Post-Cold War nuclear proliferation<\/p>\n
By Marty Natalegawa<\/p>\n
Jakarta (JP): The continuing uncertainty over North Korea's
\nsuspected nuclear program has shown how unfounded were the hopes
\nthat the end of the Cold War would reduce the world's
\npreoccupation with nuclear issues.<\/p>\n
Of course, the Cold War and nuclear weapons were always
\nclosely entwined. The American-Soviet nuclear arms race was
\narguably the most tangible manifestation of the Cold-War.<\/p>\n
A number of formal and informal agreements between the two
\nsuperpowers, most notably the INF Treaty, START I and II, and the
\n1991 U.S. and Soviet decision to withdraw their tactical nuclear
\nweapons worldwide testified to the end of the Cold War.<\/p>\n
The post-Cold War period has, however, seen greater attention
\nto the threat of horizontal nuclear proliferation beyond the five
\nrecognized nuclear powers.<\/p>\n
Even the remarkable and indeed appalling revelations about lax
\nenvironmental standards, undisclosed nuclear tests and
\ngovernment-ordered radiation experiments on unsuspecting
\ncivilians by the U.S. and the Soviet's have failed to attract the
\nsustained attention that the threat of horizontal proliferation
\nhas.<\/p>\n
The U.S., arguably the preponderant military power in the
\npost-Cold War era, has certainly seized on the nuclear
\nproliferation issue. The almost unprecedented external probing
\ninto Iraq's alleged nuclear and chemical weapons program, for
\nexample, was not entirely isolated from U.S. pressure.<\/p>\n
When the specter of an Iraqi nuclear weapon declined, it was
\nthe turn of Iran's and North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons
\nprograms to receive U.S. attention.<\/p>\n
The phenomenal destructive capacity of the bomb combined with
\nthe perceived capricious nature of the aging leadership in
\nPyongyang has caused considerable disquiet throughout the world.
\nOn the other hand, Iran's alleged nuclear ambitions have created
\nconcern particularly in Washington, not surprising in view of the
\ntwo countries recent histories.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, the U.S. now appears less reticent to publicly
\nhighlight Pakistan's alleged nuclear weapons program and the
\nrelative neglect paid to Israel's nuclear program appears to be
\non the mend. In contrast, the Pretoria regimes' own admission of
\nproducing nuclear weapons has received relatively scant
\nattention.<\/p>\n
The Clinton administration has issued a statement calling on
\nIsrael to accede to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as
\na 'non-nuclear weapon state'. The request was made by Assistant
\nSecretary of State Robert Galluci in July 1993.<\/p>\n
American concern over nuclear proliferation, more specifically
\nthe situation in the Korean Peninsula, was also aired at the July
\n1993 ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting in Singapore. At that meeting
\nU.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher was reported to state
\nthat Asian participation in international agreements governing
\nthe export of so-called 'dual-use' equipment, components and
\ntechnology was 'absolutely essential'.<\/p>\n
Arguably the most notable aspect of the U.S. non-proliferation
\npolicy is its steps to control the spread of the fissionable
\nmaterials essential for nuclear weapons production.<\/p>\n
Overall, the proposal on the control of plutonium and highly-
\nenriched uranium stocks shifted the identification of nuclear
\nproliferation threats to a much earlier stage in the weapons
\nproduction chain than had previously been the case.<\/p>\n
Yet the focus on plutonium and highly enriched uranium is not
\nwithout its problems. For example, the policy would have a
\nminimal impact on the U.S. and Russia, since they already have
\nstockpiles of weapons-grade fissionable material from their
\ndismantled weapons. Furthermore, some countries are likely to
\nidentify a double standard in the U.S. pledge of continued
\nsupport for the use of plutonium in civil nuclear programs in
\nWestern Europe and Japan.<\/p>\n
Of course, the U.S. Administration reassures states that its
\ndual-use export control policies will not affect those countries
\ngenuinely intent on peaceful uses of nuclear energy.<\/p>\n
