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SE Asia and the peace dividend

| Source: The Jakarta Post

SE Asia and the peace dividend

By Dewi Fortuna Anwar

This is the second of two articles based on a paper presented
at the Defense Services Asia 1996 conference: "Changing
Conception of Security in a Changing Pacific Asia" in Kuala
Lumpur on April 25 and April 26, 1996.

KUALA LUMPUR: While there is a cautious optimism concerning
the prospect for greater regional peace and security as
manifested in the development of the ASEAN Regional Forum, a
contradictory trend also seems to be taking place simultaneously.

While in other parts of the world the end of the Cold War led
to massive cuts in defense expenditures, the reverse is true for
the Asia-Pacific region. Most of these defense expenditures have
been spent on arms procurement.

In the past few years various ASEAN states have purchased or
negotiated to buy substantial numbers of fighter jets, warships,
submarines, frigates and armored tanks to enhance the
capabilities of all branches of their respective armed forces.

In reality, most of the increases in defense spending have
taken place in Northeast Asia. China and Japan, in fact, account
for 70 percent of East Asia's total military spending. In 1993,
China spent an estimated US$12 billion to $24 billion on defense,
Japan $40 billion, Taiwan $10.5 billion and South Korea $12
billion.

Defense spending in Southeast Asia is far more modest in
comparison, ranging from $1 billion in the Philippines to $3
billion in Thailand.

Several reasons have been put forward for the increases in
defense spendings. The single most important reason is clearly
economic growth. Other contributing factors include the
increasing ease of obtaining weapons in the aftermath of the Cold
War as well as the development of the local defense industry.

Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the increases in
ASEAN countries' purchases of sophisticated military technology
since the mid-1980s have also been driven by more fundamental
reasons of security. The patterns of purchases clearly indicate
that ASEAN countries are gearing their defenses against possible
external threats.

During the mid-1970s and 1980s the rise in defense
expenditures among the ASEAN states, notably Thailand, was
regarded as one way of restoring the regional balance disturbed
by the communist victory in Indochina and the subsequent
hegemonic policy pursued by Vietnam in the area, with the backing
of the Soviet Union. However, as we saw earlier, by early 1990
the confrontation between ASEAN and Vietnam came to an end and
since 1995 Vietnam has become a full member of ASEAN.

The end of the Cold War, however, brought new security
problems to countries in Southeast Asia. The withdrawal of the
Soviet military presence and the subsequent major reduction of
American military forces from the region caused disquiet among
many ASEAN states about who will fill the "regional power
vacuum". These countries are worried that the bigger regional
states, notably China, Japan and India will try to assert their
power.

The feeling of disquiet has been exacerbated by the increasing
tension in the South China Sea. The Spratly Islands claimed by
China, Taiwan and now four ASEAN states (Brunei, Malaysia, the
Philippines and Vietnam), have the potential of being the new
flash point in the region.

China's policy of claiming the whole of the South China Sea
and its willingness to use military means to enforce its claims
have caused a general apprehension in Southeast Asia. The
modernization of the Chinese armed forces, the signing of the
United Nations Peace Keeping Operation bill, and India's
possession of a blue water navy have all excited comments and
responses from the ASEAN states.

For many ASEAN states there has been an added urgency to
develop a more conventional defense posture. In the past all
ASEAN members, except Indonesia, mostly depended on external
military alliances for their external defenses. The withdrawal of
most of these foreign bases from the region has forced the ASEAN
countries to become more self-sufficient in ensuring their
respective national security.

One of the major occurrences of the post-Cold War era is the
withdrawal of most foreign military from Southeast Asia.
While this has forced countries in the region to become more
self-reliant in their defense policy, it does not mean that
security relations with extra-regional powers have become totally
obsolete. Despite the closure of their bases, the United States
continues to maintain its existing bilateral security agreements
with its allies, the Philippines and Thailand, at least formally.

At the same time an important trend has developed in which
"bases" have been replaced with "places". This phenomenon
signifies the offers of military facilities to the U.S., such as
to carry out refueling and ship repairs, by a number of ASEAN
countries not formerly linked to the United States security
alliance system. Indonesia and Malaysia have both offered
facilities to U.S. ships, while Singapore has gone even further
and has provided a mini base for the U.S. navy and air force.

