RI recovery: A distant mirage
RI recovery: A distant mirage
The following is the second of two articles on economic
recovery by Sidhesh Kaul, a regional commentator on political and
economic issues based in Jakarta.
JAKARTA (JP): The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA)
has an onerous role to play in Indonesia's recovery but the lack
of policy direction and a sound and realistic framework have made
it a toothless tiger. IBRA as well as the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) know full well that the nucleus for recovery and
rehabilitation of the country's banking sector lies in the
recovery of the real sector.
A crippled real sector effectively destroys revenue generation
and hence the ability to service debts. There is no doubt that
the ongoing crisis presents a good opportunity to discard non-
productive and expensive assets but to tar the entire real sector
in one broad stroke is an exercise at over simplification.
Unless IBRA discards the assets approach (or deploys it on a
limited basis) and adopts one that rehabilitates the real sector,
recovery can only be a distant mirage. IBRA's approach in the
past has only succeeded in shielding the bank owners from the
real penalties for the economic woes and passing the buck to the
real sector.
Indonesia's Supreme Audit Agency (BPK), after a fitful slumber
spanning the better portion of Indonesia's post-independence
period, has recently completed an audit that was commissioned in
the wake of the Rp 35 billion Bulogate scandal.
It laid bare the fact that a number of government institutions
(government departments and state-owned enterprises or BUMNs)
regularly created treasure chests that were often used for
purposes out of the purview of the state budget.
BPK's recent awakening and subsequent pronouncements could not
have come at a worse time for Indonesia. While it is to President
Abdurrahman Wahid's credit that these disclosures have happened
during his tenure, what has proven disruptive to the recovery
process is the suspicion that the Bulogate funds were
requisitioned by the highest authorities for non-Bulog purposes.
That the Bulogate scandal happened during the supposed era of
reform and right under the nose of Abdurrahman fuels the growing
concern that reform in Indonesia lacks any real intent. It is now
more than obvious that such non-budgetary funds were an important
pillar of the authoritarian New Order regime and unless
Abdurrahman takes firm and substantive steps towards ushering in
a culture of open accountability the whole world is going to
doubt the Government's seriousness of purpose in moving away from
the ills that plagued the New Order regime.
These BPK findings raise concerns about the lackadaisical
approach towards the framing of the budget as well as the total
lack of concern towards public accountability.
The BPK report methodically and clinically describes the
extent of the non-budgetary funds that are nesting with several
government departments and beyond the domain of accountability.
However, the report is silent on the methodology used by the
various departments to create these off-balance sheet surpluses.
Knowing the mechanism behind the accumulation of these non-
budgetary funds is important because there could be more than
meets the auditor's eye; only when the government gets to the
root of the problem can any remedial legislation be designed and
implemented and the culprits brought to book.
BPK's report mentions that in the period 1998-1999 Bulog's
expenditures from the non-budgetary funds was about Rp 2 trillion
(and the bulk of these expenditures had nothing to do with
Bulog's activities) and that at a time when the country's poor
were reeling from unemployment and scrounging for relief.
Disbursements included Rp 8 billion towards "Cendana needs"
(the Soeharto family is often referred to as the Cendana family),
Rp. 4.6 billion towards PT Rejosari Agung (a Cendana enterprise)
and a Rp 32 billion loan to Hokiarto (erstwhile owner of Bank
Hokindo, a regular supplier to Bulog and reportedly a crony of
Bustanil Arifin, the ex-Bulog chief for over two decades) amongst
a shockingly long list of other questionable expenditures.
The BPK audit report also has a section in its findings on
IBRA that echoes the qualified opinion of HTM (IBRA's statutory
auditors), but goes on to highlight the incompetence with which
IBRA manages its funds, especially the implementation of the
guarantee program.
The report candidly highlights the weaknesses (IMF please wake
up!) in the procedures that IBRA uses in its settlement of
shareholder's obligations, and specifically points out that IBRA
has undervalued the BCA shareholder's obligations by a whopping
Rp 3.635 trillion and the under-calculation for the shareholders
of Bank Umum Nasional is Rp 7.188 trillion.
The report further goes on to comment that IBRA could
potentially lose Rp 7.769 trillion as a result of the under
valuation of Bank Danamon's assets.
The BPK report is a virtual litany of IBRA's shortcomings but
it remains silent on the collection of penalties from banks for
the breach of the legal lending limit (LLL).
Before the crisis banks were prohibited from exceeding the LLL
under threat of penalty (that banks used to pay up periodically)
so that exposures to a bank's affiliates in the real sector could
be limited (don't forget that every and any conglomerate worth
their salt in Indonesia had their own bank on the side).
Did this measure stop the banks from lending to their
connected companies? Not one bit. The clever owners found a way
around this minor obstacle through a reciprocal arrangement with
like-minded owners of other banks.
This fact has contributed in a major way towards diluting the
overall credit quality of the assets of most banks and has
further compounded the travails of recovery. Surprisingly there
is hardly any mention either from the government on how it plans
to deal with this issue.
The road to recovery is long and tiresome and there are no
quick fixes or shortcuts that can solve this nightmare problem in
a hurry. Meanwhile, the political elite are busy squabbling and
jockeying for power and pulling each other down.
Political rhetoric has drowned the voice of reason and
diverted energies from rebuilding the nation to creating an
unstable environment. The coalitions of forces in the present
government are suspicious of each other, casting doubts on their
marriages of convenience.
There appears to be no sense of urgency on the part of any of
the political elite as evidenced by the fact that the Ministry of
Finance reportedly delayed the finalization of the latest Letter
of Intent to the IMF knowing full well that the IMF is shortly
going to be in recess.
Meanwhile the rupiah continues to test the limits of free
fall. Under such circumstances it is unfair to expect IBRA or the
other recovery agencies to perform.
By establishing a half-baked recovery agency in the form of
IBRA, the government might be perceived as fulfilling IMF's
criteria. However, without providing the necessary tools and
infrastructure in a supportive and conducive political climate,
the government might well stand accused of sabotaging the
recovery and unwittingly betraying Indonesians a second time
around.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/ri-recovery-a-distant-mirage-1447893297-1315181)
Originally published by The Jakarta Post