Resolving Japan-China problems

Takashi Shiraishi, The Yomiuri Shimbun, Asia News Network, Tokyo

After the April 23 meeting in Jakarta between Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Chinese President Hu Jintao, the storm of anti-Japanese demonstrations that had taken place in many urban centers in China last month appeared to have passed. But the abrupt departure of Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi before her scheduled meeting with Koizumi and the heated reaction on the part of some Japanese have further mired Sino-Japanese relations in the emotional quicksands of "saving face."

I do not believe that the anti-Japanese demonstrations in April were all stage-managed by the Chinese government. There is no question that anti-Japanese sentiment exists among young Chinese, but the Chinese government undoubtedly mobilized these sentiments to achieve its political purposes. Over the last three years, the Japanese government has been trying to deal separately with important diplomatic issues such as UN reform and becoming a permanent member of the Security Council, Sino-Japanese relations and Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine, East Asian economic partnership, and the realignment of the U.S. military and Japan's adjustment to it.

But this time the Chinese government made it clear, in a way that could no longer be ignored, that some of these issues are connected. There is no point in getting angry at the way the Chinese went about making their point. The legitimacy of the current regime in China is dependent on nationalism and the performance of its socialist market economy.

The Chinese government can be expected to use patriotism to shore up its regime and achieve its political objectives. No diplomacy worth its name can afford to ignore this reality. It is useless to harp on the "discourtesy" of the Chinese government. Both countries now need to address the problems in a coolheaded way.

What are the problems? The bottom line is: How do we deal with the mutual distrust between Japan and China? Seen from the Japanese perspective, the anti-Japanese demonstrations at the Asia Cup soccer matches last year, China's exploration of natural gas resources in the East China Sea, the incursion of a Chinese nuclear submarine into Japanese territorial waters, the recent nationwide anti-Japanese demonstrations and China's opposition to Japan's aspirations to become a permanent member of the Security Council all appear to signify China's hostility to Japan.

Seen from the Chinese perspective, Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni, references to Taiwan in the Japan-U.S. strategic dialogue, discussions in Japan about ending Japanese official development assistance to China and the history textbook controversy all appear to signify Japan's hostility to China. Dissolving this mutual distrust, however slowly, is the primary task.

What to do then? Strategic decisions on the history question must be made by both sides.

It is a mistake to say that Japan has never apologized for its colonial and wartime past. The Japanese government, for instance, expressed its "deep regret" in the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint Statement, the 1978 Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty and the 1995 Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration. The Chinese government accepted these statements. At the recent Jakarta summit meeting, Hu proposed that the principle and spirit of these three documents be upheld.

In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and abroad, of that history."

This Japanese official policy was decided on by the Cabinet and has since been reaffirmed, most recently by Koizumi himself in his speech at the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung this April. And yet Japan continues to be criticized for not confronting its wartime past. This criticism is shared not only by Chinese and Koreans, but by the world, as evident in Southeast Asian, American and European reports on the demonstrations.

There are two reasons for this. The first is Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine. The prime minister's visits to the shrine where class-A war criminals are enshrined have created the impression that the Koizumi administration has quietly undermined the government policy formulated by Murayama. But the policy committee headed by then Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda had already recommended in 2002 the building of a new national war memorial. What the prime minister should do now is stop visiting the shrine and decide on the establishment of a new war memorial to back up his speech at the Asia-Africa Conference.

The second reason is the history textbook controversy. The Japanese government has proposed to undertake collaborative research on history with the Chinese. This is welcome, but takes time. Besides, only one out of eight middle school history textbooks argues that the "Greater East Asia War" was a war of liberation, and this textbook is used by less than 0.1 percent of high schools (or fewer than 10 schools).

But it is useless to argue this point. As long as the current national textbook authorization system exists, whatever it authorizes will be viewed as state-sanctioned by people in China and South Korea, countries that use state-sanctioned textbooks. A third-party inspection system similar to that used in Germany should replace the current national authorization system.

I do not propose this because of external pressure. Japan's freedom of action has been constrained by its colonial and wartime past. This is undesirable. The Chinese premier opposed Japan's aspiration to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

What the Japanese government should do is to deal with this question in a way that cannot be misunderstood by anyone so that no one can criticize the Japanese government for its failure to deal with the past.

But, at the same time, restoring the friendship between Japan and China is not solely Japan's responsibility. What the Chinese government must do is up to the Chinese themselves, of course. However, I urge the Chinese government to consider two points.

First of all, the Chinese government should punish those who damaged Japanese property and injured Japanese citizens during the demonstrations, as well compensate for the damage and the injured.

Second, the Chinese government should stop disseminating misinformation concerning Japan's "failure" to apologize for its colonial and wartime history. As long as the Chinese government relies on anti-Japanese patriotism and occupies the moral high ground in relation to Japan, there can be no Sino-Japanese friendship built on equality. The Chinese government should educate its citizens about postwar Sino-Japanese efforts to promote amity and economic cooperation between the two countries.

Stabilizing and strengthening Sino-Japanese relations are crucial for Japan and China as well as for Asia and the world. Sino-Japanese rapprochement is indispensable for building an East Asia community. What is needed is to transform the current relationship of mutual distrust into a relationship of mutual trust.

The writer is a professor of the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo.