Security pact brings together RI, Australia<\/p>\n
From the Indonesian view, there are at least five points of
\nlong-term substantive interest in the agreement.<\/p>\n
By Ikrar Nusa Bhakti<\/p>\n
The recent signing of the Agreement on Maintaining Security
\nbetween Indonesia and Australia was a historic event for the two
\ncountries. For Indonesia, it was the first time since its
\nproclamation of independence 50 years ago that it has engaged in
\na security arrangement with another country.<\/p>\n
Even though foreign ministers Ali Alatas and Senator Gareth
\nEvans said that the agreement is not a defense pact, it is
\nunsurprising that some quarters in Indonesia and in the region
\nare skeptical about it. This is legitimate, because for half a
\ncentury Indonesia had rejected any security arrangement with
\nanother country because of its independent foreign policy
\ndoctrine and because it was a founding member of the non-aligned
\nmovement.<\/p>\n
For Australia, the agreement has a very special meaning,
\nbecause for almost a decade it had tried to persuade Indonesia to
\nenter into a Joint Declaration of Principles, similar to the
\nagreement between Australia and Papua New Guinea. Indonesia
\nalways rejected such agreements because they partly related to
\nsecurity matters.<\/p>\n
Prime Minister Paul Keating can be justifiably pleased that
\nhis government has been able to establish the last of the four
\npillars of the Australia-Indonesia relationship, that is a
\ndefense\/security pillar. The three other pillars are: first,
\npolitical\/diplomatic, which were developed through an inter-
\npersonal relationship between Keating and President Soeharto, and
\namong other Australian and Indonesian policy-makers; second, an
\neconomic pillar, through regular meetings of economic ministers
\nas provided for in the Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum; and
\nthird, a sociocultural pillar through the establishment of the
\nAustralia-Indonesia Institute. All this has proved that Prime
\nMinister Keating has been consistent with his statement in 1994
\nthat no other country is more important to Australia than
\nIndonesia.<\/p>\n
Australia and Indonesia have always appeared to each other as
\ntwo strange neighbors, with different cultures, languages,
\nreligions, ethnicities, political, legal and social systems, and
\nhistorical backgrounds. Because of its geographical proximity,
\nIndonesia has always been seen by Australia both as a \"buffer
\nstate\" and a potential threat. Consequently, Australia has always
\nlooked for stability in Indonesia and in an Indonesian government
\nwhich takes a responsible view of its role in Southeast Asia and
\na constructive approach to its relationship with Australia.<\/p>\n
A security agreement between Indonesia and Australia is very
\nimportant for the two countries, particularly for Australia. As
\nwritten in the 1994 Defense White Paper, Defending Australia,
\nAustralia's defense relationship with Indonesia is its most
\nimportant in the region and a key element in Australia's approach
\nto regional defense engagement. It is underpinned by an
\nincreasing awareness of the two countries' shared strategic
\ninterests and perceptions.<\/p>\n
The political and security developments in the Asia-Pacific
\nregion after the Cold War are still uncertain. The decision by
\nthe United States to reduce its military presence in East Asia
\nhas worried regional states that countries such as Japan, China
\nand India might become dominant powers in the region.<\/p>\n
From the Indonesian perspective, there are at least five
\npoints of long-term substantive interest in the security
\nagreement with Australia. First and foremost, it emphasizes to
\nthe government and the wider Australian community that Indonesia
\nhas never and will never be a threat to Australia's security.
\nSecond, it is also a symbolic statement that Indonesia perceives
\nAustralia as an important neighbor in the southern-most region.
\nThird, Australia is perceived as a friendly developed country,
\nparticularly for military training and technical cooperation.
\nSince the early 1990s, Indonesia has faced difficulties in
\nsending its military officers for training to the U.S.,
\nespecially since the U.S. government stopped its International
\nMilitary Education and Training program for Indonesia in 1992.
\nSince then, more and more Indonesian military officers have been
\nsent to Australia.<\/p>\n
Fourth, it seems that Indonesia wants some benefits from
\nAustralia's advanced defense industry. It is highly likely that
\nin the near future Indonesia and Australia will co-develop such
\nmilitary hardware as frigates and submarines, which are very
\nimportant for Indonesia as an archipelagic state. Fifth,
\nIndonesia needs Australia's diplomatic support to reduce anti-
\nIndonesian sentiments both in Australia and in the international
\nfora regarding East Timor, Irian Jaya and other human rights
\nissues.<\/p>\n
The security agreement between Australia and Indonesia was
\ndesigned to formalize the defense relationship between the two
\ncountries which has developed and diversified strongly in recent
\nyears. Defense co-operation continues to be based on a clear
\nunderstanding of one another's strategic perception and
\npriorities. It will never replace the defense pacts between
\nAustralia and other countries in the region, such as the Five
\nPower Defense Arrangements (Australia, Great Britain, Malaysia,
\nSingapore and New Zealand) or Australia, New Zealand and the U.S.
\npact.<\/p>\n
The new agreement will have a positive impact on Southeast
\nAsia because the two countries have committed themselves to
\nmaintaining regional stability. The countries in Southeast Asia
\nhave no need to worry about this agreement because Indonesia and
\nAustralia are not building a military alliance in order to
\nconfront common enemies. In reality, the agreement is a key
\nelement for Australia to become engaged in Southeast Asian
\nregional security.<\/p>\n
Australia is diversifying its defense relationship with
\nIndonesia and the other ASEAN countries from traditional defense
\nco-operation programs to providing a higher priority to strategic
\nexchanges, combined military exercises, logistics agreements,
\nscience and industry co-operation, co-operative equipment
\nacquisition and training co-operation. In other words, Australia
\nwill replace traditional defense co-operation programs of the
\ndonor-recipient kind with activities which are based on an equal
\nrelationship.<\/p>\n
Finally, it seems that the security agreement is based on
\npolitical and economic considerations rather than on purely
\nmilitary considerations.<\/p>\n
Dr. Ikrar Nusa Bhakti is a researcher at the Center for
\nPolitical and Regional Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences,
\nJakarta.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/security-pact-brings-together-ri-australia-1447893297",
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"sponsor": "Okusi Associates",
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