Post-Cold War nuclear proliferation

By Marty Natalegawa

Jakarta (JP): The continuing uncertainty over North Korea's suspected nuclear program has shown how unfounded were the hopes that the end of the Cold War would reduce the world's preoccupation with nuclear issues.

Of course, the Cold War and nuclear weapons were always closely entwined. The American-Soviet nuclear arms race was arguably the most tangible manifestation of the Cold-War.

A number of formal and informal agreements between the two superpowers, most notably the INF Treaty, START I and II, and the 1991 U.S. and Soviet decision to withdraw their tactical nuclear weapons worldwide testified to the end of the Cold War.

The post-Cold War period has, however, seen greater attention to the threat of horizontal nuclear proliferation beyond the five recognized nuclear powers.

Even the remarkable and indeed appalling revelations about lax environmental standards, undisclosed nuclear tests and government-ordered radiation experiments on unsuspecting civilians by the U.S. and the Soviet's have failed to attract the sustained attention that the threat of horizontal proliferation has.

The U.S., arguably the preponderant military power in the post-Cold War era, has certainly seized on the nuclear proliferation issue. The almost unprecedented external probing into Iraq's alleged nuclear and chemical weapons program, for example, was not entirely isolated from U.S. pressure.

When the specter of an Iraqi nuclear weapon declined, it was the turn of Iran's and North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons programs to receive U.S. attention.

The phenomenal destructive capacity of the bomb combined with the perceived capricious nature of the aging leadership in Pyongyang has caused considerable disquiet throughout the world. On the other hand, Iran's alleged nuclear ambitions have created concern particularly in Washington, not surprising in view of the two countries recent histories.

Meanwhile, the U.S. now appears less reticent to publicly highlight Pakistan's alleged nuclear weapons program and the relative neglect paid to Israel's nuclear program appears to be on the mend. In contrast, the Pretoria regimes' own admission of producing nuclear weapons has received relatively scant attention.

The Clinton administration has issued a statement calling on Israel to accede to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a 'non-nuclear weapon state'. The request was made by Assistant Secretary of State Robert Galluci in July 1993.

American concern over nuclear proliferation, more specifically the situation in the Korean Peninsula, was also aired at the July 1993 ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting in Singapore. At that meeting U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher was reported to state that Asian participation in international agreements governing the export of so-called 'dual-use' equipment, components and technology was 'absolutely essential'.

Arguably the most notable aspect of the U.S. non-proliferation policy is its steps to control the spread of the fissionable materials essential for nuclear weapons production.

Overall, the proposal on the control of plutonium and highly- enriched uranium stocks shifted the identification of nuclear proliferation threats to a much earlier stage in the weapons production chain than had previously been the case.

Yet the focus on plutonium and highly enriched uranium is not without its problems. For example, the policy would have a minimal impact on the U.S. and Russia, since they already have stockpiles of weapons-grade fissionable material from their dismantled weapons. Furthermore, some countries are likely to identify a double standard in the U.S. pledge of continued support for the use of plutonium in civil nuclear programs in Western Europe and Japan.

Of course, the U.S. Administration reassures states that its dual-use export control policies will not affect those countries genuinely intent on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

However, it is doubtful whether these assurances can effectively allay the suspicions of some states that such export controls are inconsistent with the undertakings contained within the NPT by the nuclear-weapon states to assist in the promotion of nuclear energy in those states which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

Nor should one ignore the obvious difficulty in tracking and accounting for existing plutonium and highly enriched uranium stockpiles; Viktor N. Mikhailov, head of Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, for example, recently disclosed that Moscow's stocks of weapon-grade uranium, at 1,200 metric tons, is more than twice what was previously assumed.

Above all, the focus on supply-side measures can be questioned, since even the most stringent restrictions on acquisition can be surmounted by a state determined to acquire nuclear weapons. Instead, equal attention should be given to the question of why states wish to acquire nuclear weapons; the demand side of the equation.

Is it any wonder, for example, that some states should find nuclear weapons politically attractive when their possession opens membership into the exclusive nuclear club? The fact that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are all nuclear-weapon states, for example, may convey the wrong signal about the diplomatic benefits of nuclear ownership.

Should we not instead reward those states which, despite the technical know-how and wherewithal have opted not to acquire nuclear weapons and expended their diplomatic energy to curb the arms race?

Or is it any wonder that states accustomed to sermons on the 'stabilizing' impact of nuclear deterrence during the decades of the Cold War now find the argument equally convincing in their regions? After all, nuclear weapons can be seen as relatively cheap 'strategic equalizers' for a state faced with a conventionally superior rival.

In this context, the outcome of the on-going debate in the U.S. about the place of nuclear weapons in the Post-Cold War environment is of the utmost importance, in particular the notion of the utility of tactical nuclear weapons in the so-called Third World conflicts.

In most instances, the motives for the acquisition of nuclear weapons are regional in nature as is the case of South Asia, the Middle East and, until recently, Latin America. Justification by the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) of their nuclear weapons to deter would-be NWS might in fact provide non-regional incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons.

Of course, the American government's expression of support for various regional nuclear non-proliferation initiatives in the Korean Peninsula, the Middle East and South Asia is to be welcomed. In these areas, a regional approach towards nuclear non-proliferation, complementing the global non-proliferation treaty can significantly contribute towards the easing of tensions and the building of confidence.

The members of ASEAN have also proposed a Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone. The Cambodian issue and the Indochina- ASEAN dichotomy it had encouraged, long cited as a stumbling block towards the attainment of such a zone, has been resolved. The question of superpower military bases, Soviet and American, no longer serves to stymie debate on the proposal.

As often expressed by various U.S. officials, America today needs access rather than bases. A nuclear-weapon free zone in Southeast Asia would not hamper U.S. military access to the region, more definitely in view of the U.S.'s own decision to remove tactical nuclear weapons from aboard its ships and submarines.

Politically, the zone proposal cannot be construed as against any particular state. Instead, it is a political reaffirmation of the regional states' commitment to nuclear non-proliferation, thereby further undermining the legitimacy of nuclear weapons.

R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa has a Ph.D from the Australian National University.