Rapprochement Between Sunnis and Shias: From Taqrib to Conflict and Then Ta’ayush (II)
By Fahmi Salim, Chairman of Fordamai and Deputy Chairman of the HLNKI Commission of the MUI Centre
Republika.co.id, Jakarta — Dar at-Taqrib bayna al-Madzahib al-Islamiyyah (the Institute for Rapprochement Between Islamic Sects) was founded in Cairo in 1947. To oppose Western colonialism and prevent the establishment of Israel after World War II, unity and Sunni–Shia rapprochement were deemed essential.
Dar at-Taqrib was established through collaboration between Sunni and Shia scholars. Four scholars who consecutively served as Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar joined: Muhammad Mustafa al-Maraghi, Mustafa ’Abd ar-Raziq, Abdul Majid Salim, and Mahmud al-Shaltut. Also joined were Hasan al-Banna, leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and Haj Amin al-Husaini, Mufti of Palestine.
From among Shia scholars, major figures joined: Muhammad Taqi al-Qummi, Muhammad Husain Kashif al-Ghitha’, Muhammad Jawad Mughniyah, and Husain al-Burujirdi.
This Institute published the magazine Risalat al-Islam as its official mouthpiece, taking God’s word: “Sesungguhnya umatmu ini adalah umat yang satu, dan Aku adalah Tuhanmu, maka sembahlah Aku.” (QS. al-Anbiya: 92) as its slogan, as the expression of the aim to unite Muslims across madhahib and to convey the one message of Islam to humanity.
Many thinkers and literary figures wrote in this magazine, including: Muhammad Abu Zahrah, Muhammad al-Madani, Ahmad Amin, Abbas al-’Aqqad, and Muhammad Farid Wajdi.
The magazine was published for 60 editions before it ceased, followed by the closure of Dar at-Taqrib itself in 1979 through political decisions of the Anwar Sadat regime, after the Iranian Revolution and the deterioration of Egypt–Iran relations to total severance.
From Taqrib to Conflict
After the closure of Dar at-Taqrib, the course of history moved toward conflict, triggered by political factors, psychological background, differences in fiqh, and theological differences. The eight-year war between Iraq and Iran (1980-1988) following the Khomenei Revolution deepened the sectarian rift. Gulf regimes fearful of the “Iranian revolutionary movement” also fanned the flames of sectarian strife.
The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, followed by the Arab Spring waves in 2011-2013, and the Saudi–Iran regional conflict from 2012-2024, created a fertile environment for the rise of the sectarian propaganda monster. Thousands of lives, billions of dollars, and tons of weapons and bombs were poured into the cauldron of conflict.
As a result, extremists on both sides found justification: Shia described as “Rafidhah Kafir,” Sunnis described as “Nawashib Jahat.” Ethnic extremism revived “Persian Shu‘ubiyya” and “Arab fanaticism.”
Worse, an ugly narrative emerged since 2007: Hamas is Shia and Iran’s proxy that Muslims of the Ahlus Sunnah are forbidden to support. There were even those who argued: it would be better to normalise with Zionist Israel than join the resistance axis of Hamas supported by Iran and Hezbollah.
Finally, the Ikhwanul Muslimin’s narrative was pro-Shia to the extent that it ought to be designated a terrorist organisation in Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon. Perhaps Donald Trump made that decision due to pressure from Israel, which was overwhelmed by the Palestine resistance narrative supported by broad international public opinion.
The end result: efforts at unity and rapprochement declined, while the conflict and division between Sunnis and Shias grew stronger, which of course benefits the Zionist oppressor.