President Ziang's visit boosts Sino-Indian ties

President Ziang's visit boosts Sino-Indian ties

By Dipankar Banerjee

The recent visit of the Chinese President to India helped to
improve relations.

SINGAPORE: A ceremonial 21-gun salute welcomed Mr. Jiang Zemin
at the forecourt of Lutyen's Vice Regal Palace in New Delhi,
marking the first ever visit to India by a Chinese President. The
visit was a part of China's ongoing attempt at improving
bilateral relations with its neighbors, especially with those
with whom there are outstanding issues, such as Vietnam, the
Central Asian Republics and Russia.

It was also why Jiang included Pakistan and Nepal in his South
Asian itinerary. But the significance of this particular foray
has an impact on a wider canvas. A mention of its highlights will
need to precede an analysis of political, economic and security
issues.

Jiang came at a time of steadily improving relations between
India and China in recent years. Border talks started in 1981.
Except for a period of tension along the eastern border in
1986-87, these talks have made some progress. An agreement was
signed in 1993 to maintain "peace and tranquility" along the
Line of Actual Control (LAC) without prejudice to the eventual
settlement of the boundary question. Military confidence-building
measures (MCBMs) between the two sides have been strengthened
over the years.

Four agreements were signed during President Jiang's visit.
One was on maintaining India's Consulate General in Hong Kong.
Another on co-operation to check narcotics trafficking. The third
was on maritime transport. The fourth, and the most important,
was on MCBMs along the LAC.

The last agreement may be divided into two parts. First are
issues that are in the nature of general statements: "Neither
side will use its military capability against the other ...", and
that the boundary question will be settled in a "fair, reasonable
and mutually acceptable" manner.

The second part consisted of substantive measures at force
reduction and limiting military activities. Fairly comprehensive
arrangements will be worked out later and include reducing all
security forces and major military equipment. Details will be
prepared after further discussions based on the principle of
equal and mutual security. Advance notice will be given for troop
exercises involving more than a brigade, and exercises above
divisional level will be avoided. Combat aircraft will keep out
of an area 10 km from the LAC.

Full implementation of the agreement will depend on arriving
at a common understanding of the LAC. Though this line, it is
claimed, is defined objectively as one that separates the forces
on either side, differences exist on at least a few areas. An LAC
clarification exercise will be expedited through the exchange of
maps. Large territories that are under dispute make the
resolution of the LAC an imperative and a precondition to
stability, even though both sides are determined to maintain
peace along the line.

Some have argued that the agreement is not new. It has merely
packaged existing arrangements into one document and attempted
to present this as a major achievement of the visit. This is
largely true, though some forward movement is also visible.
Therein lies the importance of the first part of the agreement
and in particular the statement on "non-use of military
capability against each other". This is a powerful commitment
towards peace and comes close to a no-war pact.

Politically, Sino-Indian relations are delicately poised. The
asymmetry in political power is widening in the global arena.
Through skillful diplomacy, China has established itself as a
major player in the world. Washington is increasingly
accommodating its interests, as was evident during Chinese
Defense Minister General Chi Haotian's visit to the United States
recently.

Clinton's second term is likely to focus more closely on
improving relations with Beijing. On the other hand, India has
allowed itself to be isolated on non-proliferation issues with
its stand on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Its "moral
high ground" no longer carries much weight. It is still far from
getting a clear endorsement on a permanent seat at the UN
Security Council. Given these vulnerabilities India has done well
to limit China's advantages and pursued its interests skillfully
on the border. The question is whether delaying a final
settlement, along lines that have by now become clear, is in
India's interest.

The same cannot be said of Indian diplomacy in containing
growing Sino-Pakistan interaction. China's continuing help to
Islamabad's nuclear program and supply of missiles and missile
technology is an issue of deep concern to Delhi. Yet, it is not
often raised forcefully during bilateral dialogues. Beijing's
statements on these issues have been evasive and its commitment
to the Missile Technology Control Regime, to which it is an
adherent, is far from satisfactory.

From Beijing's perception, Pakistan furthers its interaction
with the Islamic world to the West and is a relationship that
will be nurtured independently. It also helps to keep India tied
down to the sub-continent. However, it is also true that
Beijing's policy on Kashmir has undergone a change in recent
years. This was evident in President Jiang's address to the
Pakistani Senate on Dec. 2. Without mentioning Kashmir directly,
he hoped that the South Asian countries would settle their
differences peacefully through "mutual understanding and mutual
accommodation". A position much closer to India's than what
Pakistan would like.

Jiang made specific reference to the possibilities of economic
co-operation in a major address to business leaders in Delhi.
Mutual trade has increased by about 30 percent annually over the
past few years. But in 1995 the total value stood at only US$1.1
billion, accounting for merely 0.4 percent of China's global
trade and 2.3 percent of India's. There is enormous potential
for growth, even though both economies may be comparable and
hence competitive. Major structural changes are needed to bring
this about.

Eastern India will need to open up to China, both to the north
across Arunachal Pradesh and through Myanmar across a land route.
Some movement on these lines may be expected as India implements
its "look east" policy. But this will need to overcome obsession
with past conflict in favor of pragmatic business co-operation
through individual and group entrepreneurship.

That brings us to the larger security dimension of this
relationship. Asymmetry in economic and political power and an
unresolved border situation are not normally conducive to peace
and stability between two countries. Along with this is the
reality of China's military modernization and its nuclear weapons
upgrading programs.

How do these developments mesh with its wider attempts at
developing good relations with its neighbors? How would large
countries such as India ensure their security and maintain their
strategic options? Through resolving outstanding disputes no
doubt but also through maintaining an adequate capability to deal
with unexpected and changing situations.

How would this evolving relationship impact on the
Asia-Pacific? Two major countries that are both growing and
integrating with the region provide enormous opportunity to all
players. A stable and mature relationship between them will no
doubt be a positive factor. As China transitions slowly to a more
open and democratic regime there are bound to be pressures both
within and without. In the meantime, resolving outstanding issues
with it through engagement and dialogue provides the best option.

Major-General (ret.) Dipankar Banerjee is the Co-Director,
Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.