President Ziang's visit boosts Sino-Indian ties<\/p>\n
By Dipankar Banerjee<\/p>\n
The recent visit of the Chinese President to India helped to
\nimprove relations.<\/p>\n
SINGAPORE: A ceremonial 21-gun salute welcomed Mr. Jiang Zemin
\nat the forecourt of Lutyen's Vice Regal Palace in New Delhi,
\nmarking the first ever visit to India by a Chinese President. The
\nvisit was a part of China's ongoing attempt at improving
\nbilateral relations with its neighbors, especially with those
\nwith whom there are outstanding issues, such as Vietnam, the
\nCentral Asian Republics and Russia.<\/p>\n
It was also why Jiang included Pakistan and Nepal in his South
\nAsian itinerary. But the significance of this particular foray
\nhas an impact on a wider canvas. A mention of its highlights will
\nneed to precede an analysis of political, economic and security
\nissues.<\/p>\n
Jiang came at a time of steadily improving relations between
\nIndia and China in recent years. Border talks started in 1981.
\nExcept for a period of tension along the eastern border in
\n1986-87, these talks have made some progress. An agreement was
\nsigned in 1993 to maintain "peace and tranquility" along the
\nLine of Actual Control (LAC) without prejudice to the eventual
\nsettlement of the boundary question. Military confidence-building
\nmeasures (MCBMs) between the two sides have been strengthened
\nover the years.<\/p>\n
Four agreements were signed during President Jiang's visit.
\nOne was on maintaining India's Consulate General in Hong Kong.
\nAnother on co-operation to check narcotics trafficking. The third
\nwas on maritime transport. The fourth, and the most important,
\nwas on MCBMs along the LAC.<\/p>\n
The last agreement may be divided into two parts. First are
\nissues that are in the nature of general statements: "Neither
\nside will use its military capability against the other ...", and
\nthat the boundary question will be settled in a "fair, reasonable
\nand mutually acceptable" manner.<\/p>\n
The second part consisted of substantive measures at force
\nreduction and limiting military activities. Fairly comprehensive
\narrangements will be worked out later and include reducing all
\nsecurity forces and major military equipment. Details will be
\nprepared after further discussions based on the principle of
\nequal and mutual security. Advance notice will be given for troop
\nexercises involving more than a brigade, and exercises above
\ndivisional level will be avoided. Combat aircraft will keep out
\nof an area 10 km from the LAC.<\/p>\n
Full implementation of the agreement will depend on arriving
\nat a common understanding of the LAC. Though this line, it is
\nclaimed, is defined objectively as one that separates the forces
\non either side, differences exist on at least a few areas. An LAC
\nclarification exercise will be expedited through the exchange of
\nmaps. Large territories that are under dispute make the
\nresolution of the LAC an imperative and a precondition to
\nstability, even though both sides are determined to maintain
\npeace along the line.<\/p>\n
Some have argued that the agreement is not new. It has merely
\npackaged existing arrangements into one document and attempted
\nto present this as a major achievement of the visit. This is
\nlargely true, though some forward movement is also visible.
\nTherein lies the importance of the first part of the agreement
\nand in particular the statement on "non-use of military
\ncapability against each other". This is a powerful commitment
\ntowards peace and comes close to a no-war pact.<\/p>\n
Politically, Sino-Indian relations are delicately poised. The
\nasymmetry in political power is widening in the global arena.
\nThrough skillful diplomacy, China has established itself as a
\nmajor player in the world. Washington is increasingly
\naccommodating its interests, as was evident during Chinese
\nDefense Minister General Chi Haotian's visit to the United States
\nrecently.<\/p>\n
Clinton's second term is likely to focus more closely on
\nimproving relations with Beijing. On the other hand, India has
\nallowed itself to be isolated on non-proliferation issues with
\nits stand on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Its "moral
\nhigh ground" no longer carries much weight. It is still far from
\ngetting a clear endorsement on a permanent seat at the UN
\nSecurity Council. Given these vulnerabilities India has done well
\nto limit China's advantages and pursued its interests skillfully
\non the border. The question is whether delaying a final
\nsettlement, along lines that have by now become clear, is in
\nIndia's interest.<\/p>\n
The same cannot be said of Indian diplomacy in containing
\ngrowing Sino-Pakistan interaction. China's continuing help to
\nIslamabad's nuclear program and supply of missiles and missile
\ntechnology is an issue of deep concern to Delhi. Yet, it is not
\noften raised forcefully during bilateral dialogues. Beijing's
\nstatements on these issues have been evasive and its commitment
\nto the Missile Technology Control Regime, to which it is an
\nadherent, is far from satisfactory.<\/p>\n
From Beijing's perception, Pakistan furthers its interaction
\nwith the Islamic world to the West and is a relationship that
\nwill be nurtured independently. It also helps to keep India tied
\ndown to the sub-continent. However, it is also true that
\nBeijing's policy on Kashmir has undergone a change in recent
\nyears. This was evident in President Jiang's address to the
\nPakistani Senate on Dec. 2. Without mentioning Kashmir directly,
\nhe hoped that the South Asian countries would settle their
\ndifferences peacefully through "mutual understanding and mutual
\naccommodation". A position much closer to India's than what
\nPakistan would like.<\/p>\n
Jiang made specific reference to the possibilities of economic
\nco-operation in a major address to business leaders in Delhi.
\nMutual trade has increased by about 30 percent annually over the
\npast few years. But in 1995 the total value stood at only US$1.1
\nbillion, accounting for merely 0.4 percent of China's global
\ntrade and 2.3 percent of India's. There is enormous potential
\nfor growth, even though both economies may be comparable and
\nhence competitive. Major structural changes are needed to bring
\nthis about.<\/p>\n
Eastern India will need to open up to China, both to the north
\nacross Arunachal Pradesh and through Myanmar across a land route.
\nSome movement on these lines may be expected as India implements
\nits "look east" policy. But this will need to overcome obsession
\nwith past conflict in favor of pragmatic business co-operation
\nthrough individual and group entrepreneurship.<\/p>\n
That brings us to the larger security dimension of this
\nrelationship. Asymmetry in economic and political power and an
\nunresolved border situation are not normally conducive to peace
\nand stability between two countries. Along with this is the
\nreality of China's military modernization and its nuclear weapons
\nupgrading programs.<\/p>\n
How do these developments mesh with its wider attempts at
\ndeveloping good relations with its neighbors? How would large
\ncountries such as India ensure their security and maintain their
\nstrategic options? Through resolving outstanding disputes no
\ndoubt but also through maintaining an adequate capability to deal
\nwith unexpected and changing situations.<\/p>\n
How would this evolving relationship impact on the
\nAsia-Pacific? Two major countries that are both growing and
\nintegrating with the region provide enormous opportunity to all
\nplayers. A stable and mature relationship between them will no
\ndoubt be a positive factor. As China transitions slowly to a more
\nopen and democratic regime there are bound to be pressures both
\nwithin and without. In the meantime, resolving outstanding issues
\nwith it through engagement and dialogue provides the best option.<\/p>\n
Major-General (ret.) Dipankar Banerjee is the Co-Director,
\nInstitute for Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi.<\/p>",
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