However, it is doubtful whether these assurances can
\neffectively allay the suspicions of some states that such export
\ncontrols are inconsistent with the undertakings contained within
\nthe NPT by the nuclear-weapon states to assist in the promotion
\nof nuclear energy in those states which have renounced the
\nacquisition of nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n
Nor should one ignore the obvious difficulty in tracking and
\naccounting for existing plutonium and highly enriched uranium
\nstockpiles; Viktor N. Mikhailov, head of Russian Ministry of
\nAtomic Energy, for example, recently disclosed that Moscow's
\nstocks of weapon-grade uranium, at 1,200 metric tons, is more
\nthan twice what was previously assumed.<\/p>\n
Above all, the focus on supply-side measures can be
\nquestioned, since even the most stringent restrictions on
\nacquisition can be surmounted by a state determined to acquire
\nnuclear weapons. Instead, equal attention should be given to the
\nquestion of why states wish to acquire nuclear weapons; the
\ndemand side of the equation.<\/p>\n
Is it any wonder, for example, that some states should find
\nnuclear weapons politically attractive when their possession
\nopens membership into the exclusive nuclear club? The fact that
\nthe five permanent members of the UN Security Council are all
\nnuclear-weapon states, for example, may convey the wrong signal
\nabout the diplomatic benefits of nuclear ownership.<\/p>\n
Should we not instead reward those states which, despite the
\ntechnical know-how and wherewithal have opted not to acquire
\nnuclear weapons and expended their diplomatic energy to curb the
\narms race?<\/p>\n
Or is it any wonder that states accustomed to sermons on the
\n'stabilizing' impact of nuclear deterrence during the decades of
\nthe Cold War now find the argument equally convincing in their
\nregions? After all, nuclear weapons can be seen as relatively
\ncheap 'strategic equalizers' for a state faced with a
\nconventionally superior rival.<\/p>\n
In this context, the outcome of the on-going debate in the
\nU.S. about the place of nuclear weapons in the Post-Cold War
\nenvironment is of the utmost importance, in particular the notion
\nof the utility of tactical nuclear weapons in the so-called Third
\nWorld conflicts.<\/p>\n
In most instances, the motives for the acquisition of nuclear
\nweapons are regional in nature as is the case of South Asia, the
\nMiddle East and, until recently, Latin America. Justification by
\nthe nuclear-weapon states (NWS) of their nuclear weapons to deter
\nwould-be NWS might in fact provide non-regional incentives for
\nacquiring nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n
Of course, the American government's expression of support for
\nvarious regional nuclear non-proliferation initiatives in the
\nKorean Peninsula, the Middle East and South Asia is to be
\nwelcomed. In these areas, a regional approach towards nuclear
\nnon-proliferation, complementing the global non-proliferation
\ntreaty can significantly contribute towards the easing of
\ntensions and the building of confidence.<\/p>\n
The members of ASEAN have also proposed a Southeast Asian
\nNuclear Weapon Free Zone. The Cambodian issue and the Indochina-
\nASEAN dichotomy it had encouraged, long cited as a stumbling
\nblock towards the attainment of such a zone, has been resolved.
\nThe question of superpower military bases, Soviet and American,
\nno longer serves to stymie debate on the proposal.<\/p>\n
As often expressed by various U.S. officials, America today
\nneeds access rather than bases. A nuclear-weapon free zone in
\nSoutheast Asia would not hamper U.S. military access to the
\nregion, more definitely in view of the U.S.'s own decision to
\nremove tactical nuclear weapons from aboard its ships and
\nsubmarines.<\/p>\n
Politically, the zone proposal cannot be construed as against
\nany particular state. Instead, it is a political reaffirmation of
\nthe regional states' commitment to nuclear non-proliferation,
\nthereby further undermining the legitimacy of nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n
R.M. Marty M. Natalegawa has a Ph.D from the Australian
\nNational University.<\/p>",
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