Public involvement crucial in fight against terror

Public involvement crucial in fight against terror

Following the second bomb attack on Bali in under three years,
the government plans to amend the current antiterror law, which
is considered ineffective in stamping out terrorism. Head of the
antiterror desk at the Office of Coordinating Minister for
Political, Legal and Security Affairs Ansja'ad Mbai shared the
reasons behind the revision with The Jakarta Post's Tiarma Siboro
and Dwi Atmanta.

Question: The government intends to involve the Indonesian
Military more in counterterror activities. What are the
obstacles?

Answer: There has been public resistance to the plan due to
the traumatic experience in the past. The TNI (Indonesian
Military) involvement was legitimate back in the New Order time.
Now that the military is the subject of the reform movement, we
need a comprehensive study before reviving the old policy.

As the head of the antiterror desk I have recommended that the
TNI intelligence unit be involved in the early prevention stage.
The TNI has the infrastructure, personnel and other resources,
why should we not make good use of those things? The government
realizes terrorists are the enemies of the nation, the state and
all religions; therefore all institutions in this nation should
fight them. Without the involvement of intelligence agents, we
will only be able react after there are more bomb attacks, plane
hijackings, mass killings or abductions.

The "war on terror" emphasizes preventive measures, which
start from detection of people who inculcate radicalism, hatred,
and hostility against certain groups, religions or nations. The
next phase is detection of activities to recruit, train,
brainwash and provide equipment and funding for people to
perpetrate acts of terrorism. Public support is pivotal to make
intelligence missions a success.

How important is public support?

It might sound like anecdotal evidence, but we did find out
after each bomb attack on Bali in 2002, the J.W. Marriott Hotel,
the Australian Embassy and Bali for the second time, that two men
usually rent a house and dozens of pairs of sandals can be seen
outside the front door most nights; they ordered dozens of meals
to be delivered and bought various brands of cigarettes.
Neighbors actually noticed all these peculiar things. The bombs
were not assembled in forests, but in the house next door.

Terror attack have always required a long process, starting
from the rental of, usually, a boarding house and getting new ID
cards, which should be easily detected by neighborhood or
community unit heads. That kind of support is what the government
needs from the public when the military territorial operation is
revived. There cannot be great intelligence or policing without
public support.

Coordination between the military and police has been ongoing
since the Bali bombing in 2002. Has it been effective?

Indeed it has been, but such cooperation has been less
effective as we have not had full cooperation from other
institutions. For example the Ministry of Home Affairs,
especially when it comes to applications for new ID cards. Also
the Directorate General of Immigration has been lax in the case
of applications for new passports, and so forth. Most of us can
recall that the Jamaah Islamiyah leader in Singapore, Mas Slamet
Kastari, who several years ago fled Singapore, got to Penang and
proceeded to Belawan (Medan's seaport), Denpasar, Surabaya and
settled in Sidoarjo, East Java.

In less than one month, he was able to obtain an Indonesian ID
card and passport for himself, in addition to helping his wife do
the same before they were finally arrested in Tanjung Pinang port
(on Bintan island near Singapore). A case like this is why
interdepartmental coordination is so important. Jamaah Islamiyah
is a politically motivated group, which intends to establish a
large pan-Islamic state (across southeastern Asia). This movement
cannot be addressed through legal and intelligence measures
alone, but also requires the involvement of other institutions.

How?

Their aspirations can be channeled through political parties
in this democratic country. We may open a dialog with spiritual
leaders and supporters of such an ideology, in order to get to
know what they want; what kind of Islamic state and sharia they
want to implement.

Such a democratic exercise occurred when Islamic politicians
demanded the formalization of the Jakarta Charter in our
Constitution, but to no avail. Religious, economic and social
approaches are also possible.

Extreme religious conservatism at the grassroots level cannot
be addressed through military operations or law enforcement
alone, but through the persuasive approach using religious
figures, in this case the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the
Indonesian Ulema Council and Muslim clerics.

We can ask the extremist groups what books they read and which
teachings justify the killing of others. We have also learned
that most suicide bombers have come from poor families, although
poverty does not equate with terrorism necessarily.

What we should do is consider how to address the root causes
of terrorism, such as the feelings of being oppressed,
marginalization, the endless cycle of revenge in conflict areas,
the reaction against globalization, the reaction against U.S.
hegemony and other issues. To address poverty, we need to create
more jobs.

Which measures are most urgent?

We need to integrate the work of law enforcement institutions
and intelligence, as well as improve security in public
facilities and establishments in transportation and energy
infrastructure, which are prone to terror attacks.

Since the government has refused to ban it, does Jamaah
Islamiyah really exist in Indonesia?

I have no capacity to comment on that. It'd be better to ask
me what JI is. The facts and what I saw myself reveal that JI was
behind the terror attacks. Evidence presented to the court in the
trial of the Bali bombers, in the form of documents and other
materials, showed that the masterminds and field operators of the
attack were JI members.

The bomb attacks on the residence of the Philippine envoy to
Indonesia, on the Marriott Hotel and the Australian Embassy, were
perpetrated by JI. Singapore released a white book on JI and
Malaysia arrested dozens of JI members.

JI member (Indonesian citizen) Fatur Rachman Al-Ghozi was
captured and later shot dead in the Philippines and several
Indonesian students arrested in Pakistan are JI members. A
military training ground in Mindanao belongs to JI and some
verdicts handed down by the South Jakarta District Court refer to
the defendants as JI members.

Are these things not considered proof? The UN has also listed
JI as a terrorist organization, so what else is there for us to
deny?