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Security pact brings together RI, Australia

Security pact brings together RI, Australia

From the Indonesian view, there are at least five points of
long-term substantive interest in the agreement.

By Ikrar Nusa Bhakti

The recent signing of the Agreement on Maintaining Security
between Indonesia and Australia was a historic event for the two
countries. For Indonesia, it was the first time since its
proclamation of independence 50 years ago that it has engaged in
a security arrangement with another country.

Even though foreign ministers Ali Alatas and Senator Gareth
Evans said that the agreement is not a defense pact, it is
unsurprising that some quarters in Indonesia and in the region
are skeptical about it. This is legitimate, because for half a
century Indonesia had rejected any security arrangement with
another country because of its independent foreign policy
doctrine and because it was a founding member of the non-aligned
movement.

For Australia, the agreement has a very special meaning,
because for almost a decade it had tried to persuade Indonesia to
enter into a Joint Declaration of Principles, similar to the
agreement between Australia and Papua New Guinea. Indonesia
always rejected such agreements because they partly related to
security matters.

Prime Minister Paul Keating can be justifiably pleased that
his government has been able to establish the last of the four
pillars of the Australia-Indonesia relationship, that is a
defense/security pillar. The three other pillars are: first,
political/diplomatic, which were developed through an inter-
personal relationship between Keating and President Soeharto, and
among other Australian and Indonesian policy-makers; second, an
economic pillar, through regular meetings of economic ministers
as provided for in the Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum; and
third, a sociocultural pillar through the establishment of the
Australia-Indonesia Institute. All this has proved that Prime
Minister Keating has been consistent with his statement in 1994
that no other country is more important to Australia than
Indonesia.

Australia and Indonesia have always appeared to each other as
two strange neighbors, with different cultures, languages,
religions, ethnicities, political, legal and social systems, and
historical backgrounds. Because of its geographical proximity,
Indonesia has always been seen by Australia both as a "buffer
state" and a potential threat. Consequently, Australia has always
looked for stability in Indonesia and in an Indonesian government
which takes a responsible view of its role in Southeast Asia and
a constructive approach to its relationship with Australia.

A security agreement between Indonesia and Australia is very
important for the two countries, particularly for Australia. As
written in the 1994 Defense White Paper, Defending Australia,
Australia's defense relationship with Indonesia is its most
important in the region and a key element in Australia's approach
to regional defense engagement. It is underpinned by an
increasing awareness of the two countries' shared strategic
interests and perceptions.

The political and security developments in the Asia-Pacific
region after the Cold War are still uncertain. The decision by
the United States to reduce its military presence in East Asia
has worried regional states that countries such as Japan, China
and India might become dominant powers in the region.

From the Indonesian perspective, there are at least five
points of long-term substantive interest in the security
agreement with Australia. First and foremost, it emphasizes to
the government and the wider Australian community that Indonesia
has never and will never be a threat to Australia's security.
Second, it is also a symbolic statement that Indonesia perceives
Australia as an important neighbor in the southern-most region.
Third, Australia is perceived as a friendly developed country,
particularly for military training and technical cooperation.
Since the early 1990s, Indonesia has faced difficulties in
sending its military officers for training to the U.S.,
especially since the U.S. government stopped its International
Military Education and Training program for Indonesia in 1992.
Since then, more and more Indonesian military officers have been
sent to Australia.

Fourth, it seems that Indonesia wants some benefits from
Australia's advanced defense industry. It is highly likely that
in the near future Indonesia and Australia will co-develop such
military hardware as frigates and submarines, which are very
important for Indonesia as an archipelagic state. Fifth,
Indonesia needs Australia's diplomatic support to reduce anti-
Indonesian sentiments both in Australia and in the international
fora regarding East Timor, Irian Jaya and other human rights
issues.

The security agreement between Australia and Indonesia was
designed to formalize the defense relationship between the two
countries which has developed and diversified strongly in recent
years. Defense co-operation continues to be based on a clear
understanding of one another's strategic perception and
priorities. It will never replace the defense pacts between
Australia and other countries in the region, such as the Five
Power Defense Arrangements (Australia, Great Britain, Malaysia,
Singapore and New Zealand) or Australia, New Zealand and the U.S.
pact.

The new agreement will have a positive impact on Southeast
Asia because the two countries have committed themselves to
maintaining regional stability. The countries in Southeast Asia
have no need to worry about this agreement because Indonesia and
Australia are not building a military alliance in order to
confront common enemies. In reality, the agreement is a key
element for Australia to become engaged in Southeast Asian
regional security.

Australia is diversifying its defense relationship with
Indonesia and the other ASEAN countries from traditional defense
co-operation programs to providing a higher priority to strategic
exchanges, combined military exercises, logistics agreements,
science and industry co-operation, co-operative equipment
acquisition and training co-operation. In other words, Australia
will replace traditional defense co-operation programs of the
donor-recipient kind with activities which are based on an equal
relationship.

Finally, it seems that the security agreement is based on
political and economic considerations rather than on purely
military considerations.

Dr. Ikrar Nusa Bhakti is a researcher at the Center for
Political and Regional Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences,
Jakarta.

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