Responses to crises: Jakarta and the Balkans<\/p>\n
By Suryono Darusman<\/p>\n
Suryono Darusman looks at President Soeharto's recent proposal
\nto bring peace to the Balkans.<\/p>\n
On his flight back from a recent trip to Europe, Indonesia's
\nPresident Soeharto put forward proposals for a peaceful
\nsettlement of the ongoing civil war in the former Federal
\nRepublic of Yugoslavia. He was speaking to a group of journalists
\nwho accompanied him on his official visit to Zagreb and Sarajevo
\nin early March.<\/p>\n
Indonesia's move is a timely one. This is not merely because
\nthe country is currently chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement
\n(NAM), but also because of the dismal failure of the United
\nStates, the European Union and the United Nations to come to
\ngrips with a situation which, if unresolved, will mean indefinite
\nhuman suffering for some 20 million people.<\/p>\n
Viewed from a geopolitical perspective, it would be Europe --
\nWestern Europe to be more precise -- that would feel the impact
\nof a prolonged armed conflict in the underbelly of the continent.
\nBut the initial determination of Europe to act in partnership
\nwith the United States, and under the umbrella of the UN in co-
\noperation with NATO, was in the end defeated by the different
\nnational interests of the European states which have shown
\nan amazing inability to grasp the profound ethnic divisions
\nprevailing in the Balkans.<\/p>\n
It also has been especially disappointing to the world at
\nlarge that the remaining post-Cold War superpower, the U.S., has
\nnot been successful in finding the right formula through which to
\nuse its international prestige and power to arrest the political
\ndestabilization of the Balkans. Since the demise of communism in
\nEastern Europe, Yugoslavia has ceased to carry sufficient
\nstrategic significance for Washington to merit its special
\nattention. The Clinton Administration has been anxious not to
\nrisk precious American lives to safeguard non-existent American
\ninterests abroad.<\/p>\n
As to other international reactions to the developments in the
\nformer Yugoslav Republic, none have produced workable concepts
\nfor a lasting solution.<\/p>\n
The religious aspect of the Serbian-Bosnian confrontation has,
\nvery wisely, not been pursued too actively by either belligerent
\nexcept for a Serbian effort to alert the European-Christian
\ncommunity of the existence of a thesis, called Islamic
\nDeclaration, written by Bosnian President Alia Izetbegovic in
\n1970 and the inherent danger emanating from a Moslem country in
\nthe heart of Christian Europe.<\/p>\n
Neither has the Moslem world community expressed firm demands
\nfor direct and formal participation in the ongoing search for a
\nfinal solution to the Balkans crisis, beyond a strong
\ncondemnation -- through the Organization of Islamic Conference --
\nof Serbia's aggression against Moslem Bosnia.<\/p>\n
Within the Non-Aligned Movement, the case of Yugoslavia has
\nbeen of particular interest and concern. Each and every NAM
\nmember state is aware of the dent it would make in the
\ncredibility of the movement if the very symbol of non-alignment,
\nthe Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, one of its founding members,
\nwas irreparably shattered. However the not quite homogeneous
\ngroup of non-aligned countries carries many divergent views on
\nthe issue. And the seeming inability of NAM to resolve
\ndifferences among its members has led to the movement's failure
\nto agree on a course of action to solve the conflict. This was
\nreflected in the \"Jakarta Message\" put out by NAM on Sept. 4,
\n1992, where no direct mention was made of the case of Yugoslavia
\napart from re-asserting the movement's solemn commitment \"to the
\npeaceful resolution in all regions of the world through a
\nsustained process of dialog and negotiations\".<\/p>\n
Three years later, with the process of deep human suffering
\nand destruction continuing, it was felt that a new approach was
\ncalled for to find a final solution to the Yugoslav crisis. In
\nthe face of the possible resumption of hostilities leading to a
\nwidening of the war, Indonesia came out with a proposal based on
\nthe consideration that a comprehensive approach towards an
\nintegral settlement might produce better results than the search
\npursued thus far for partial solutions.<\/p>\n
An important aspect to the proposal was that Indonesia itself
\nwould not assume the role of mediator, but would act in the
\ncapacity of a facilitator, providing the framework for the work
\nto be done. The best time and venue to present such an
\nalternative peace proposal was the official visits to Zagreb and
\nSarajevo by President Soeharto. The proposal was well received by
\nCroatian President Franco Tudjman and Bosnian President Alia
\nIzetbegovic.<\/p>\n
And there is reason to expect a similar receptive reaction
\nfrom the other republics -- Slovenia, Macedonia, Serbia and
\nMontenegro, who were approached through diplomatic channels.<\/p>\n
The Indonesian peace proposal consists of a two-tier approach,
\nstarting with a joint meeting among leaders of the Federal
\nRepublic of Yugoslavia, Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia-
\nHerzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro. The outcome of this meeting
\nis to be formalized in a wider international forum, including the
\nUN Security Council, the five-member Contact Group, and other
\ncountries with a particular interest in a final settlement of the
\nconflict in the Balkans.<\/p>\n
The basic principles of the negotiations are to include the
\nfollowing: peaceful co-existence and non-interference in other
\ncountries internal affairs; acceptance of relevant UN
\nresolutions\/decisions; protection of ethnic minorities, and the
\nhonoring of internationally-recognized borders. Safeguarding
\nthose basic conditions might require a new state-format such as a
\nconfederation.<\/p>\n
No spectacular international reaction to the Indonesian
\nproposal was recorded, nor was it expected. UN Secretary-General
\nBoutros Boutros-Ghali welcomed President Soeharto's initiative
\n\"considering the fact that peace efforts made in the area have so
\nfar reached a dead end\". The foreign diplomatic community in
\nJakarta, speaking for their respective governments, endorsed
\nIndonesia's peace plan, while at the same time wondering why it
\ncame so late.<\/p>\n
Given the awful complexity of the problem, it would be
\nunrealistic to expect much from Indonesia's undertaking. The very
\nfirst step will consist of convincing the main actors of the
\ndrama to enter the new stage. Who will do the pushing and
\nprodding? The Contact Group? Most probably not the \"facilitator\".
\nRenewed efforts by past performers might hopefully bring better
\nresults if approaches are made along the proposed new platform
\nfor negotiations.<\/p>\n
Irrespective of legitimate reasons for optimism or pessimism,
\nand dismissing irresponsible speculations of positional gains to
\nbe derived in the context of Indonesian domestic politics, the
\nmove made by President Soeharto was done in the spirit of
\nIndonesia's Pancasila ideology, the universal principles of the
\nNon-Aligned Movement and the simple objective of bringing peace
\nto mankind.<\/p>\n
Suryono Darusman is a retired Indonesian ambassador.<\/p>", "url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/responses-to-crises-jakarta-and-the-balkans-1447893297", "image": "" }, "sponsor": "Okusi Associates", "sponsor_url": "https:\/\/okusiassociates.com" }