PPP now aims for religious-nationalist Muslim voters

Rais Hidayat, Research and Development Unit, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta

There is no way for any party to survive in these rapidly changing times without making adjustments. The United Development Party (PPP), seeking support mainly among Indonesia's 83 percent of Muslims, is not in doubt. Now PPP refers to itself as a "religious but nationalist" party.

One crucial sign for the need for change among several parties was found in the results of the 1999 election. Each of the parties that had stated the enforcement of the sharia as part of their agenda, namely PPP, the Crescent Star Party (PBB) and the then Justice Party (PK) only managed to garner a sum total of 16 percent of the votes nationwide.

This figure was much lower than the number of votes gained by the parties espousing the sharia in the 1955 election, which different sources put at between 43 and 45 percent.

This showed that voters and/or their children previously associated with the Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations (Masyumi), the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the Indonesian Muslim Association Party (PSII), and Islamic Tarbiyah Party (Perti), which wanted sharia law in 1955, are now much less attracted to the idea of strict Islamic law.

Coming to terms with the end of the New Order regime under Soeharto from 1965 to 1998, which suppressed anyone standing up too strongly for Islamist ideals, and also the hard facts of the 1999 poll results, PPP now displays a desire to show that it supports "Muslim" and also "nationalist" aspirations. The results have been mixed.

In 2002, when a number of groups and political parties pushed to amend the Constitution on issues concerning religious affairs, PPP did not take a strong stance either way.

During the party's congress last May, the establishment of an Islamic state and enforcement of the sharia -- two issues usually associated with those claiming to represent "pure" Islamic interest -- were not even on the agenda.

PPP, set up in 1973 as a conglomeration of several Islamist parties and organizations, thus seems to be also targeting voters of secular parties -- the only option if it wants to get more votes. And despite Golkar being the best nurtured party over 30 years, PPP still has a few factors to its advantage; the first being a huge, established network that reaches into rural areas in a number of "loyal" provinces.

Second, the party is also more consolidated. Learning from the 1999 election when it got just under 11 percent of votes, PPP has become better at identifying Muslim communities with "traditional" or "modernist" outlooks, from which it might draw potential voters. Some of those communities have indeed gone to the new parties like the National Awakening Party (PKB), with its strong NU network, or the National Mandate Party (PAN) often associated with the other large Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah.

But with many loyalists still on board, established over the last three decades in areas such as parts of Java and Sumatra, PPP may be able to maintain its strong bases and expand to reach others.

A third factor is that PPP seems to have gotten past its internal conflicts. There are no longer power struggles between the original parties and organizations grouped together to form PPP. NU, for instance, always felt manipulated by PPP to get votes from its millions of members while it then would become sidelined after elections.

There have only been conflicts which are considered individual, particularly that involving noted Islamist orator Zainuddin MZ, who was nominated but lost to Hamzah Haz in a struggle for the party's leadership. Zainuddin now has formed the Reform Star Party (PBR). PPP will lose some votes to PBR, but it may have become a more solid party.

It is unclear whether it has really sorted out what seems to be the root of the "personal" conflicts, that of the lack of regeneration with many of the "oldies" dominating PPP.

Fourth, the presence of a few retired military officers including Yunus Yosfiah shows that PPP is accommodating "outsiders." The military has traditionally been suspicious of "Islamist" parties, but the presence of Yunus may break down some of that suspicion and earn it more credibility.

Yet another positive factor for PPP is the position of Hamzah as vice president of the country, adding greatly to its exposure. Cooperation between "Islamists" and "nationalists" used to be nearly impossible, but that may have been overcome by the "duo" of Hamzah and President Megawati Soekarnoputri of the "nationalist" Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P).

However Hamzah has taken stances which may have raised eyebrows among the "moderate" Muslims he would like to court. He visited the commander of the paramilitary group Laskar Jihad, Umar Thalib, while the latter was in jail for allegedly inciting attacks on Christian villages in Maluku.

Hamzah also spoke up strongly in defense of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, despite his suspected links to Jamaah Islamiyah, a regional network on the list of terrorist groups linked to al- Qaeda.

He also maintains good relations with hardline organizations such as the Islamic Defenders' Front (FPI) and Majelis Mujahidin.

Yet such groups so far form a small portion of the population and will not likely boost overall voting percentages for the party, which is hoping for 20 percent of votes in April -- an increase from 10.7 percent in 1999 election.

Additionally, there is no indication of significantly better positioning in certain regions. War-torn Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, currently under martial law, and the only province that PPP won in 1999, is no longer a good place to build support.

In Jakarta, where it secured second place in 1999, PPP faces many new parties, most notably the new Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) which seems to gaining popularity among urban, well- educated Muslims. In South Sulawesi, PPP was second in 1999 but with only 8 percent, and it is no match for Golkar, which took 67 percent there.

Further, PPP is not a leader in public opinion. The party has neither spoken up clearly on law enforcement, an issue of appeal to middle-class voters. Hamzah's concern for small- and medium- sized enterprises is one of its strong points; but PPP, to borrow the words of some young people, still seems to be a party of the elderly, given its little impact on modern, reform-oriented policy.