Although these facilities are basically offered on a
commercial basis, there are clearly important security
considerations behind them, namely to keep the United States
engaged in the region. There are obviously some concerns that a
total U.S. withdrawal from the region would lead to a power
disequilibrium given the emergence of other major Asia-Pacific
powers.

At the same time, by keeping these facilities relatively small
and offering them on a commercial basis, these countries also
signify their desire for independence.

One of the most important trends that has recently emerged is
the shift in Indonesia's attitude towards security relations with
external powers, as demonstrated by Indonesia's offer of naval
facilities to the U.S. and the recent signing of the Indonesia-
Australia security agreement.

Indonesia's offer of naval repair facilities to the U.S. navy
was earlier commented upon, given Indonesia's well-known aversion
to formal security linkages with outside powers.

The security agreement between Indonesia and Australia, signed
in January 1995, has clearly gone even further. Although the
Indonesian government has been at pains to explain that the
security agreement does not amount to a defense alliance, the
fact remains that this is the first such agreement that Indonesia
has signed with any country.

Such a shift in Indonesia's security policy is clearly a
product of its re-assessment of the geopolitical realities in the
post-Cold War era, which demand a much more pragmatic and
flexible response than before.

The security agreement was to formalize the existing defense
relationship between the two countries, both which have
flourished and diversified in the past decade. More than anything
else, for Indonesia the agreement is regarded as a symbolic
statement that Australia is important to Indonesia and to
reassure the Australian public that Indonesia does not pose a
threat to Australia. The security agreement has not been
conceived as an alliance against a common enemy.

The Indonesia-Australia security agreement has obviously
raised some questions regarding the continuing relevance of the
Five Powers Defense Arrangement (FPDA), a security alliance
between Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand and the
United Kingdom. Although never openly articulated, it was
generally perceived that the FPDA was partly aimed at containing
Indonesia. In response, Indonesia tended to view the FPDA with
irritation, regarding its presence as an obstacle to the
realization of the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality concept
in Southeast Asia.

With the agreement between Indonesia and Australia there has
clearly been a slight shift in equation, but this is not
necessarily detrimental to the FPDA. In fact, now Indonesia is
likely to view the FPDA in a much more favorable light.

At the same time, given the very close relations between the
ASEAN countries, in particular between Indonesia, Malaysia and
Singapore and the traditional links that exits between Australia
and the latter two countries, it is highly unlikely that the new
security agreement will be seen as a threat by the two countries.

It is quite conceivable that a link can be established between
the FPDA and the Indonesia-Australia security agreement which
would provide a foundation for the development of a common
security framework in the region. Such a development, if it is
carried out within a much wider regional security dialog and
cooperation, would clearly enhance regional stability.

The ASEAN countries' responses to the new security challenges
have been characterized by pragmatism, producing an eclectic mix
of idealism and realism. On the one hand, ASEAN has taken the
lead in the development of the ASEAN Regional Forum as a means to
promote confidence building measures, preventive diplomacy and
possibly finding solutions to the various regional conflict. In
particular, ASEAN has studiously tried to deal with China, the
country posing the biggest security question in the Asia-Pacific
region.

On the other hand, it can be seen that countries in Southeast
Asia do not want to take chances where their security is
concerned. With the declining security role of the United States
most of the non-communist states in Southeast Asia have tried to
become more self-reliant in their defense policies.

This has led to a significant rise in arms procurement and the
modernization of the regional defense structures, shifting from
counterinsurgency to a more conventional defense structure. At
the same time new security cooperation and linkages are being
developed. All of these moves are designed to enhance the
countries' respective defense capabilities, which in turn will
also contribute to the development of regional resilience.

Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar is head of the Regional and
International Affairs Division at the Center for Political and
Regional Studies, Indonesian Institute of Sciences, and research
executive at Center for Information and Development Studies in
Jakarta.

Window A: The ASEAN countries' responses to the new security
challenges have been characterized by pragmatism, producing an
electric mix of idealism and realism.

Window B: With the declining security role of the United States
most of the non-communist states in Southest Asia have tried to
become more self-reliant in their defense policies.

More from 7 June 1996 โ†’

Cite this article
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/se-asia-and-the-peace-dividend-1447893297-1037042)
Originally published by The Jakarta Post
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