Responses to crises: Jakarta and the Balkans

Responses to crises: Jakarta and the Balkans

By Suryono Darusman

Suryono Darusman looks at President Soeharto's recent proposal
to bring peace to the Balkans.

On his flight back from a recent trip to Europe, Indonesia's
President Soeharto put forward proposals for a peaceful
settlement of the ongoing civil war in the former Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. He was speaking to a group of journalists
who accompanied him on his official visit to Zagreb and Sarajevo
in early March.

Indonesia's move is a timely one. This is not merely because
the country is currently chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement
(NAM), but also because of the dismal failure of the United
States, the European Union and the United Nations to come to
grips with a situation which, if unresolved, will mean indefinite
human suffering for some 20 million people.

Viewed from a geopolitical perspective, it would be Europe --
Western Europe to be more precise -- that would feel the impact
of a prolonged armed conflict in the underbelly of the continent.
But the initial determination of Europe to act in partnership
with the United States, and under the umbrella of the UN in co-
operation with NATO, was in the end defeated by the different
national interests of the European states which have shown
an amazing inability to grasp the profound ethnic divisions
prevailing in the Balkans.

It also has been especially disappointing to the world at
large that the remaining post-Cold War superpower, the U.S., has
not been successful in finding the right formula through which to
use its international prestige and power to arrest the political
destabilization of the Balkans. Since the demise of communism in
Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia has ceased to carry sufficient
strategic significance for Washington to merit its special
attention. The Clinton Administration has been anxious not to
risk precious American lives to safeguard non-existent American
interests abroad.

As to other international reactions to the developments in the
former Yugoslav Republic, none have produced workable concepts
for a lasting solution.

The religious aspect of the Serbian-Bosnian confrontation has,
very wisely, not been pursued too actively by either belligerent
except for a Serbian effort to alert the European-Christian
community of the existence of a thesis, called Islamic
Declaration, written by Bosnian President Alia Izetbegovic in
1970 and the inherent danger emanating from a Moslem country in
the heart of Christian Europe.

Neither has the Moslem world community expressed firm demands
for direct and formal participation in the ongoing search for a
final solution to the Balkans crisis, beyond a strong
condemnation -- through the Organization of Islamic Conference --
of Serbia's aggression against Moslem Bosnia.

Within the Non-Aligned Movement, the case of Yugoslavia has
been of particular interest and concern. Each and every NAM
member state is aware of the dent it would make in the
credibility of the movement if the very symbol of non-alignment,
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, one of its founding members,
was irreparably shattered. However the not quite homogeneous
group of non-aligned countries carries many divergent views on
the issue. And the seeming inability of NAM to resolve
differences among its members has led to the movement's failure
to agree on a course of action to solve the conflict. This was
reflected in the "Jakarta Message" put out by NAM on Sept. 4,
1992, where no direct mention was made of the case of Yugoslavia
apart from re-asserting the movement's solemn commitment "to the
peaceful resolution in all regions of the world through a
sustained process of dialog and negotiations".

Three years later, with the process of deep human suffering
and destruction continuing, it was felt that a new approach was
called for to find a final solution to the Yugoslav crisis. In
the face of the possible resumption of hostilities leading to a
widening of the war, Indonesia came out with a proposal based on
the consideration that a comprehensive approach towards an
integral settlement might produce better results than the search
pursued thus far for partial solutions.

An important aspect to the proposal was that Indonesia itself
would not assume the role of mediator, but would act in the
capacity of a facilitator, providing the framework for the work
to be done. The best time and venue to present such an
alternative peace proposal was the official visits to Zagreb and
Sarajevo by President Soeharto. The proposal was well received by
Croatian President Franco Tudjman and Bosnian President Alia
Izetbegovic.

And there is reason to expect a similar receptive reaction
from the other republics -- Slovenia, Macedonia, Serbia and
Montenegro, who were approached through diplomatic channels.

The Indonesian peace proposal consists of a two-tier approach,
starting with a joint meeting among leaders of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro. The outcome of this meeting
is to be formalized in a wider international forum, including the
UN Security Council, the five-member Contact Group, and other
countries with a particular interest in a final settlement of the
conflict in the Balkans.

The basic principles of the negotiations are to include the
following: peaceful co-existence and non-interference in other
countries internal affairs; acceptance of relevant UN
resolutions/decisions; protection of ethnic minorities, and the
honoring of internationally-recognized borders. Safeguarding
those basic conditions might require a new state-format such as a
confederation.

No spectacular international reaction to the Indonesian
proposal was recorded, nor was it expected. UN Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali welcomed President Soeharto's initiative
"considering the fact that peace efforts made in the area have so
far reached a dead end". The foreign diplomatic community in
Jakarta, speaking for their respective governments, endorsed
Indonesia's peace plan, while at the same time wondering why it
came so late.

Given the awful complexity of the problem, it would be
unrealistic to expect much from Indonesia's undertaking. The very
first step will consist of convincing the main actors of the
drama to enter the new stage. Who will do the pushing and
prodding? The Contact Group? Most probably not the "facilitator".
Renewed efforts by past performers might hopefully bring better
results if approaches are made along the proposed new platform
for negotiations.

Irrespective of legitimate reasons for optimism or pessimism,
and dismissing irresponsible speculations of positional gains to
be derived in the context of Indonesian domestic politics, the
move made by President Soeharto was done in the spirit of
Indonesia's Pancasila ideology, the universal principles of the
Non-Aligned Movement and the simple objective of bringing peace
to mankind.

Suryono Darusman is a retired Indonesian ambassador.