Part 2 of 2: Serious, not soft, change in TNI

Part 2 of 2: Serious, not soft, change in TNI

Agus Widjojo, Jakarta

While it is unlikely to satisfy all parties concerned, the
Indonesian Military (TNI) has made some progress in ensuring its
soldiers are held to account for criminal or human rights abuses
they commit.

A significant step was the trials in a military court held in
the operations zone in Aceh, relating to soldiers accused of
misconduct and human rights violations. Never before have such
trials been conducted in an operations zone.

Still being debated are past cases when soldiers were
acquitted or received light sentences for other abuses. It is not
our place to judge whether these court decisions were right or
wrong, but from the point of view of the TNI, some progress has
been made.

It is important to note that the many of these trials the
military never obstructed the court, preventing it from gaining
access to its members and never interfered in the judicial
process.

This is unlike the Semanggi I or II trials when the military
leadership did not give its officers permission to appear in
court.

There are now increased pressures on the TNI such as the
politicization of judicial issues, the lack of public trust to
judicial institutions, and the lack of scrutiny into the
political strategy as the precondition for formulating the
military strategy, and political accountability. These aspects
are also reflections of the general situation pertaining to law
enforcement in Indonesia.

How serious is TNI in carrying out its reforms? The TNI exists
not in isolation, and the national context will influence its
reform.

The decision to reform the TNI and to repaint the national
defense landscape is a political decision.

The elected authorities are politically accountable to the
public regarding their policies, and the TNI is supposed to act
in accordance with them as is spelt out by the nation's amended
1945 Constitution.

Often, however, politicians ignore the law and give in to the
wishes of the TNI. The reasons for doing so are not always easily
distinguished; they are often a mixture of incompetence,
ignorance or a self-serving desire for military support or
patronage.

A good example of this collusion was the establishment of new
military area commands (Kodam) in Ambon and Aceh, which escaped
hearings in the House of Representatives and were never discussed
during the annual budget deliberations.

Establishments of structures should be a result of defense
planning analysis rather than a cloudy back-room political deal.

However, the recently passed Indonesian Military Bill gives
hopes to those who want a sense of direction to the military
reform. The bill is promising in that it has undergone a
fundamental change since the initial draft was submitted by
president Megawati Soekarnoputri's administration.

But however promising it is, it is still ambiguous with some
loose definitions and a compromised understanding of the issues
involved.

The military's crucial territorial command function had some
vague limits imposed on it while the function itself was never
properly defined. While the bill did address the issue of the TNI
leadership coming under the president's authority and later under
the Ministry of Defense, it set out no clear time frame for
change.

Many in the military establishment wish to retain the
organization's older, more powerful socio-political role as
"guardian of the nation", reflected by the recent launch of a
book -- Modern War -- by the Army, justifying the military in
this role.

Although much has been done to reform the TNI in the past, the
complete de-politicization of the TNI will only occur with the
will, commitment and understanding of both the military and
politicians.

And any real hope of reforming the TNI will depend on the
efforts of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to initiate this
process and to rally the public's support.

House of Representatives members also must be serious about
pushing the change agenda and not use the issue to further their
own partisan, selfish interests.

In times of transition, the executive must also work to ensure
the instruments that take over the old roles of the TNI are
effective, otherwise there is unlikely to be a smooth change.

Another requirement will be to increase the defense budget in
proportion to the national budget and set national priorities to
support the TNI's program to enhance professionalism in its new
role as an instrument of national defense.

We should not forget the need to educate people about the
principles of democracy, specifically those that relate to the
civilian control of the military.

Over the last six years the military has already undergone a
series of fundamental changes. This places us in better position
to continue this process of moving toward a truly democratic
society.

It is important to understand that there is no going back to
the institutional structures of the past. Those structures may
have worked well enough in the past but now there is a new world
order.

Today we need to think collectively about our future
challenges. Military reform is not a unilateral process and both
military and civilian authorities must make key commitments to
the process, the former in promoting a professional, non-
political military, the latter in laying down precise guidelines
for TNI deployment and ensuring full funding of the institution.

What hopes and expectations do we have of Susilo's
administration?

The President's military background, and his role in the early
phases of TNI reform is an asset to his understanding of the
issues.

But we should not forget that policy making and implementation
will always be a political process, and the first and foremost
challenge to be met is the ability of the government to
communicate the intent of the policy and to rally public support
for it.

Positive foundations have been laid with the passing of the
Indonesian Military Bill; follow-up implementation will require
the government's vision, political will and commitment.

The writer is a senior fellow at Centre for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS) and a senior advisor of UNSFIR
-- a joint project between the Indonesian government and the
United Nations Development Program. He is also a former
Indonesian Military chief of territorial affairs.