Spratly dispute needs democratic settlement (2)<\/p>\n
The following article is based on a paper presented at the
\nannual meeting of the Southeast Asian Program on Ocean Law
\n(SEAPOL) in Bangkok on Dec. 13, 1994 by Dr. Hasyim Djalal. This
\nis the second of two articles.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): To Indonesia, peace, stability and cooperation
\nin the South China Sea is important for its development.
\nIndonesia has just begun its second long term development program
\nfor the next twenty five years. To achieve this, in addition to
\nthe requirement of domestic stability, Indonesia has also to
\ndevelop an atmosphere of peace, stability and cooperation in its
\nsurroundings. The South China Sea is one of the areas in which
\nthat peace and stability could be endangered.<\/p>\n
When taking the initiative to launch the South China Sea
\nworkshop, I actually wanted to advance the workshop process
\nthrough a two-pronged approach. First, by seeking areas where
\ncooperation involving all the South China Sea countries or
\nparticipants could be developed, and secondly, by seeking ways to
\nprevent potential conflicts in the area from developing into
\narmed conflicts and, if possible, to try to create through
\nconfidence-building measures an atmosphere that is conducive to
\nthe solution of the conflicting claims. Indonesia did not intend
\nto solve the problems or mediate in solving them. We have not
\nbeen asked to do so by any one. All that it tries to do is to
\ndevelop a conducive atmosphere that would facilitate the possible
\nsolution of the conflicts.<\/p>\n
The second workshop took place in Bandung in 1991. The
\nworkshop laid the foundation for the second prong of the
\napproach, namely to agree on non-use of force in settling the
\ndispute and the commitment to solve the potential disputes by
\npeaceful means and negotiation. That was an important document
\nwhich was later developed into as ASEAN Declaration in Manila in
\n1992, and was later welcomed and endorsed by the countries around
\nthe South China Sea as well as by the non-South China Sea states,
\nparticularly the United States, Japan, Australia and the European
\nUnion.<\/p>\n
With regard to the first prong, namely developing areas for
\ncooperation, Indonesia attempted to identify the possible areas
\nof cooperation in various fields, particularly in:<\/p>\n
a. Shipping, navigation and communication<\/p>\n
b. Environmental, ecology and scientific research<\/p>\n
c. Management of the resources.<\/p>\n
Political and security issues as well as territorial and
\njurisdictional matters and institutional mechanism for
\ncooperation were also discussed. Spratly and Paracel issues were
\ndiscussed in a cooperative way and every effort was made to
\nprevent the discussion on the Spratly and Paracel issues from
\nentering into the determination of the legality of the claims
\nthemselves since these would create more confrontation than
\ncooperation, at least for this stage. In fact, as it later turned
\nout, the participation from China and Taiwan did not quite like
\nto have this topic at all.<\/p>\n
The third workshop in Yogyakarta in 1992 began to identify a
\nnumber of potential areas for cooperation in various fields. The
\ndiscussion had entered specifics and there was agreement already
\nthat some Technical Working Groups would have to be organized in
\norder to study the various proposals more closely and identify
\nwhat concrete project proposals could be drafted in which all
\nSouth China Sea Workshop participants could be involved. Two
\ngroups were established, namely on Resources Assessment and Ways
\nof Development and on Marine Scientific Research. The first group
\non resources assessment and ways of development was convened in
\nJakarta in July 1993 and studied the possibility for cooperation
\nin four areas, namely in fisheries, hydrocarbon, non-hydrocarbon
\nand non-mineral resources. To further coordinate activities the
\ngroups have appointed three coordinators, namely the participants
\nfrom Thailand on fisheries, including the study on the stock
\nassessment in the South China Sea, the participant from Vietnam
\non the non-living, non-hydrocarbon resources, and the participant
\nfrom Indonesia on the hydrocarbon resources. All three
\ncoordinators would cooperate with the respective focal points
\nthat would be appointed in each participating country. The groups
\nalso recommended investigation of the feasibility for setting up
\na marine reserve or marine park in an area to be defined within
\nthe multiple claims area, namely in the Spratly Islands group.<\/p>\n
The group on Marine Scientific Research has met three times:
\nIn Manila, Surabaya and Singapore. It has suggested three areas
\nfor cooperation, namely on the study of biodiversity, on sea
\nlevel and tide monitoring, and on data base, information exchange
\nand net-working. The group also requested three countries to take
\nthe lead in preparing the relevant papers on the topics, namely
\nChina for data base, Indonesia for sea level and Vietnam for
\nbiodiversity. In Singapore, the group has been able to finalize a
\nproject proposal dealing with biodiversity studies and is
\ncontinuing to finalize the project proposals for the other two
\nsubjects, namely on data base, information exchange and net
\nworking, and on the sea level and tide monitoring.<\/p>\n
The fourth workshop in Surabaya in 1993 discussed some of
\nthese project proposals as suggested by the group. The workshop
\nalso continued discussions on other topics, including the
\nSpratlys and the Paracels. The Surabaya workshop decided to
\ninvite participants from Kampuchea, and that "non-South China Sea
\nstates and other regional or global organization would also be
\ninvited, as necessary, to be involved and to participate in the
\nrealization of specific projects of cooperation." The workshop
\nalso decided to convene a special group on the protection of the
\nmarine environment. This group met in Hangzhou, China, on Oct.
