Reconciling quixotic reform pressures

Reconciling quixotic reform pressures

By Kusnanto Anggoro

JAKARTA (JP): What is now the legitimate and justified reform
question under the leadership of President Megawati
Soekarnoputri? No sensible person would be capable of giving a
satisfactory answer. Three years ago, in the immediate aftermath
of the downfall of Soeharto, many could have answered the
question with much greater certainty. However, developments and
events during the reign of Abdurrahman Wahid have had a dazzling
effect on us regarding our view of our ongoing struggle for
democracy.

Abdurrahman, or Gus Dur, is a great man, for sure. He remains
the doyen of democracy, justice, and humanity, with his strong
commitment toward pluralism, tolerance, peaceful resolution of
conflict and respect of human rights. More than any other
president of Indonesia, he desacralized some of the state's
symbols, including the State Palace and government bureaucracy.
However, he was incapable of managing an effective government.
His style of leadership was too erratic, setting the tone to his
own orchestra, making it difficult for others to follow his
rhythm.

Megawati has now taken up the presidency. The way she selected
her Cabinet appears to have negated earlier accusations that she
was unable to decide things on her own. Many would consider her
as more capable than she appears, uncertain though her capability
may be to rein in her coalition partners. For sure, the success
of Megawati's government will depend on dynamics in the
legislature and the support of the state bureaucracy, both of
which were pretty well dominated by reluctant reformers, if not
conservatives.

To purist democracy and human rights activists, Megawati's
ascendancy will lead to the return of Soeharto-era forces into
political life, which could end Indonesia's road to democracy.
Her fervent nationalist patina may jeopardize regional autonomy.
The creation of a state minister for communications and
information and the presence of a lieutenant-general at the helm
of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Regional Autonomy have
revived fears of a return to an authoritarian past.

These are all indeed legitimate worries. Soeharto's rule has
become a serious cause of distress and infringement of human
rights. A victim of the 1965 massacre is not able to turn a new
page before the previous page has even been read. The relatives
of students who were shot dead in the Trisakti and Semanggi
incidents in 1998 are hearing the new, before they have heard the
truth of history. Victims of incidents in Lampung, Aceh, and East
Timor will not expect that the hurt in their hearts can be
forgotten before it is healed.

Undoubtedly, the urgent need to restore peace and stability,
national as well as regional, is the prerequisite for an economic
recovery that will stimulate foreign as well as domestic
investment. This urgency may bring a more statist approach of
governance back to the fore.

Megawati will be more determined to resort to military
solutions than Abdurrahman; she will also be more cautious in
implementing regional autonomy. She is a constitutionalist with a
marked streak of legalism. Her close relations with the military
may hinder trials of human rights abuses in East Timor, Aceh and
elsewhere.

To a certain extent, this could create serious problems
between the Megawati government and civil society. Human rights
activists may well be disappointed by the world discussing the
new, before talking about resolving old problems. Their fears
have been expressed in recent statements by rights activists in
New York and Canberra and environmentalists in London; their
voicing of opposition against closer military relations with
Indonesia's military has indicated such worries.

Indeed, one cannot expect too much from transitional regimes.
As the scholar Samuel Huntington suggests, the building of
democracy requires a balance between excessive participation and
political institutionalization. Nick Kirtz presupposed the
persistence of transitional justice, in which laws could well be
insufficient instruments to seek justice.

Mohammed Ayoob has even suggested that "adequate stateness"
(of democracies) allows the use of coercive forces, including the
national police and the military, so long as such decisions are
reached through democratic processes by institutions in
authority.

The tranquility of transition, especially a transition that
failed to completely break with the past, would have to
accommodate the more pervasive aspects of the old regime.

The psyche of transition pragmatically assumes obectives that
are more practical than idealistic. Democratic mechanisms such as
transparency and accountability could well be more important than
purist democratic norms, values, and virtues. Megawati's
government is hardly an exception. It may be nothing wrong, at
least until 2004, to use extra-constitutional measures so long as
they are morally legitimate and politically justifiable.

After all, the struggle for reform, democracy and human rights
will not stand still because Megawati tells it to. Those who want
to be part of the future must keep pace with changes in the
course of history. We must not be woven so intricately into the
past that we are unable calmly to turn our attention to the new.
Perhaps, the present struggle is for us to be more confident and
realistic.

There is simply no place now for a "Don Quixote", a man who
absurdly tilted at windmills that he thought were monstrous
giants.

Dr. Kusnanto Anggoro is a senior researcher at the Centre for
Strategic and International Studies and a lecturer in Strategic
Studies at the postgraduate studies program at the University of
Indonesia.