RI-Australia ties solidifying (2)

RI-Australia ties solidifying (2)

The following is the second of two articles based on an
excerpt of a paper presented by former minister of defense and
security Gen. (ret.) L.B. Moerdani at a conference mid-last
month in Canberra hosted by the Australian Defense Studies
Center.

CANBERRA: At this point, allow me to elaborate on the
importance of regional initiatives and efforts towards confidence
building. The end of the Cold War has paved the way for a new era
in which a greater sense of regional cooperation and a stronger
spirit of multilateralism prevail. The changing security
environment and new challenges confronting the Asia-Pacific
region have provided us with an unprecedented opportunity to
forge a closer partnership, namely through the enactment of a new
regional order based on regional cooperation and multilateralism.

To ensure that the conceived regional order fully complies to
our own interests and priorities, it is essential that this new
order first and foremost facilitate the search and establishment
of a new equilibrium in the relationship between the United
States, Japan and China. These three major powers are currently
undergoing significant domestic changes. As a result, their
external relations are also being continuously adjusted. These
developments could produce major uncertainties that could
adversely affect the security and stability of the region.

Local and regional sources of conflict abound and equally
threaten the security of the region. Of late, developments in the
Korean peninsula have raised, rather than reduced, the level of
anxiety in the major capitals. The situation in Indochina is
still highly precarious. In addition there is the so-called "new
issues" in international relations such as environment, drugs,
migration, and human rights, just to name a few important ones.

The new response to all these security issues may not lie in
the multilateralism of the problems. Rather, the region should
develop practices, mechanisms or even structures that could help
facilitate and actively support bilateral or local efforts
towards peaceful settlements of dispute. Here is where Australia
can cooperate closely with ASEAN countries.

Within ASEAN itself there may not necessarily be a common
perception of threat at all times. However, ASEAN's cohesion is
promoted on the basis of an all-encompassing relationship.
ASEAN's security interests are also developed along the notion of
comprehensive security that encompasses all aspects of life.
ASEAN cooperation in its totality is the barometer for the
closeness among ASEAN countries. In some areas, the views within
ASEAN may differ more pronouncedly than those between some ASEAN
members and some non-ASEAN member. However, it is the totality of
the cooperation that is important.

On the issue of the growing Australia-Singapore association, I
do not think that this will create a problem for Indonesia,
especially if this bilateral defense relationship is placed
within the context of Australia's regional engagement as
described in the 1994 Defense White Paper. From a pragmatic point
of view, if such an association is considered important to
enhance Singapore's sense of security, it should be in
Indonesia's interest to see that Singapore associates itself with
a close friend of Indonesia.

Equally, on the question of the Five Power Defense
Arrangements (FPDA), there is no longer any problem on
Indonesia's side. I need not give a lecture on why Indonesians do
not like to be reminded of FPDA's origins. Today, as dictated by
our pragmatism, Indonesia does not want to make an issue of the
continued existence of the FPDA. However, as this issue is
brought to my attention, I would like to make two points. First,
if the FPDA provides a framework for Australia's security
relationships with Malaysia and Singapore which enhances their
sense of security, this should be seen as a contribution to the
enhancement of regional security. Second, as indicated in the
1994 Defense White Paper, the FPDA may undertake some
adjustments. As the FPDA should contribute to confidence building
not only among its members but also in the wider region, it may
henceforth focus its activities on joint exercises which will be
open for other regional countries to observe.

Australia's alliance with the United States will certainly not
hinder Australia's policy to get closer to ASEAN because some
ASEAN members are themselves allies of the United States. ASEAN
also has good relations with the United States but relationships
can be further improved. Australia, being a U.S. ally, perhaps
can contribute to this improvement by encouraging the United
States to take a more balanced, less unilateral and assertive
stance towards ASEAN countries. This mediating role may come
naturally as it is in Australia's own interests to see that good
relations are maintained between Southeast Asia -- and Asia as a
whole -- with the United States.

On Australia's mediating role in the Spratly Islands disputes,
much will depend on the willingness of the claimant countries to
internationalize the issue. China has clearly stated its
opposition to the involvement of non-claimant countries,
including involvement in the workshop series initiated by
Indonesia. Perhaps Australia can best contribute to resolving
this problem through its bilateral diplomacy.

There is the question of how as an Indonesian, or from a
regional perspective, I would react to the continued Australian
Defense Force move to the north. Again, I do not see this as a
problem because Australia can only move to the north. And moving
to the north does not necessarily mean to aim at Indonesia.
Possible disturbances to Australia's security also can come only
from the north as Australia is already so far "down under".

The more specific question relating to the acquisition of
additional F 111 fighter jets is also not a question that is
widely addressed in Indonesia. Even from the laymen's perspective
it never occurs to many Indonesians why Australia would want to
threaten Indonesia.

Finally, there is the question of how the relationship between
Australia and Indonesia will be affected by the succession. I am
not the one to give you any assurance but on the basis of my own
assessment I believe that the transition in 1998 or beyond will
be smooth. President Soeharto has made the point over and over
again that the mechanism for the transfer of power is in place
and that this will be used in accordance with the constitution
and the constitutional spirit that has been nurtured by the New
Order government.

Beyond this, two main factors support this view. Firstly, as
at no other time before in Indonesia's history, it is possible
now for the people to see a potential successor in the Vice
President. Secondly, the stakes have been too high for the
country and the people at large, but especially the rising and
growing middle class, to allow for political instability and
turmoil to accompany the succession. The situation would differ
if the economy was going down and had been for many years.

A new leadership in Jakarta is not likely to negatively affect
the development of the bilateral relationship with Australia.
Internal developments in Indonesia, economically, politically and
even socially, are not likely to lead to a divergence between our
two societies. External, global developments in the course of the
next 15 years are not likely to push us into two opposing camps.

Even if turmoil occurs in Indonesia, this will not threaten
Australians if they are not involved in it. There will not be an
outflow of Indonesian refugees as experienced in mainland
Southeast Asia because there is no such tradition in the
Indonesian archipelago.

In this new era of confidence building in our region let us be
frank and readily acknowledge that at least our two countries do
not face any real threat from anywhere. This does not mean that
problems may not arise in our relations in the future, or that we
are not faced with regional problems and conflicts. What is
important is that we can talk about those emerging problems, and
that a forum exists for regional countries to share their views
and experiences, as well as the burden to maintain peace and
stability in the region and globally.

Countries have legitimate needs for their defense and
security. However, they also have the responsibility to give a
clear explanation of what they intend to do and why. The 1994
Defense White Paper has greatly contributed to creating this new
environment.