President Ziang's visit boosts Sino-Indian ties

President Ziang's visit boosts Sino-Indian ties

By Dipankar Banerjee

The recent visit of the Chinese President to India helped to improve relations.

SINGAPORE: A ceremonial 21-gun salute welcomed Mr. Jiang Zemin at the forecourt of Lutyen's Vice Regal Palace in New Delhi, marking the first ever visit to India by a Chinese President. The visit was a part of China's ongoing attempt at improving bilateral relations with its neighbors, especially with those with whom there are outstanding issues, such as Vietnam, the Central Asian Republics and Russia.

It was also why Jiang included Pakistan and Nepal in his South Asian itinerary. But the significance of this particular foray has an impact on a wider canvas. A mention of its highlights will need to precede an analysis of political, economic and security issues.

Jiang came at a time of steadily improving relations between India and China in recent years. Border talks started in 1981. Except for a period of tension along the eastern border in 1986-87, these talks have made some progress. An agreement was signed in 1993 to maintain "peace and tranquility" along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) without prejudice to the eventual settlement of the boundary question. Military confidence-building measures (MCBMs) between the two sides have been strengthened over the years.

Four agreements were signed during President Jiang's visit. One was on maintaining India's Consulate General in Hong Kong. Another on co-operation to check narcotics trafficking. The third was on maritime transport. The fourth, and the most important, was on MCBMs along the LAC.

The last agreement may be divided into two parts. First are issues that are in the nature of general statements: "Neither side will use its military capability against the other ...", and that the boundary question will be settled in a "fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable" manner.

The second part consisted of substantive measures at force reduction and limiting military activities. Fairly comprehensive arrangements will be worked out later and include reducing all security forces and major military equipment. Details will be prepared after further discussions based on the principle of equal and mutual security. Advance notice will be given for troop exercises involving more than a brigade, and exercises above divisional level will be avoided. Combat aircraft will keep out of an area 10 km from the LAC.

Full implementation of the agreement will depend on arriving at a common understanding of the LAC. Though this line, it is claimed, is defined objectively as one that separates the forces on either side, differences exist on at least a few areas. An LAC clarification exercise will be expedited through the exchange of maps. Large territories that are under dispute make the resolution of the LAC an imperative and a precondition to stability, even though both sides are determined to maintain peace along the line.

Some have argued that the agreement is not new. It has merely packaged existing arrangements into one document and attempted to present this as a major achievement of the visit. This is largely true, though some forward movement is also visible. Therein lies the importance of the first part of the agreement and in particular the statement on "non-use of military capability against each other". This is a powerful commitment towards peace and comes close to a no-war pact.

Politically, Sino-Indian relations are delicately poised. The asymmetry in political power is widening in the global arena. Through skillful diplomacy, China has established itself as a major player in the world. Washington is increasingly accommodating its interests, as was evident during Chinese Defense Minister General Chi Haotian's visit to the United States recently.

Clinton's second term is likely to focus more closely on improving relations with Beijing. On the other hand, India has allowed itself to be isolated on non-proliferation issues with its stand on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Its "moral high ground" no longer carries much weight. It is still far from getting a clear endorsement on a permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Given these vulnerabilities India has done well to limit China's advantages and pursued its interests skillfully on the border. The question is whether delaying a final settlement, along lines that have by now become clear, is in India's interest.

The same cannot be said of Indian diplomacy in containing growing Sino-Pakistan interaction. China's continuing help to Islamabad's nuclear program and supply of missiles and missile technology is an issue of deep concern to Delhi. Yet, it is not often raised forcefully during bilateral dialogues. Beijing's statements on these issues have been evasive and its commitment to the Missile Technology Control Regime, to which it is an adherent, is far from satisfactory.

From Beijing's perception, Pakistan furthers its interaction with the Islamic world to the West and is a relationship that will be nurtured independently. It also helps to keep India tied down to the sub-continent. However, it is also true that Beijing's policy on Kashmir has undergone a change in recent years. This was evident in President Jiang's address to the Pakistani Senate on Dec. 2. Without mentioning Kashmir directly, he hoped that the South Asian countries would settle their differences peacefully through "mutual understanding and mutual accommodation". A position much closer to India's than what Pakistan would like.

Jiang made specific reference to the possibilities of economic co-operation in a major address to business leaders in Delhi. Mutual trade has increased by about 30 percent annually over the past few years. But in 1995 the total value stood at only US$1.1 billion, accounting for merely 0.4 percent of China's global trade and 2.3 percent of India's. There is enormous potential for growth, even though both economies may be comparable and hence competitive. Major structural changes are needed to bring this about.

Eastern India will need to open up to China, both to the north across Arunachal Pradesh and through Myanmar across a land route. Some movement on these lines may be expected as India implements its "look east" policy. But this will need to overcome obsession with past conflict in favor of pragmatic business co-operation through individual and group entrepreneurship.

That brings us to the larger security dimension of this relationship. Asymmetry in economic and political power and an unresolved border situation are not normally conducive to peace and stability between two countries. Along with this is the reality of China's military modernization and its nuclear weapons upgrading programs.

How do these developments mesh with its wider attempts at developing good relations with its neighbors? How would large countries such as India ensure their security and maintain their strategic options? Through resolving outstanding disputes no doubt but also through maintaining an adequate capability to deal with unexpected and changing situations.

How would this evolving relationship impact on the Asia-Pacific? Two major countries that are both growing and integrating with the region provide enormous opportunity to all players. A stable and mature relationship between them will no doubt be a positive factor. As China transitions slowly to a more open and democratic regime there are bound to be pressures both within and without. In the meantime, resolving outstanding issues with it through engagement and dialogue provides the best option.

Major-General (ret.) Dipankar Banerjee is the Co-Director, Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.