Resolving Japan-China problems<\/p>\n
Takashi Shiraishi, The Yomiuri Shimbun, Asia News Network, Tokyo<\/p>\n
After the April 23 meeting in Jakarta between Prime Minister
\nJunichiro Koizumi and Chinese President Hu Jintao, the storm of
\nanti-Japanese demonstrations that had taken place in many urban
\ncenters in China last month appeared to have passed. But the
\nabrupt departure of Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi before her
\nscheduled meeting with Koizumi and the heated reaction on the
\npart of some Japanese have further mired Sino-Japanese relations
\nin the emotional quicksands of \"saving face.\"<\/p>\n
I do not believe that the anti-Japanese demonstrations in
\nApril were all stage-managed by the Chinese government. There is
\nno question that anti-Japanese sentiment exists among young
\nChinese, but the Chinese government undoubtedly mobilized these
\nsentiments to achieve its political purposes. Over the last three
\nyears, the Japanese government has been trying to deal separately
\nwith important diplomatic issues such as UN reform and becoming a
\npermanent member of the Security Council, Sino-Japanese relations
\nand Koizumi's visits to Yasukuni Shrine, East Asian economic
\npartnership, and the realignment of the U.S. military and Japan's
\nadjustment to it.<\/p>\n
But this time the Chinese government made it clear, in a way
\nthat could no longer be ignored, that some of these issues are
\nconnected. There is no point in getting angry at the way the
\nChinese went about making their point. The legitimacy of the
\ncurrent regime in China is dependent on nationalism and the
\nperformance of its socialist market economy.<\/p>\n
The Chinese government can be expected to use patriotism to
\nshore up its regime and achieve its political objectives. No
\ndiplomacy worth its name can afford to ignore this reality. It is
\nuseless to harp on the \"discourtesy\" of the Chinese government.
\nBoth countries now need to address the problems in a coolheaded
\nway.<\/p>\n
What are the problems? The bottom line is: How do we deal with
\nthe mutual distrust between Japan and China? Seen from the
\nJapanese perspective, the anti-Japanese demonstrations at the
\nAsia Cup soccer matches last year, China's exploration of natural
\ngas resources in the East China Sea, the incursion of a Chinese
\nnuclear submarine into Japanese territorial waters, the recent
\nnationwide anti-Japanese demonstrations and China's opposition to
\nJapan's aspirations to become a permanent member of the Security
\nCouncil all appear to signify China's hostility to Japan.<\/p>\n
Seen from the Chinese perspective, Koizumi's visits to
\nYasukuni, references to Taiwan in the Japan-U.S. strategic
\ndialogue, discussions in Japan about ending Japanese official
\ndevelopment assistance to China and the history textbook
\ncontroversy all appear to signify Japan's hostility to China.
\nDissolving this mutual distrust, however slowly, is the primary
\ntask.<\/p>\n
What to do then? Strategic decisions on the history question
\nmust be made by both sides.<\/p>\n
It is a mistake to say that Japan has never apologized for its
\ncolonial and wartime past. The Japanese government, for instance,
\nexpressed its \"deep regret\" in the 1972 Sino-Japanese Joint
\nStatement, the 1978 Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty and
\nthe 1995 Sino-Japanese Joint Declaration. The Chinese government
\naccepted these statements. At the recent Jakarta summit meeting,
\nHu proposed that the principle and spirit of these three
\ndocuments be upheld.<\/p>\n
In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I
\nregard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of
\nhistory, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse
\nand state my heartfelt apology. Allow me also to express my
\nfeelings of profound mourning for all victims, both at home and
\nabroad, of that history.\"<\/p>\n
This Japanese official policy was decided on by the Cabinet
\nand has since been reaffirmed, most recently by Koizumi himself
\nin his speech at the Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung this
\nApril. And yet Japan continues to be criticized for not
\nconfronting its wartime past. This criticism is shared not only
\nby Chinese and Koreans, but by the world, as evident in Southeast
\nAsian, American and European reports on the demonstrations.<\/p>\n
There are two reasons for this. The first is Koizumi's visits
\nto Yasukuni Shrine. The prime minister's visits to the shrine
\nwhere class-A war criminals are enshrined have created the
\nimpression that the Koizumi administration has quietly undermined
\nthe government policy formulated by Murayama. But the policy
\ncommittee headed by then Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda had
\nalready recommended in 2002 the building of a new national war
\nmemorial. What the prime minister should do now is stop visiting
\nthe shrine and decide on the establishment of a new war memorial
\nto back up his speech at the Asia-Africa Conference.<\/p>\n
The second reason is the history textbook controversy. The
\nJapanese government has proposed to undertake collaborative
\nresearch on history with the Chinese. This is welcome, but takes
\ntime. Besides, only one out of eight middle school history
\ntextbooks argues that the \"Greater East Asia War\" was a war of
\nliberation, and this textbook is used by less than 0.1 percent of
\nhigh schools (or fewer than 10 schools).<\/p>\n
But it is useless to argue this point. As long as the current
\nnational textbook authorization system exists, whatever it
\nauthorizes will be viewed as state-sanctioned by people in China
\nand South Korea, countries that use state-sanctioned textbooks. A
\nthird-party inspection system similar to that used in Germany
\nshould replace the current national authorization system.<\/p>\n
I do not propose this because of external pressure. Japan's
\nfreedom of action has been constrained by its colonial and
\nwartime past. This is undesirable. The Chinese premier opposed
\nJapan's aspiration to become a permanent member of the UN
\nSecurity Council.<\/p>\n
What the Japanese government should do is to deal with this
\nquestion in a way that cannot be misunderstood by anyone so that
\nno one can criticize the Japanese government for its failure to
\ndeal with the past.<\/p>\n
But, at the same time, restoring the friendship between Japan
\nand China is not solely Japan's responsibility. What the Chinese
\ngovernment must do is up to the Chinese themselves, of course.
\nHowever, I urge the Chinese government to consider two points.<\/p>\n
First of all, the Chinese government should punish those who
\ndamaged Japanese property and injured Japanese citizens during
\nthe demonstrations, as well compensate for the damage and the
\ninjured.<\/p>\n
Second, the Chinese government should stop disseminating
\nmisinformation concerning Japan's \"failure\" to apologize for its
\ncolonial and wartime history. As long as the Chinese government
\nrelies on anti-Japanese patriotism and occupies the moral high
\nground in relation to Japan, there can be no Sino-Japanese
\nfriendship built on equality. The Chinese government should
\neducate its citizens about postwar Sino-Japanese efforts to
\npromote amity and economic cooperation between the two countries.<\/p>\n
Stabilizing and strengthening Sino-Japanese relations are
\ncrucial for Japan and China as well as for Asia and the world.
\nSino-Japanese rapprochement is indispensable for building an East
\nAsia community. What is needed is to transform the current
\nrelationship of mutual distrust into a relationship of mutual
\ntrust.<\/p>\n
The writer is a professor of the National Graduate Institute
\nfor Policy Studies in Tokyo.<\/p>",
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