Resolving Japan-China problems

Resolving Japan-China problems

Takashi Shiraishi, The Yomiuri Shimbun, Asia News Network, Tokyo

After the April 23 meeting in Jakarta between Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi and Chinese President Hu Jintao, the storm of
anti-Japanese demonstrations that had taken place in many urban
centers in China last month appeared to have passed. But the
abrupt departure of Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi before her
scheduled meeting with Koizumi and the heated reaction on the
part of some Japanese have further mired Sino-Japanese relations
in the emotional quicksands of "saving face."

I do not believe that the anti-Japanese demonstrations in
April were all stage-managed by the Chinese government. There is
no question that anti-Japanese sentiment exists among young
Chinese, but the Chinese government undoubtedly mobilized these
sentiments to achieve its political purposes. Over the last three
years, the Japanese government has been trying to deal separately
with important diplomatic issues such as UN reform and becoming a
permanent member of the Security Council, Sino-Japanese relations
and Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine, East Asian economic
partnership, and the realignment of the U.S. military and Japan's
adjustment to it.

But this time the Chinese government made it clear, in a way
that could no longer be ignored, that some of these issues are
connected. There is no point in getting angry at the way the
Chinese went about making their point. The legitimacy of the
current regime in China is dependent on nationalism and the
performance of its socialist market economy.

The Chinese government can be expected to use patriotism to
shore up its regime and achieve its political objectives. No
diplomacy worth its name can afford to ignore this reality. It is
useless to harp on the "discourtesy" of the Chinese government.
Both countries now need to address the problems in a coolheaded
way.

What are the problems? The bottom line is: How do we deal with
the mutual distrust between Japan and China? Seen from the
Japanese perspective, the anti-Japanese demonstrations at the
Asia Cup soccer matches last year, China's exploration of natural
gas resources in the East China Sea, the incursion of a Chinese
nuclear submarine into Japanese territorial waters, the recent
nationwide anti-Japanese demonstrations and China's opposition to
Japan's aspirations to become a permanent member of the Security
Council all appear to signify China's hostility to Japan.

Seen from the Chinese perspective, Koizumi's visits to
Yasukuni, references to Taiwan in the Japan-U.S. strategic
dialogue, discussions in Japan about ending Japanese official
development assistance to China and the history textbook
controversy all appear to signify Japan's hostility to China.
Dissolving this mutual distrust, however slowly, is the primary
task.

What to do then? Strategic decisions on the history question
must be made by both sides.

It is a mistake to say that Japan has never apologized for its
colonial and wartime past. The Japanese government, for instance,
expressed its "deep regret" in the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint
Statement, the 1978 Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty and
the 1995 Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration. The Chinese government
accepted these statements. At the recent Jakarta summit meeting,
Hu proposed that the principle and spirit of these three
documents be upheld.

In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I
regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of
history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse
and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my
feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and
abroad, of that history."

This Japanese official policy was decided on by the Cabinet
and has since been reaffirmed, most recently by Koizumi himself
in his speech at the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung this
April. And yet Japan continues to be criticized for not
confronting its wartime past. This criticism is shared not only
by Chinese and Koreans, but by the world, as evident in Southeast
Asian, American and European reports on the demonstrations.

There are two reasons for this. The first is Koizumi's visits
to Yasukuni Shrine. The prime minister's visits to the shrine
where class-A war criminals are enshrined have created the
impression that the Koizumi administration has quietly undermined
the government policy formulated by Murayama. But the policy
committee headed by then Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda had
already recommended in 2002 the building of a new national war
memorial. What the prime minister should do now is stop visiting
the shrine and decide on the establishment of a new war memorial
to back up his speech at the Asia-Africa Conference.

The second reason is the history textbook controversy. The
Japanese government has proposed to undertake collaborative
research on history with the Chinese. This is welcome, but takes
time. Besides, only one out of eight middle school history
textbooks argues that the "Greater East Asia War" was a war of
liberation, and this textbook is used by less than 0.1 percent of
high schools (or fewer than 10 schools).

But it is useless to argue this point. As long as the current
national textbook authorization system exists, whatever it
authorizes will be viewed as state-sanctioned by people in China
and South Korea, countries that use state-sanctioned textbooks. A
third-party inspection system similar to that used in Germany
should replace the current national authorization system.

I do not propose this because of external pressure. Japan's
freedom of action has been constrained by its colonial and
wartime past. This is undesirable. The Chinese premier opposed
Japan's aspiration to become a permanent member of the UN
Security Council.

What the Japanese government should do is to deal with this
question in a way that cannot be misunderstood by anyone so that
no one can criticize the Japanese government for its failure to
deal with the past.

But, at the same time, restoring the friendship between Japan
and China is not solely Japan's responsibility. What the Chinese
government must do is up to the Chinese themselves, of course.
However, I urge the Chinese government to consider two points.

First of all, the Chinese government should punish those who
damaged Japanese property and injured Japanese citizens during
the demonstrations, as well compensate for the damage and the
injured.

Second, the Chinese government should stop disseminating
misinformation concerning Japan's "failure" to apologize for its
colonial and wartime history. As long as the Chinese government
relies on anti-Japanese patriotism and occupies the moral high
ground in relation to Japan, there can be no Sino-Japanese
friendship built on equality. The Chinese government should
educate its citizens about postwar Sino-Japanese efforts to
promote amity and economic cooperation between the two countries.

Stabilizing and strengthening Sino-Japanese relations are
crucial for Japan and China as well as for Asia and the world.
Sino-Japanese rapprochement is indispensable for building an East
Asia community. What is needed is to transform the current
relationship of mutual distrust into a relationship of mutual
trust.

The writer is a professor of the National Graduate Institute
for Policy Studies in Tokyo.