prong of the approach to manage the potential conflicts within the context of promoting "preventive diplomacy". Many observers would consider this willingness to cooperate as peripheral to the central issue, namely solving the Spratly Islands dispute. It may be so. But I think these efforts are important as confidence building measures, no matter how small or insignificant they may seem to be. We have to remember that South China Sea states do not have much experience in cooperating, but they have had plenty of experience in confronting each other, either among the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries themselves, or between ASEAN members vis-a-vis Indochina and China, and perhaps more significantly between Southeast Asia and China itself. Even within ASEAN, after more than twenty five years since its establishment, we still have plenty of territorial and jurisdictional issues, although we are fortunate to have had the opportunity to develop this important sense of "ASEAN way, solidarity and cohesiveness". It was only within the last three or four years that friendly and good relations have been happily developing between ASEAN and China. In fact, relations between China and Vietnam still need a lot of fostering. I believe that we need patience in this endeavor. There is no alternative. The consequences for the region would be a lot worse if we did not take appropriate measures or if we took a confrontational policy toward each other. I feel that our biggest enemy is impatience and the desire to achieve quick results.

There has been a lot of talk recently on the possibility of creating a joint development zone or a zone of cooperation in the South China Sea and to achieve this, some claimants have even declared their willingness to shelve the sovereignty issue for a while in favor of joint development. China has talked about this all the time. Others also seem to respond positively to the idea. But when we scrutinize the concept and the willingness more thoroughly, then we encounter many difficulties, primarily because each one of us has a different meaning of the concept. In my view, the notion of joint development is a good one but there are many aspects that need to be clearly defined and agreed upon with regard to this concept. First, we have to agree "where" the concept shall be applied, namely the geographical definition of the cooperative zone. Second, we have to agree on "what" subjects the joint cooperation shall involve, namely whether it should be for fisheries, oil and gas, marine scientific research, environmental protection, and others or a mixture of all these. Third, we have to identify and agree on the "participants" in such a joint development zone or zone of cooperation. Fourth, we also have a agree on the "modalities" and the "institutional mechanisms" for such cooperation. There are many problems that need to be discussed. All these will need time and patience. Indonesia and Australia needed more than ten years to devise and establish a bilateral zone of cooperation in the Timor Sea. Certainly we would need more time to deal with this multilateral issue in the South China Sea.

I personally have undertaken a study on a possible area or zone that could be designated as the joint development zone. Understandably my suggestion encountered various reactions and therefore should be treated with a lot of caution. A lot of informal dialogs and consultations would have to be undertaken on this topic. There may also be plenty of other suggestions which are being studied and which, I am sure, at appropriate time, may come to the surface.

With regard to the prospects for the second prong, namely reduction of tension and developing confidence building measures in the Spratly, the outlook is more bleak. Mutual suspicion still lingers on. At the same time, the need by claimants to do something to reaffirm their claims, as well as to develop the resources unilaterally for their particular national interests, is getting stronger by the day. Sometimes I feel that the efforts to promote cooperation and to contain and reduce tension appear to be moving a lot slower than the national efforts of building up capabilities and posturings, which in the end may increase rather than reduce tension. It is therefore essential for every participant and for every country in the south China Sea area to devote more efforts and attention to helping develop confidence building measures and eliminate potential tension in the area.

In conclusion, let me state that the prospect for the solution of the territorial sovereignty issues in the disputed Spratly Islands group is not very bright within the near future, but there are a good number of measures that could be undertaken to contain the disputes and to convert them to he potential areas for cooperation. I believe that every potential conflict contains in itself elements potential cooperation. It is for us to find them out, and to develop them into actual cooperation. Hopefully in the long run the Spratly Islands dispute will not erupt again into armed conflagration that could engulf the region as a whole, thus diverting us from the path of economic and social development. Let us all work in the direction of cooperation and away from confrontation.

Dr. Hasyim Djalal is an Ambassador at Large for the Law of the Sea and is also the initiator of the South China Sea workshop. The views expressed in this paper are personal.

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