Reform of the National Police

Reform of the National Police

The following is the summary of the Feb. 20 report of the
Brussels-based International Crisis Group on the National Police.

JAKARTA: In the euphoria at the demise of the New Order, there
was an expectation that the 1945 Constitution's declaration that
Indonesia was a state based on the rule of law might be
resurrected after 40 years of neglect.

The euphoria soon dissipated, however, when the scale of the
challenge and the weakness of the first democratically elected
government since 1957 became evident.

Reform of particular institutions, like the Indonesian
National Police, cannot be implemented in isolation from the
other institutions of state. An effective police force will soon
be rendered impotent if prosecutors, judges, and prison governors
fail in their responsibilities.

Likewise, reform in any of these institutions is unlikely if
government revenues are not adequate to pay salaries that meet
basic needs and cover the basic resources and operational costs
of the institutions of government.

As a result of these shortcomings, corruption has become
endemic across the whole field of public employment from top to
bottom. Despite democratic elections, the underlying political
structures are still based on deeply rooted patronage networks.

Reforms that threaten these structures will be strongly
resisted unless means are found to raise taxes to cover
reasonable costs of government and legitimize the existing
structures of power.

Reform is not so much a matter of inadequate law, feeble
institutions, ethical codes or expertise as of mustering
political will. The Abdurrahman Wahid government is in survival
mode, and there are doubts about the capacity of a successor
government to address fundamental issues.

Even in the absence of political will, however, it should
still be possible and productive to pursue reform in areas of
police administration and operations that do not threaten the
structures of power.

As political conditions change, reform might spread to more
significant areas, eventually containing corruption to manageable
levels. But there should be no illusions that this is a short-
term process.

Senior police leadership is seen by some observers to be
heavily politicized and inclined to block officers who want to
push reform more energetically.

That might be so but it also faces an enormous task of
maintaining a semblance of law and order across a huge country
while trying to exercise expanded responsibilities for internal
security with grossly inadequate resources.

It may consider that trying to impose radical change in such
circumstances would overwhelm the capacity of the organization to
cope.

Regardless of senior leadership's motives, the absence of
pressure from within reinforces the need for political leadership
to provide the policy, resources and oversight to drive the
reform process forward.

The discussion of individual motives also suggests that "the
power of one" should not be forgotten. Authoritarianism seeks to
suppress individuality but individuals with vision,
organizational skills and drive will emerge and should be
identified and encouraged.

These persons, even acting separately, can give organic
direction and impetus that might eventually force democratic
change in and on the institutions of state, including the police
and create a culture that minimises corruption.

Recommendations to the Indonesian government are as follows:

In the short term:

1. Appoint a multi-disciplinary, broadly representative
commission to review the role, function and organization of
police within the emerging political and social structure, taking
account of the introduction of regional autonomy, and clarify the
law enforcement role of other government agencies.

2. Introduce legislation to implement the agreed results of
the above review.

3. Establish a cabinet committee to oversee approved reforms.

4. Provide police chiefs with clear terms of appointment and
goals for reform.

5. Establish a mechanism to review political activity laws,
especially pertaining to treason, subversion and other crimes
against the state, to ensure legitimate political activity is not
impeded by threat of criminal sanctions.

6. Revise the draft police bill to emphasize the law
enforcement rather than "security" role of the police.

7. Transfer the volunteer civil defense militia organization
(Hansip) to local government and disassociate it from the police.

8. Review internal security and devise an overall strategy for
reconciling regional grievances within a national framework,
including the role of the police.

9. Overhaul the education and training system to produce
recruits attuned to the new social environment and reorient those
already in the service.

10. Establish a publicly accountable body to manage police-
owned businesses.

In the medium term:

11. Review human resource management, including terms and
conditions of employment, and expand hiring of women and
horizontal recruitment.

12. Examine National Police coordination with other law
enforcement elements, especially the state prosecutor and the
judicial system, and including the police forces of neighboring
countries.

13. Dispose of or revamp police businesses.

14. Develop the ombudsman's office or a separate external
review mechanism to handle complaints against the police.

15. Encourage community groups to foster cooperation with and
oversight of police.

To the international community:

16. Encourage Indonesian politicians to take the lead on
police reform, including helping to show how reform can be
implemented in a non-threatening way and developing links to
foreign parliamentary police oversight bodies.

17. Support non-governmental groups promoting constructive
police reform.

18. Encourage graduate and post-graduate studies in policing
for both police and students of public administration or
political science.

19. Expand opportunities for Indonesian police to gain
experience of how police forces in democratic countries are
managed, controlled, and operate.

20. Adjust the level, content and material support of in-
country training and expand co-operation with the National Police
in areas of mutual interest like international crime as and when
democratic reform takes hold.

21. Support military reform as an essential complement to
National Police reform.