Peace Council in the Fire of the Middle East
The Peace Council (Board of Peace) launched by US President Donald Trump finds itself tested as the world anxiously awaits its role in the Gaza peace process, while the Middle East again burns with war. The Israeli military strike against Iran’s strategic targets on 28 February 2026 was like a spark falling on dry tinder—rapidly spreading, hard to control, and threatening to engulf a region that has long harboured enmity.
Rather than being a protective umbrella, the Peace Council is now tested by the first storm that comes from its closest ally, Israel. Together with the US, Israel attacked Iran, resulting in the death of Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. How should the future of the Peace Council be read after Khamenei’s death?
There is a paradox accompanying the birth of the Peace Council: while it is expected to create peace, what happened was the Israel-US strike on Iran that sparked war in the region. The follow-up question arises: why did Israel choose to strike Iran just after the institution was formed? Is this merely a tactical step to provoke Tehran, or part of a grand strategy to destroy Iran’s nuclear programme while unsettling its regime?
The death of the central figure Ali Khamenei, who for more than three decades had been the ideological and military command axis of Iran, creates a dangerous power vacuum. It is widely understood that Iran’s political system rests on the authority of a single supreme leader, making his death prone to destabilising internal stability and creating uncertainty.
For the Middle East, Khamenei’s death is not merely a leadership transition but a change in the structure of conflict. Iran under new leadership faces two options: radicalisation of reprisals to restore regional influence, or pragmatic-conciliatory approaches to avoid the destruction of the state.
Both options are equally risky. A hard retaliation would widen the regional war, while pragmatism could trigger internal power struggles no less damaging. From Israel’s strategic interests, the strike is an existential gamble—a belief that threats must be crushed before they erase the states existence.
In the view of security expert Kenneth M. Pollack, within Israel’s strategic calculations, the risk of international condemnation is lighter than the risk of facing an enemy armed with nuclear weapons (Which Path to Persia?: Options for a New American Strategy Toward Iran, 2009). It is clear that the Israel–Iran rivalry is not merely ideological, but a struggle over geopolitics long simmering.
The impact of the Israel and US strikes on Middle East stability was felt instantly. The region is like a nervous system linked to knots of explosive points: one spark, and the whole body reacts. Iran has a range of retaliation options, both direct and through its proxies in Palestine/Gaza, Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Bahrain.
The likelihood of escalation aligns with Barry Buzan’s view of the Middle East as a regional security complex where local conflicts nearly always resonate globally. When one actor takes military action, other states do not remain passive. And that is what is happening now.
The complication is heightened because escalation could drag in American allies in the region, broadening the war from a bilateral conflict into a coalition confrontation. This was evident when Iran retaliated against the Israel–US strike by firing missiles at US allies: the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait.
Many expect the Israel–Iran war to widen and involve many countries in the Middle East and endure for a long time. In such a situation, the Peace Council would lose its justification for existence. Surely its primary mission is to create peace in Gaza? It is hard to imagine peace in Gaza while missiles and drones cross the skies of the Middle East.
The Israel–Iran crisis becomes more complicated if global powers join in: Russia and China. Both have strategic interests in Iran. Yet it seems unlikely they would engage directly in open warfare against the United States. As John Mearsheimer notes, great powers tend to avoid direct confrontation and prefer proxy games (The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 2014).
However, with Khamenei’s death, it is not impossible that the two countries give indirect support to Iran to prevent a regime change in Iran that is backed by Israel and the US. With a pro-Western Iranian regime, the US and Israel are certain to threaten Russia and China’s interests in the Middle East. Moscow and Beijing’s involvement in the theatre of the Middle East only adds to the complexity of the peace efforts the Peace Council is pursuing.
It is now apparent that the Israel–Iran war is the first test for the Security Council since its formation. If the body cannot respond to a crisis involving its founders (the US) and its allies (Israel), and even more if the war ends with a de facto regime change in Iran, its moral legitimacy will crumble before it can function concretely.
The Peace Council risks being perceived not as a mechanism for peace but as a political instrument that legitimises unilateral use of force by the US. If it is to endure, the Peace Council must be able to bridge the parties in conflict. If not, it will be remembered not as a global fire-fighter.