PPP now aims for religious-nationalist Muslim voters<\/p>\n
Rais Hidayat, Research and Development Unit, The Jakarta Post, Jakarta<\/p>\n
There is no way for any party to survive in these rapidly
\nchanging times without making adjustments. The United Development
\nParty (PPP), seeking support mainly among Indonesia's 83 percent
\nof Muslims, is not in doubt. Now PPP refers to itself as a
\n"religious but nationalist" party.<\/p>\n
One crucial sign for the need for change among several parties
\nwas found in the results of the 1999 election. Each of the
\nparties that had stated the enforcement of the sharia as part of
\ntheir agenda, namely PPP, the Crescent Star Party (PBB) and the
\nthen Justice Party (PK) only managed to garner a sum total of 16
\npercent of the votes nationwide.<\/p>\n
This figure was much lower than the number of votes gained by
\nthe parties espousing the sharia in the 1955 election, which
\ndifferent sources put at between 43 and 45 percent.<\/p>\n
This showed that voters and\/or their children previously
\nassociated with the Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations
\n(Masyumi), the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the Indonesian Muslim
\nAssociation Party (PSII), and Islamic Tarbiyah Party (Perti),
\nwhich wanted sharia law in 1955, are now much less attracted to
\nthe idea of strict Islamic law.<\/p>\n
Coming to terms with the end of the New Order regime under
\nSoeharto from 1965 to 1998, which suppressed anyone standing up
\ntoo strongly for Islamist ideals, and also the hard facts of the
\n1999 poll results, PPP now displays a desire to show that it
\nsupports "Muslim" and also "nationalist" aspirations. The results
\nhave been mixed.<\/p>\n
In 2002, when a number of groups and political parties pushed
\nto amend the Constitution on issues concerning religious affairs,
\nPPP did not take a strong stance either way.<\/p>\n
During the party's congress last May, the establishment of an
\nIslamic state and enforcement of the sharia -- two issues usually
\nassociated with those claiming to represent "pure" Islamic
\ninterest -- were not even on the agenda.<\/p>\n
PPP, set up in 1973 as a conglomeration of several Islamist
\nparties and organizations, thus seems to be also targeting voters
\nof secular parties -- the only option if it wants to get more
\nvotes. And despite Golkar being the best nurtured party over 30
\nyears, PPP still has a few factors to its advantage; the first
\nbeing a huge, established network that reaches into rural areas
\nin a number of "loyal" provinces.<\/p>\n
Second, the party is also more consolidated. Learning from the
\n1999 election when it got just under 11 percent of votes, PPP has
\nbecome better at identifying Muslim communities with
\n"traditional" or "modernist" outlooks, from which it might draw
\npotential voters. Some of those communities have indeed gone to
\nthe new parties like the National Awakening Party (PKB), with its
\nstrong NU network, or the National Mandate Party (PAN) often
\nassociated with the other large Muslim organization,
\nMuhammadiyah.<\/p>\n
But with many loyalists still on board, established over the
\nlast three decades in areas such as parts of Java and Sumatra,
\nPPP may be able to maintain its strong bases and expand to reach
\nothers.<\/p>\n
A third factor is that PPP seems to have gotten past its
\ninternal conflicts. There are no longer power struggles between
\nthe original parties and organizations grouped together to form
\nPPP. NU, for instance, always felt manipulated by PPP to get
\nvotes from its millions of members while it then would become
\nsidelined after elections.<\/p>\n
There have only been conflicts which are considered
\nindividual, particularly that involving noted Islamist orator
\nZainuddin MZ, who was nominated but lost to Hamzah Haz in a
\nstruggle for the party's leadership. Zainuddin now has formed the
\nReform Star Party (PBR). PPP will lose some votes to PBR, but it
\nmay have become a more solid party.<\/p>\n
It is unclear whether it has really sorted out what seems to
\nbe the root of the "personal" conflicts, that of the lack of
\nregeneration with many of the "oldies" dominating PPP.<\/p>\n
Fourth, the presence of a few retired military officers
\nincluding Yunus Yosfiah shows that PPP is accommodating
\n"outsiders." The military has traditionally been suspicious of
\n"Islamist" parties, but the presence of Yunus may break down some
\nof that suspicion and earn it more credibility.<\/p>\n
Yet another positive factor for PPP is the position of Hamzah
\nas vice president of the country, adding greatly to its exposure.
\nCooperation between "Islamists" and "nationalists" used to be
\nnearly impossible, but that may have been overcome by the "duo"
\nof Hamzah and President Megawati Soekarnoputri of the
\n"nationalist" Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P).<\/p>\n
However Hamzah has taken stances which may have raised
\neyebrows among the "moderate" Muslims he would like to court. He
\nvisited the commander of the paramilitary group Laskar Jihad,
\nUmar Thalib, while the latter was in jail for allegedly inciting
\nattacks on Christian villages in Maluku.<\/p>\n
Hamzah also spoke up strongly in defense of Abu Bakar
\nBa'asyir, despite his suspected links to Jamaah Islamiyah, a
\nregional network on the list of terrorist groups linked to al-
\nQaeda.<\/p>\n
He also maintains good relations with hardline organizations
\nsuch as the Islamic Defenders' Front (FPI) and Majelis Mujahidin.<\/p>\n
Yet such groups so far form a small portion of the population
\nand will not likely boost overall voting percentages for the
\nparty, which is hoping for 20 percent of votes in April -- an
\nincrease from 10.7 percent in 1999 election.<\/p>\n
Additionally, there is no indication of significantly better
\npositioning in certain regions. War-torn Nanggroe Aceh
\nDarussalam, currently under martial law, and the only province
\nthat PPP won in 1999, is no longer a good place to build support.<\/p>\n
In Jakarta, where it secured second place in 1999, PPP faces
\nmany new parties, most notably the new Prosperous Justice Party
\n(PKS) which seems to gaining popularity among urban, well-
\neducated Muslims. In South Sulawesi, PPP was second in 1999 but
\nwith only 8 percent, and it is no match for Golkar, which took 67
\npercent there.<\/p>\n
Further, PPP is not a leader in public opinion. The party has
\nneither spoken up clearly on law enforcement, an issue of appeal
\nto middle-class voters. Hamzah's concern for small- and medium-
\nsized enterprises is one of its strong points; but
\nPPP, to borrow the words of some young people, still seems to be
\na party of the elderly, given its little impact on modern,
\nreform-oriented policy.<\/p>",
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