Responses to crises: Jakarta and the Balkans

Responses to crises: Jakarta and the Balkans

By Suryono Darusman

Suryono Darusman looks at President Soeharto's recent proposal to bring peace to the Balkans.

On his flight back from a recent trip to Europe, Indonesia's President Soeharto put forward proposals for a peaceful settlement of the ongoing civil war in the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He was speaking to a group of journalists who accompanied him on his official visit to Zagreb and Sarajevo in early March.

Indonesia's move is a timely one. This is not merely because the country is currently chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), but also because of the dismal failure of the United States, the European Union and the United Nations to come to grips with a situation which, if unresolved, will mean indefinite human suffering for some 20 million people.

Viewed from a geopolitical perspective, it would be Europe -- Western Europe to be more precise -- that would feel the impact of a prolonged armed conflict in the underbelly of the continent. But the initial determination of Europe to act in partnership with the United States, and under the umbrella of the UN in co- operation with NATO, was in the end defeated by the different national interests of the European states which have shown an amazing inability to grasp the profound ethnic divisions prevailing in the Balkans.

It also has been especially disappointing to the world at large that the remaining post-Cold War superpower, the U.S., has not been successful in finding the right formula through which to use its international prestige and power to arrest the political destabilization of the Balkans. Since the demise of communism in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia has ceased to carry sufficient strategic significance for Washington to merit its special attention. The Clinton Administration has been anxious not to risk precious American lives to safeguard non-existent American interests abroad.

As to other international reactions to the developments in the former Yugoslav Republic, none have produced workable concepts for a lasting solution.

The religious aspect of the Serbian-Bosnian confrontation has, very wisely, not been pursued too actively by either belligerent except for a Serbian effort to alert the European-Christian community of the existence of a thesis, called Islamic Declaration, written by Bosnian President Alia Izetbegovic in 1970 and the inherent danger emanating from a Moslem country in the heart of Christian Europe.

Neither has the Moslem world community expressed firm demands for direct and formal participation in the ongoing search for a final solution to the Balkans crisis, beyond a strong condemnation -- through the Organization of Islamic Conference -- of Serbia's aggression against Moslem Bosnia.

Within the Non-Aligned Movement, the case of Yugoslavia has been of particular interest and concern. Each and every NAM member state is aware of the dent it would make in the credibility of the movement if the very symbol of non-alignment, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, one of its founding members, was irreparably shattered. However the not quite homogeneous group of non-aligned countries carries many divergent views on the issue. And the seeming inability of NAM to resolve differences among its members has led to the movement's failure to agree on a course of action to solve the conflict. This was reflected in the "Jakarta Message" put out by NAM on Sept. 4, 1992, where no direct mention was made of the case of Yugoslavia apart from re-asserting the movement's solemn commitment "to the peaceful resolution in all regions of the world through a sustained process of dialog and negotiations".

Three years later, with the process of deep human suffering and destruction continuing, it was felt that a new approach was called for to find a final solution to the Yugoslav crisis. In the face of the possible resumption of hostilities leading to a widening of the war, Indonesia came out with a proposal based on the consideration that a comprehensive approach towards an integral settlement might produce better results than the search pursued thus far for partial solutions.

An important aspect to the proposal was that Indonesia itself would not assume the role of mediator, but would act in the capacity of a facilitator, providing the framework for the work to be done. The best time and venue to present such an alternative peace proposal was the official visits to Zagreb and Sarajevo by President Soeharto. The proposal was well received by Croatian President Franco Tudjman and Bosnian President Alia Izetbegovic.

And there is reason to expect a similar receptive reaction from the other republics -- Slovenia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, who were approached through diplomatic channels.

The Indonesian peace proposal consists of a two-tier approach, starting with a joint meeting among leaders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro. The outcome of this meeting is to be formalized in a wider international forum, including the UN Security Council, the five-member Contact Group, and other countries with a particular interest in a final settlement of the conflict in the Balkans.

The basic principles of the negotiations are to include the following: peaceful co-existence and non-interference in other countries internal affairs; acceptance of relevant UN resolutions/decisions; protection of ethnic minorities, and the honoring of internationally-recognized borders. Safeguarding those basic conditions might require a new state-format such as a confederation.

No spectacular international reaction to the Indonesian proposal was recorded, nor was it expected. UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali welcomed President Soeharto's initiative "considering the fact that peace efforts made in the area have so far reached a dead end". The foreign diplomatic community in Jakarta, speaking for their respective governments, endorsed Indonesia's peace plan, while at the same time wondering why it came so late.

Given the awful complexity of the problem, it would be unrealistic to expect much from Indonesia's undertaking. The very first step will consist of convincing the main actors of the drama to enter the new stage. Who will do the pushing and prodding? The Contact Group? Most probably not the "facilitator". Renewed efforts by past performers might hopefully bring better results if approaches are made along the proposed new platform for negotiations.

Irrespective of legitimate reasons for optimism or pessimism, and dismissing irresponsible speculations of positional gains to be derived in the context of Indonesian domestic politics, the move made by President Soeharto was done in the spirit of Indonesia's Pancasila ideology, the universal principles of the Non-Aligned Movement and the simple objective of bringing peace to mankind.

Suryono Darusman is a retired Indonesian ambassador.