Post-Cold War nuclear proliferation

Post-Cold War nuclear proliferation

By Marty Natalegawa

Jakarta (JP): The continuing uncertainty over North Korea's
suspected nuclear program has shown how unfounded were the hopes
that the end of the Cold War would reduce the world's
preoccupation with nuclear issues.

Of course, the Cold War and nuclear weapons were always
closely entwined. The American-Soviet nuclear arms race was
arguably the most tangible manifestation of the Cold-War.

A number of formal and informal agreements between the two
superpowers, most notably the INF Treaty, START I and II, and the
1991 U.S. and Soviet decision to withdraw their tactical nuclear
weapons worldwide testified to the end of the Cold War.

The post-Cold War period has, however, seen greater attention
to the threat of horizontal nuclear proliferation beyond the five
recognized nuclear powers.

Even the remarkable and indeed appalling revelations about lax
environmental standards, undisclosed nuclear tests and
government-ordered radiation experiments on unsuspecting
civilians by the U.S. and the Soviet's have failed to attract the
sustained attention that the threat of horizontal proliferation
has.

The U.S., arguably the preponderant military power in the
post-Cold War era, has certainly seized on the nuclear
proliferation issue. The almost unprecedented external probing
into Iraq's alleged nuclear and chemical weapons program, for
example, was not entirely isolated from U.S. pressure.

When the specter of an Iraqi nuclear weapon declined, it was
the turn of Iran's and North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons
programs to receive U.S. attention.

The phenomenal destructive capacity of the bomb combined with
the perceived capricious nature of the aging leadership in
Pyongyang has caused considerable disquiet throughout the world.
On the other hand, Iran's alleged nuclear ambitions have created
concern particularly in Washington, not surprising in view of the
two countries recent histories.

Meanwhile, the U.S. now appears less reticent to publicly
highlight Pakistan's alleged nuclear weapons program and the
relative neglect paid to Israel's nuclear program appears to be
on the mend. In contrast, the Pretoria regimes' own admission of
producing nuclear weapons has received relatively scant
attention.

The Clinton administration has issued a statement calling on
Israel to accede to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as
a 'non-nuclear weapon state'. The request was made by Assistant
Secretary of State Robert Galluci in July 1993.

American concern over nuclear proliferation, more specifically
the situation in the Korean Peninsula, was also aired at the July
1993 ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting in Singapore. At that meeting
U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher was reported to state
that Asian participation in international agreements governing
the export of so-called 'dual-use' equipment, components and
technology was 'absolutely essential'.

Arguably the most notable aspect of the U.S. non-proliferation
policy is its steps to control the spread of the fissionable
materials essential for nuclear weapons production.

Overall, the proposal on the control of plutonium and highly-
enriched uranium stocks shifted the identification of nuclear
proliferation threats to a much earlier stage in the weapons
production chain than had previously been the case.

Yet the focus on plutonium and highly enriched uranium is not
without its problems. For example, the policy would have a
minimal impact on the U.S. and Russia, since they already have
stockpiles of weapons-grade fissionable material from their
dismantled weapons. Furthermore, some countries are likely to
identify a double standard in the U.S. pledge of continued
support for the use of plutonium in civil nuclear programs in
Western Europe and Japan.

Of course, the U.S. Administration reassures states that its
dual-use export control policies will not affect those countries
genuinely intent on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

However, it is doubtful whether these assurances can
effectively allay the suspicions of some states that such export
controls are inconsistent with the undertakings contained within
the NPT by the nuclear-weapon states to assist in the promotion
of nuclear energy in those states which have renounced the
acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Nor should one ignore the obvious difficulty in tracking and
accounting for existing plutonium and highly enriched uranium
stockpiles; Viktor N. Mikhailov, head of Russian Ministry of
Atomic Energy, for example, recently disclosed that Moscow's
stocks of weapon-grade uranium, at 1,200 metric tons, is more
than twice what was previously assumed.

Above all, the focus on supply-side measures can be
questioned, since even the most stringent restrictions on
acquisition can be surmounted by a state determined to acquire
nuclear weapons. Instead, equal attention should be given to the
question of why states wish to acquire nuclear weapons; the
demand side of the equation.

Is it any wonder, for example, that some states should find
nuclear weapons politically attractive when their possession
opens membership into the exclusive nuclear club? The fact that
the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are all
nuclear-weapon states, for example, may convey the wrong signal
about the diplomatic benefits of nuclear ownership.

Should we not instead reward those states which, despite the
technical know-how and wherewithal have opted not to acquire
nuclear weapons and expended their diplomatic energy to curb the
arms race?

Or is it any wonder that states accustomed to sermons on the
'stabilizing' impact of nuclear deterrence during the decades of
the Cold War now find the argument equally convincing in their
regions? After all, nuclear weapons can be seen as relatively
cheap 'strategic equalizers' for a state faced with a
conventionally superior rival.

In this context, the outcome of the on-going debate in the
U.S. about the place of nuclear weapons in the Post-Cold War
environment is of the utmost importance, in particular the notion
of the utility of tactical nuclear weapons in the so-called Third
World conflicts.

In most instances, the motives for the acquisition of nuclear
weapons are regional in nature as is the case of South Asia, the
Middle East and, until recently, Latin America. Justification by
the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) of their nuclear weapons to deter
would-be NWS might in fact provide non-regional incentives for
acquiring nuclear weapons.

Of course, the American government's expression of support for
various regional nuclear non-proliferation initiatives in the
Korean Peninsula, the Middle East and South Asia is to be
welcomed. In these areas, a regional approach towards nuclear
non-proliferation, complementing the global non-proliferation
treaty can significantly contribute towards the easing of
tensions and the building of confidence.

The members of ASEAN have also proposed a Southeast Asian
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. The Cambodian issue and the Indochina-
ASEAN dichotomy it had encouraged, long cited as a stumbling
block towards the attainment of such a zone, has been resolved.
The question of superpower military bases, Soviet and American,
no longer serves to stymie debate on the proposal.

As often expressed by various U.S. officials, America today
needs access rather than bases. A nuclear-weapon free zone in
Southeast Asia would not hamper U.S. military access to the
region, more definitely in view of the U.S.'s own decision to
remove tactical nuclear weapons from aboard its ships and
submarines.

Politically, the zone proposal cannot be construed as against
any particular state. Instead, it is a political reaffirmation of
the regional states' commitment to nuclear non-proliferation,
thereby further undermining the legitimacy of nuclear weapons.

R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa has a Ph.D from the Australian
National University.