Rebels have no address to be obliterated

Rebels have no address to be obliterated

Kanis Dursin, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

Foreign Affairs Minister Hassan Wirayuda unleashed the first-ever
scathing criticism by any Indonesian official on the invasion and
occupation of Iraq in early December, almost nine months after
allied forces, led by the world's lone superpower, the United
States, dropped their first bombs at selected targets across Iraq
in March.

"Terrorists have no fixed addresses that can be obliterated
once and for all with a surgical military strike," the Cabinet
minister told the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia
Pacific (CSCAP) conference here on Dec. 8.

He continued, "if those weapons (of mass destruction) have not
been found because they do not exist, then an entire country has
been leveled to the ground for no good reason."

Isn't the government doing just that in Aceh against its own
people and in its own territory? Didn't the Cabinet minister
realize that Indonesia too, the world's largest Muslim country,
has been engaged in a lopsided war against an outnumbered, poorly
trained, ill-equipped separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM)?

In a desperate attempt to crack down on the secessionist
movement, President Megawati Soekarnoputri placed the country's
westernmost province of Aceh under a state of emergency with the
declaration of martial law on May 19, paving the way for a power-
hungry military to take the reins in the resource-rich province.

Massive military offensive ensued, with the government
mobilizing some 35,000 combat troops and 14,000 police personnel,
mostly from the much-feared paramilitary Mobile Brigade (Brimob).
Tanks and warplanes were also moved overnight to support the
country's largest-ever military deployment. Since then, Aceh has
become a real-life battleground, with the military pounding and
raiding suspected GAM strongholds and hideouts, day in, day out.

But seven months into the operation, GAM rebels are still very
much around and their leaders are still in full command of the
secessionist movement. Indeed, government troops have regained
territories previously controlled by GAM but the insurgency still
poses a great security threat to both civilians and the military.
Its mission not accomplished, the government extended martial law
in mid-November for another six months.

In the meantime, over 300 innocent civilians have lost their
lives in a war they never waged. And to borrow the words of
Minister Hassan, these people have died "for no good reason." It
is for no good reason because their deaths do not and will not
change for the better the situation in Aceh and certainly will
not make Acehnese rebels give up their struggle for independence.

On the contrary, the war has dashed any hopes of a peaceful
settlement to the Aceh question. As government troops intensify
military operations and GAM rebels harden their demands for
independence, more casualties, including innocent civilians, are
likely to be sustained. That means the Acehnese will have to
suffer even more. Already, at the onset of operations, tens of
thousands of students in Aceh had to face the full brunt of the
so-called integrated operation as government troops failed to
anticipate the rebels' scorched-earth tactics in torching
hundreds of schools in the province.

If the ultimate goal of the current military offensive in Aceh
was to wipe out the decades-long secessionist movement by
arresting or killing all GAM rebels and their commanders, then
the government has little to brag about. Government troops and
police personnel have so far managed to kill just over 1,000
rebels and arrest almost 2,000 others. None of those arrested or
killed were senior members or leaders of the separatist movement.

Jakarta has indeed restored some local administrations by
installing former and active military personnel as regents and
district heads, but these newly restored local administrations
cannot function effectively without the support of the military
and police. Peace and order in those areas also remain volatile,
with local residents living in perpetual fear of being caught in
cross fire between government troops and rebels. Needless to say,
tens of thousands of Acehnese have opted to stay in makeshift
refugee camps and have to put up with miserable conditions in
those squalid camps just to spare themselves from stray bullets.

The Aceh war came after the failure of a last-ditch attempt to
save a peace agreement signed in December 2002. Under the
agreement, known as the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement
(COHA), both the government and GAM rebels vowed to end all
hostilities across the province. The government pledged, among
other things, to move its troops from offensive to defensive
positions and confine the function of Brimob police to
maintaining peace and order. The rebels, for their part, agreed
to store their weapons and abandon independence aspirations by
accepting the special autonomy status introduced in 2001. To lend
more credibility to the landmark deal, both parties agreed to
invite observers from two neighboring countries, the Philippines
and Thailand, to monitor its implementation. The peace agreement
was then hailed as the dawn of peace in Aceh.

Peace proved to be short-lived as the government and rebels
soon realized that they were strange bedfellows rather than
soulmates. They began to recant their respective vows and slowly
drifted apart, only to confront each other at deadly armed
encounters.

Government troops were never withdrawn to defensive positions
and Brimob never changed into territorial police in charge of
peace and order, while GAM members refused to collect their
weapons and continued to campaign for independence. Moreover,
neither the government nor the rebels admitted that they were
violating the peace agreement, which was sponsored by the
Switzerland-based Henry Dunant Centre. Instead of apologizing for
breaching the agreement, both sides busily pointed fingers at
each other.

