RI-Australia ties solidifying (2)<\/p>\n
The following is the second of two articles based on an
\nexcerpt of a paper presented by former minister of defense and
\nsecurity Gen. (ret.) L.B. Moerdani at a conference mid-last
\nmonth in Canberra hosted by the Australian Defense Studies
\nCenter.<\/p>\n
CANBERRA: At this point, allow me to elaborate on the
\nimportance of regional initiatives and efforts towards confidence
\nbuilding. The end of the Cold War has paved the way for a new era
\nin which a greater sense of regional cooperation and a stronger
\nspirit of multilateralism prevail. The changing security
\nenvironment and new challenges confronting the Asia-Pacific
\nregion have provided us with an unprecedented opportunity to
\nforge a closer partnership, namely through the enactment of a new
\nregional order based on regional cooperation and multilateralism.<\/p>\n
To ensure that the conceived regional order fully complies to
\nour own interests and priorities, it is essential that this new
\norder first and foremost facilitate the search and establishment
\nof a new equilibrium in the relationship between the United
\nStates, Japan and China. These three major powers are currently
\nundergoing significant domestic changes. As a result, their
\nexternal relations are also being continuously adjusted. These
\ndevelopments could produce major uncertainties that could
\nadversely affect the security and stability of the region.<\/p>\n
Local and regional sources of conflict abound and equally
\nthreaten the security of the region. Of late, developments in the
\nKorean peninsula have raised, rather than reduced, the level of
\nanxiety in the major capitals. The situation in Indochina is
\nstill highly precarious. In addition there is the so-called \"new
\nissues\" in international relations such as environment, drugs,
\nmigration, and human rights, just to name a few important ones.<\/p>\n
The new response to all these security issues may not lie in
\nthe multilateralism of the problems. Rather, the region should
\ndevelop practices, mechanisms or even structures that could help
\nfacilitate and actively support bilateral or local efforts
\ntowards peaceful settlements of dispute. Here is where Australia
\ncan cooperate closely with ASEAN countries.<\/p>\n
Within ASEAN itself there may not necessarily be a common
\nperception of threat at all times. However, ASEAN's cohesion is
\npromoted on the basis of an all-encompassing relationship.
\nASEAN's security interests are also developed along the notion of
\ncomprehensive security that encompasses all aspects of life.
\nASEAN cooperation in its totality is the barometer for the
\ncloseness among ASEAN countries. In some areas, the views within
\nASEAN may differ more pronouncedly than those between some ASEAN
\nmembers and some non-ASEAN member. However, it is the totality of
\nthe cooperation that is important.<\/p>\n
On the issue of the growing Australia-Singapore association, I
\ndo not think that this will create a problem for Indonesia,
\nespecially if this bilateral defense relationship is placed
\nwithin the context of Australia's regional engagement as
\ndescribed in the 1994 Defense White Paper. From a pragmatic point
\nof view, if such an association is considered important to
\nenhance Singapore's sense of security, it should be in
\nIndonesia's interest to see that Singapore associates itself with
\na close friend of Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Equally, on the question of the Five Power Defense
\nArrangements (FPDA), there is no longer any problem on
\nIndonesia's side. I need not give a lecture on why Indonesians do
\nnot like to be reminded of FPDA's origins. Today, as dictated by
\nour pragmatism, Indonesia does not want to make an issue of the
\ncontinued existence of the FPDA. However, as this issue is
\nbrought to my attention, I would like to make two points. First,
\nif the FPDA provides a framework for Australia's security
\nrelationships with Malaysia and Singapore which enhances their
\nsense of security, this should be seen as a contribution to the
\nenhancement of regional security. Second, as indicated in the
\n1994 Defense White Paper, the FPDA may undertake some
\nadjustments. As the FPDA should contribute to confidence building
\nnot only among its members but also in the wider region, it may
\nhenceforth focus its activities on joint exercises which will be
\nopen for other regional countries to observe.<\/p>\n
