Part 2 of 2: Serious, not soft, change in TNI

Agus Widjojo, Jakarta

While it is unlikely to satisfy all parties concerned, the Indonesian Military (TNI) has made some progress in ensuring its soldiers are held to account for criminal or human rights abuses they commit.

A significant step was the trials in a military court held in the operations zone in Aceh, relating to soldiers accused of misconduct and human rights violations. Never before have such trials been conducted in an operations zone.

Still being debated are past cases when soldiers were acquitted or received light sentences for other abuses. It is not our place to judge whether these court decisions were right or wrong, but from the point of view of the TNI, some progress has been made.

It is important to note that the many of these trials the military never obstructed the court, preventing it from gaining access to its members and never interfered in the judicial process.

This is unlike the Semanggi I or II trials when the military leadership did not give its officers permission to appear in court.

There are now increased pressures on the TNI such as the politicization of judicial issues, the lack of public trust to judicial institutions, and the lack of scrutiny into the political strategy as the precondition for formulating the military strategy, and political accountability. These aspects are also reflections of the general situation pertaining to law enforcement in Indonesia.

How serious is TNI in carrying out its reforms? The TNI exists not in isolation, and the national context will influence its reform.

The decision to reform the TNI and to repaint the national defense landscape is a political decision.

The elected authorities are politically accountable to the public regarding their policies, and the TNI is supposed to act in accordance with them as is spelt out by the nation's amended 1945 Constitution.

Often, however, politicians ignore the law and give in to the wishes of the TNI. The reasons for doing so are not always easily distinguished; they are often a mixture of incompetence, ignorance or a self-serving desire for military support or patronage.

A good example of this collusion was the establishment of new military area commands (Kodam) in Ambon and Aceh, which escaped hearings in the House of Representatives and were never discussed during the annual budget deliberations.

Establishments of structures should be a result of defense planning analysis rather than a cloudy back-room political deal.

However, the recently passed Indonesian Military Bill gives hopes to those who want a sense of direction to the military reform. The bill is promising in that it has undergone a fundamental change since the initial draft was submitted by president Megawati Soekarnoputri's administration.

But however promising it is, it is still ambiguous with some loose definitions and a compromised understanding of the issues involved.

The military's crucial territorial command function had some vague limits imposed on it while the function itself was never properly defined. While the bill did address the issue of the TNI leadership coming under the president's authority and later under the Ministry of Defense, it set out no clear time frame for change.

Many in the military establishment wish to retain the organization's older, more powerful socio-political role as "guardian of the nation", reflected by the recent launch of a book -- Modern War -- by the Army, justifying the military in this role.

Although much has been done to reform the TNI in the past, the complete de-politicization of the TNI will only occur with the will, commitment and understanding of both the military and politicians.

And any real hope of reforming the TNI will depend on the efforts of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono to initiate this process and to rally the public's support.

House of Representatives members also must be serious about pushing the change agenda and not use the issue to further their own partisan, selfish interests.

In times of transition, the executive must also work to ensure the instruments that take over the old roles of the TNI are effective, otherwise there is unlikely to be a smooth change.

Another requirement will be to increase the defense budget in proportion to the national budget and set national priorities to support the TNI's program to enhance professionalism in its new role as an instrument of national defense.

We should not forget the need to educate people about the principles of democracy, specifically those that relate to the civilian control of the military.

Over the last six years the military has already undergone a series of fundamental changes. This places us in better position to continue this process of moving toward a truly democratic society.

It is important to understand that there is no going back to the institutional structures of the past. Those structures may have worked well enough in the past but now there is a new world order.

Today we need to think collectively about our future challenges. Military reform is not a unilateral process and both military and civilian authorities must make key commitments to the process, the former in promoting a professional, non- political military, the latter in laying down precise guidelines for TNI deployment and ensuring full funding of the institution.

What hopes and expectations do we have of Susilo's administration?

The President's military background, and his role in the early phases of TNI reform is an asset to his understanding of the issues.

But we should not forget that policy making and implementation will always be a political process, and the first and foremost challenge to be met is the ability of the government to communicate the intent of the policy and to rally public support for it.

Positive foundations have been laid with the passing of the Indonesian Military Bill; follow-up implementation will require the government's vision, political will and commitment.

The writer is a senior fellow at Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and a senior advisor of UNSFIR -- a joint project between the Indonesian government and the United Nations Development Program. He is also a former Indonesian Military chief of territorial affairs.