\n6-8, 1994 and has also formulated some suggestions for
\ncooperation in the environmental area. The Surabaya workshop also
\nconsidered the possibility of holding a separate group on safety
\nof navigation, shipping and communication. The workshop is still
\nseeking ways on how best to convene this important group. The
\nSurabaya workshop also discussed the possibility of holding a
\ngroup meeting on legal matters, and asked the participant from
\nThailand to host it.<\/p>\n
The fifth workshop was held in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, on
\nOct. 26-28, 1994. While continuing discussion on the various
\ntopics relating to the South China Sea, including the Spratly
\nissues, the workshop approved, for the first time, a specific
\ncollaborative study on biodiversity in the South China Sea and
\nauthorized me as the organizer to sound out non-South China Sea
\nstates and organizations to contribute to such a study, by
\nextending scientific and technical assistance, experts or
\nfinancial contributions. The project proposal is now being
\nconveyed to various potential donors. The Bukittinggi Workshop
\nalso authorized the convening of the fourth group on Marine
\nScientific Research in Vietnam in 1995 in order to finalize the
\nother two project proposals, namely on data base, information
\nexchange and net-working, and on sea level and tide monitoring.
\nThe Workshop also authorized the convening of the group on legal
\nmatters in Thailand in 1995.<\/p>\n
With regard to the second prong, namely to seek ways to avoid
\npotential conflicts, for the first time the Bukittinggi workshop
\ndiscussed confidence building measures within the context of the
\nSpratly and Paracel issues. There are a number of confidence
\nbuilding measures that had been identified in previous workshops
\nwhich could be attempted in the South China Sea area. In fact,
\nthe agreement to cooperate on specific fields, such as on the
\nstudy of biodiversity, sea level and tide monitoring and others,
\nis regarded by some as already a significant confidence building
\nmeasure in itself. Therefore, while other participants are quite
\nwilling to discuss specific confidence building measures within
\nthe context of tension reduction and conflict prevention, there
\nare also others who opposed such discussion. The Bukittinggi
\nworkshop, however, began to discuss one specific measure, namely
\nthe "non-expansion of existing military presence in the area".
\nThe discussion was lively, but productive.<\/p>\n
With regard to the prospect for settlement, I have a feeling
\nthat there is a good and strong and political will to cooperate
\nactively in less contentious areas for mutual benefit, such as
\nspecific cooperation to study biodiversity, sea level and tide
\nmonitoring, resources assessment, data base, information exchange
\nand net-working, and even the effort to promote safety of
\nnavigation, shipping and communication. This is the first prong
\nof the approach to manage the potential conflicts within the
\ncontext of promoting "preventive diplomacy". Many observers would
\nconsider this willingness to cooperate as peripheral to the
\ncentral issue, namely solving the Spratly Islands dispute. It may
\nbe so. But I think these efforts are important as confidence
\nbuilding measures, no matter how small or insignificant they may
\nseem to be. We have to remember that South China Sea states do
\nnot have much experience in cooperating, but they have had plenty
\nof experience in confronting each other, either among the
\nAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries
\nthemselves, or between ASEAN members vis-a-vis Indochina and
\nChina, and perhaps more significantly between Southeast Asia and
\nChina itself. Even within ASEAN, after more than twenty five
\nyears since its establishment, we still have plenty of
\nterritorial and jurisdictional issues, although we are fortunate
\nto have had the opportunity to develop this important sense of
\n"ASEAN way, solidarity and cohesiveness". It was only within the
\nlast three or four years that friendly and good relations have
\nbeen happily developing between ASEAN and China. In fact,
\nrelations between China and Vietnam still need a lot of
\nfostering. I believe that we need patience in this endeavor.