Australia's alliance with the United States will certainly not
\nhinder Australia's policy to get closer to ASEAN because some
\nASEAN members are themselves allies of the United States. ASEAN
\nalso has good relations with the United States but relationships
\ncan be further improved. Australia, being a U.S. ally, perhaps
\ncan contribute to this improvement by encouraging the United
\nStates to take a more balanced, less unilateral and assertive
\nstance towards ASEAN countries. This mediating role may come
\nnaturally as it is in Australia's own interests to see that good
\nrelations are maintained between Southeast Asia -- and Asia as a
\nwhole -- with the United States.<\/p>\n
On Australia's mediating role in the Spratly Islands disputes,
\nmuch will depend on the willingness of the claimant countries to
\ninternationalize the issue. China has clearly stated its
\nopposition to the involvement of non-claimant countries,
\nincluding involvement in the workshop series initiated by
\nIndonesia. Perhaps Australia can best contribute to resolving
\nthis problem through its bilateral diplomacy.<\/p>\n
There is the question of how as an Indonesian, or from a
\nregional perspective, I would react to the continued Australian
\nDefense Force move to the north. Again, I do not see this as a
\nproblem because Australia can only move to the north. And moving
\nto the north does not necessarily mean to aim at Indonesia.
\nPossible disturbances to Australia's security also can come only
\nfrom the north as Australia is already so far \"down under\".<\/p>\n
The more specific question relating to the acquisition of
\nadditional F 111 fighter jets is also not a question that is
\nwidely addressed in Indonesia. Even from the laymen's perspective
\nit never occurs to many Indonesians why Australia would want to
\nthreaten Indonesia.<\/p>\n
Finally, there is the question of how the relationship between
\nAustralia and Indonesia will be affected by the succession. I am
\nnot the one to give you any assurance but on the basis of my own
\nassessment I believe that the transition in 1998 or beyond will
\nbe smooth. President Soeharto has made the point over and over
\nagain that the mechanism for the transfer of power is in place
\nand that this will be used in accordance with the constitution
\nand the constitutional spirit that has been nurtured by the New
\nOrder government.<\/p>\n
Beyond this, two main factors support this view. Firstly, as
\nat no other time before in Indonesia's history, it is possible
\nnow for the people to see a potential successor in the Vice
\nPresident. Secondly, the stakes have been too high for the
\ncountry and the people at large, but especially the rising and
\ngrowing middle class, to allow for political instability and
\nturmoil to accompany the succession. The situation would differ
\nif the economy was going down and had been for many years.<\/p>\n
A new leadership in Jakarta is not likely to negatively affect
\nthe development of the bilateral relationship with Australia.
\nInternal developments in Indonesia, economically, politically and
\neven socially, are not likely to lead to a divergence between our
\ntwo societies. External, global developments in the course of the
\nnext 15 years are not likely to push us into two opposing camps.<\/p>\n
Even if turmoil occurs in Indonesia, this will not threaten
\nAustralians if they are not involved in it. There will not be an
\noutflow of Indonesian refugees as experienced in mainland
\nSoutheast Asia because there is no such tradition in the
\nIndonesian archipelago.<\/p>\n
In this new era of confidence building in our region let us be
\nfrank and readily acknowledge that at least our two countries do
\nnot face any real threat from anywhere. This does not mean that
\nproblems may not arise in our relations in the future, or that we
\nare not faced with regional problems and conflicts. What is
\nimportant is that we can talk about those emerging problems, and
\nthat a forum exists for regional countries to share their views
\nand experiences, as well as the burden to maintain peace and
\nstability in the region and globally.<\/p>\n
Countries have legitimate needs for their defense and
\nsecurity. However, they also have the responsibility to give a
\nclear explanation of what they intend to do and why. The 1994
\nDefense White Paper has greatly contributed to creating this new
\nenvironment.<\/p>",
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