RI-Australia ties solidifying (2)
RI-Australia ties solidifying (2)
The following is the second of two articles based on an excerpt of a paper presented by former minister of defense and security Gen. (ret.) L.B. Moerdani at a conference mid-last month in Canberra hosted by the Australian Defense Studies Center.
CANBERRA: At this point, allow me to elaborate on the importance of regional initiatives and efforts towards confidence building. The end of the Cold War has paved the way for a new era in which a greater sense of regional cooperation and a stronger spirit of multilateralism prevail. The changing security environment and new challenges confronting the Asia-Pacific region have provided us with an unprecedented opportunity to forge a closer partnership, namely through the enactment of a new regional order based on regional cooperation and multilateralism.
To ensure that the conceived regional order fully complies to our own interests and priorities, it is essential that this new order first and foremost facilitate the search and establishment of a new equilibrium in the relationship between the United States, Japan and China. These three major powers are currently undergoing significant domestic changes. As a result, their external relations are also being continuously adjusted. These developments could produce major uncertainties that could adversely affect the security and stability of the region.
Local and regional sources of conflict abound and equally threaten the security of the region. Of late, developments in the Korean peninsula have raised, rather than reduced, the level of anxiety in the major capitals. The situation in Indochina is still highly precarious. In addition there is the so-called "new issues" in international relations such as environment, drugs, migration, and human rights, just to name a few important ones.
The new response to all these security issues may not lie in the multilateralism of the problems. Rather, the region should develop practices, mechanisms or even structures that could help facilitate and actively support bilateral or local efforts towards peaceful settlements of dispute. Here is where Australia can cooperate closely with ASEAN countries.
Within ASEAN itself there may not necessarily be a common perception of threat at all times. However, ASEAN's cohesion is promoted on the basis of an all-encompassing relationship. ASEAN's security interests are also developed along the notion of comprehensive security that encompasses all aspects of life. ASEAN cooperation in its totality is the barometer for the closeness among ASEAN countries. In some areas, the views within ASEAN may differ more pronouncedly than those between some ASEAN members and some non-ASEAN member. However, it is the totality of the cooperation that is important.
On the issue of the growing Australia-Singapore association, I do not think that this will create a problem for Indonesia, especially if this bilateral defense relationship is placed within the context of Australia's regional engagement as described in the 1994 Defense White Paper. From a pragmatic point of view, if such an association is considered important to enhance Singapore's sense of security, it should be in Indonesia's interest to see that Singapore associates itself with a close friend of Indonesia.
Equally, on the question of the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA), there is no longer any problem on Indonesia's side. I need not give a lecture on why Indonesians do not like to be reminded of FPDA's origins. Today, as dictated by our pragmatism, Indonesia does not want to make an issue of the continued existence of the FPDA. However, as this issue is brought to my attention, I would like to make two points. First, if the FPDA provides a framework for Australia's security relationships with Malaysia and Singapore which enhances their sense of security, this should be seen as a contribution to the enhancement of regional security. Second, as indicated in the 1994 Defense White Paper, the FPDA may undertake some adjustments. As the FPDA should contribute to confidence building not only among its members but also in the wider region, it may henceforth focus its activities on joint exercises which will be open for other regional countries to observe.
Australia's alliance with the United States will certainly not hinder Australia's policy to get closer to ASEAN because some ASEAN members are themselves allies of the United States. ASEAN also has good relations with the United States but relationships can be further improved. Australia, being a U.S. ally, perhaps can contribute to this improvement by encouraging the United States to take a more balanced, less unilateral and assertive stance towards ASEAN countries. This mediating role may come naturally as it is in Australia's own interests to see that good relations are maintained between Southeast Asia -- and Asia as a whole -- with the United States.
On Australia's mediating role in the Spratly Islands disputes, much will depend on the willingness of the claimant countries to internationalize the issue. China has clearly stated its opposition to the involvement of non-claimant countries, including involvement in the workshop series initiated by Indonesia. Perhaps Australia can best contribute to resolving this problem through its bilateral diplomacy.
There is the question of how as an Indonesian, or from a regional perspective, I would react to the continued Australian Defense Force move to the north. Again, I do not see this as a problem because Australia can only move to the north. And moving to the north does not necessarily mean to aim at Indonesia. Possible disturbances to Australia's security also can come only from the north as Australia is already so far "down under".
The more specific question relating to the acquisition of additional F 111 fighter jets is also not a question that is widely addressed in Indonesia. Even from the laymen's perspective it never occurs to many Indonesians why Australia would want to threaten Indonesia.
Finally, there is the question of how the relationship between Australia and Indonesia will be affected by the succession. I am not the one to give you any assurance but on the basis of my own assessment I believe that the transition in 1998 or beyond will be smooth. President Soeharto has made the point over and over again that the mechanism for the transfer of power is in place and that this will be used in accordance with the constitution and the constitutional spirit that has been nurtured by the New Order government.
Beyond this, two main factors support this view. Firstly, as at no other time before in Indonesia's history, it is possible now for the people to see a potential successor in the Vice President. Secondly, the stakes have been too high for the country and the people at large, but especially the rising and growing middle class, to allow for political instability and turmoil to accompany the succession. The situation would differ if the economy was going down and had been for many years.
A new leadership in Jakarta is not likely to negatively affect the development of the bilateral relationship with Australia. Internal developments in Indonesia, economically, politically and even socially, are not likely to lead to a divergence between our two societies. External, global developments in the course of the next 15 years are not likely to push us into two opposing camps.
Even if turmoil occurs in Indonesia, this will not threaten Australians if they are not involved in it. There will not be an outflow of Indonesian refugees as experienced in mainland Southeast Asia because there is no such tradition in the Indonesian archipelago.
In this new era of confidence building in our region let us be frank and readily acknowledge that at least our two countries do not face any real threat from anywhere. This does not mean that problems may not arise in our relations in the future, or that we are not faced with regional problems and conflicts. What is important is that we can talk about those emerging problems, and that a forum exists for regional countries to share their views and experiences, as well as the burden to maintain peace and stability in the region and globally.
Countries have legitimate needs for their defense and security. However, they also have the responsibility to give a clear explanation of what they intend to do and why. The 1994 Defense White Paper has greatly contributed to creating this new environment.