In a move that could be seen more as an attempt to justify its
impending military operation than a sincere search for peace, the
government invited GAM rebels to a last-minute meeting, but with
a string attached: The rebels had to accept unconditionally the
territorial integrity of the country, which included Aceh. It was
easy to guess that GAM members would turn down the invitation.
Thus the military operation went ahead.

The operation, which saw the deployment of some of the
country's sophisticated weaponry, including warplanes and tanks,
has so far failed to bring Acehnese rebels to their knees. The
secessionist movement remains intact and rebel leaders move
around the province undisturbed, with some readily accessible for
press interviews. Defiant as ever, virtually all GAM leaders have
eluded massive searches and have been spared from relentless air
bombardment.

If the Aceh war has produced any lessons to be learned, it
should be these: First, rebels too, just like terrorists, have no
fixed address for government troops to blow up; thus, marching
dozens of thousands of troops and police personnel against ill-
equipped, poorly trained Acehnese rebels is extremely
disproportionate. Second, ideology, including independence
ideology, cannot be defeated by military might. This holds true
in Northern Ireland, Mindanao in the Southern Philippines and
even now in Iraq. This should also be true for Aceh and Papua,
where the government has been engaging a low-level, poorly
organized rebel group, the Free Papua Movement (OPM).

It does not mean, however, that an ideology cannot be
defeated. Of course it can -- but only by another ideology.

The secessionist movement in Aceh started only in 1976, almost
two decades after Acehnese leaders had voluntarily pooled their
personal money to buy a commercial airplane. Money earned by
operating the plane was used to finance struggles for recognition
of the country's independence. This clearly suggests that
Acehnese have from the very birth of the country shared the
ideology of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia.

So, what went wrong? Looking back, Jakarta has failed Aceh and
has largely ignored the aspirations of Acehnese people. The
central government promised to grant Aceh special status in terms
of religion, culture, and education, but as of now has not yet
honored its words. Instead, Jakarta plundered Aceh's resources,
returning only a tiny fraction of the abundant wealth to the
Acehnese. Even demands by Acehnese people to prosecute those
responsible for gross human rights violations in Aceh, including
military officers, have fallen on deaf ears. What do we expect
from people whom we have failed, plundered, and whose rights we
have violated? Loyalty is certainly not one of them.

It is worth noting that the ongoing operation has failed to
draw Acehnese people to the government side. While Acehnese have
not displayed their support for GAM rebels publicly, they have
shown little interest in divulging information about the
whereabouts of GAM members and their leaders, making it difficult
for troops to track them down. This "indifference," however,
should not be taken to mean that they support the secessionist
movement. It simply demonstrates that for the Acehnese a military
operation is simply not the way to resolve the Aceh question once
and for all.

The government took the right path when it introduced in 2001
special autonomy status for Aceh, under which the province would
largely manage its own government and retain almost 70 percent of
its revenues. The province would also be free to implement sharia
(Islamic law) and establish a sharia court. The government,
however, has yet to implement the law.

Since Jakarta has long failed Aceh and violated the rights of
its people, don't expect the Acehnese, especially GAM rebels, to
patch up their differences with the government quickly and
abandon their independence aspirations. The government has to go
the extra mile, proving to and convincing the Acehnese and the
rebels that it is now serious about addressing their grievances.
It is the government, not GAM rebels, that has to prove that it
is sincere in its peaceful undertaking.

Acehnese rebels are likely to bend on engaging the government
in endless bloody conflict in order to advance their independence
aspiration and would torpedo any peace initiative in the future.
In this case, the government, especially its troops on the
ground, has to exercise patience and self-restraint.

Jakarta needs Aceh more than Aceh needs Jakarta. Aceh can do
without Jakarta, but Jakarta cannot do without Aceh. An
independent Aceh would likely spark more rebellions in other
parts of the world's largest archipelagic country.

"The war against terrorism is a struggle for the hearts and
minds of populations. That struggle calls for wise policies, not
smart bombs," said Minister Hassan. Indeed, the same principle
applies to rebellions like GAM in Aceh and OPM in Papua.

TNI vs. GAM in the ongoing war in Aceh

Personnel

TNI: Around 47,000, comprising 34,679 soldiers from all of the
three forces -- Army, Navy and Air Force, along with around
12,000 police.

GAM: Earlier was reportedly between 5,000 to 8,000 fighters.
After more than six months of military offensive, offensive,
TNI claimed to have killed over 1,000 GAM rebels and arrested
2,000 others.

Arsenal

TNI: 13 Scorpion tanks, 23 Navy amphibious tanks, 12 Navy tanks,
two F-16 jet fighters, 4 Hawk-200, six Hercules carriers, one
Superpuma, five Twinpack, helicopters, six OV-10 Bronco military
aircraft, one Hawk MK-53 fighter and two F-5 jet fighters.

GAM: 8,000 weapons, including SS-1, AK-47, AK-54 rifles and homemade
bombs.