\nThere is no alternative. The consequences for the region would be
\na lot worse if we did not take appropriate measures or if we took
\na confrontational policy toward each other. I feel that our
\nbiggest enemy is impatience and the desire to achieve quick
\nresults.<\/p>\n
There has been a lot of talk recently on the possibility of
\ncreating a joint development zone or a zone of cooperation in the
\nSouth China Sea and to achieve this, some claimants have even
\ndeclared their willingness to shelve the sovereignty issue for a
\nwhile in favor of joint development. China has talked about this
\nall the time. Others also seem to respond positively to the idea.
\nBut when we scrutinize the concept and the willingness more
\nthoroughly, then we encounter many difficulties, primarily
\nbecause each one of us has a different meaning of the concept. In
\nmy view, the notion of joint development is a good one but there
\nare many aspects that need to be clearly defined and agreed upon
\nwith regard to this concept. First, we have to agree "where" the
\nconcept shall be applied, namely the geographical definition of
\nthe cooperative zone. Second, we have to agree on "what" subjects
\nthe joint cooperation shall involve, namely whether it should be
\nfor fisheries, oil and gas, marine scientific research,
\nenvironmental protection, and others or a mixture of all these.
\nThird, we have to identify and agree on the "participants" in
\nsuch a joint development zone or zone of cooperation. Fourth, we
\nalso have a agree on the "modalities" and the "institutional
\nmechanisms" for such cooperation. There are many problems that
\nneed to be discussed. All these will need time and patience.
\nIndonesia and Australia needed more than ten years to devise and
\nestablish a bilateral zone of cooperation in the Timor Sea.
\nCertainly we would need more time to deal with this multilateral
\nissue in the South China Sea.<\/p>\n
I personally have undertaken a study on a possible area or
\nzone that could be designated as the joint development zone.
\nUnderstandably my suggestion encountered various reactions and
\ntherefore should be treated with a lot of caution. A lot of
\ninformal dialogs and consultations would have to be undertaken on
\nthis topic. There may also be plenty of other suggestions which
\nare being studied and which, I am sure, at appropriate time, may
\ncome to the surface.<\/p>\n
With regard to the prospects for the second prong, namely
\nreduction of tension and developing confidence building measures
\nin the Spratly, the outlook is more bleak. Mutual suspicion still
\nlingers on. At the same time, the need by claimants to do
\nsomething to reaffirm their claims, as well as to develop the
\nresources unilaterally for their particular national interests,
\nis getting stronger by the day. Sometimes I feel that the efforts
\nto promote cooperation and to contain and reduce tension appear
\nto be moving a lot slower than the national efforts of building
\nup capabilities and posturings, which in the end may increase
\nrather than reduce tension. It is therefore essential for every
\nparticipant and for every country in the south China Sea area to
\ndevote more efforts and attention to helping develop confidence
\nbuilding measures and eliminate potential tension in the area.<\/p>\n
In conclusion, let me state that the prospect for the solution
\nof the territorial sovereignty issues in the disputed Spratly
\nIslands group is not very bright within the near future, but
\nthere are a good number of measures that could be undertaken to
\ncontain the disputes and to convert them to he potential areas
\nfor cooperation. I believe that every potential conflict contains
\nin itself elements potential cooperation. It is for us to find
\nthem out, and to develop them into actual cooperation. Hopefully
\nin the long run the Spratly Islands dispute will not erupt again
\ninto armed conflagration that could engulf the region as a whole,
\nthus diverting us from the path of economic and social
\ndevelopment. Let us all work in the direction of cooperation and
\naway from confrontation.<\/p>\n
Dr. Hasyim Djalal is an Ambassador at Large for the Law of the
\nSea and is also the initiator of the South China Sea workshop.
\nThe views expressed in this paper are personal.<\/p>",
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