Opportunities in tsunami's wake

Opportunities in tsunami's wake

Christopher Jasparro, Yale Center for the Study of Globalization,
Honolulu

The tsunami tragedy has begun fading from the headlines, but
the aftermath of relief efforts in Indonesia's Aceh could have
far-reaching consequences. Located at the strategic tip of
Sumatra dominating the Malacca Straits, Aceh could emerge as the
new cockpit of struggle between separatists, Islamic militants,
and Indonesian government -- affecting the war on terror and
security in Southeast Asia.

Two developments have altered the dynamics in post-tsunami
Indonesia. First, U.S. and international aid efforts have
received widespread and positive press attention in Indonesia. As
a result, many Indonesians are now questioning their previous
negative assumptions about Western attitudes and policies:
According to the first post-tsunami poll in Indonesia, 65 percent
of respondents viewed the U.S. positively. U.S.-Indonesian
military cooperation after the tsunami opened the door for
resumption of U.S. military assistance.

Indonesia now may receive US$600,000 to $800,000 in 2005
through the International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program (suspended in 1992 due to concerns over the Indonesian
Army's human rights record). IMET proponents believe this will
create opportunities for the United States to influence
Indonesia's human rights behavior in Aceh and elsewhere.

The other new element is the arrival of several Java-based
militant Islamist organizations in Aceh. The Indonesian army
(TNI) helped transport some militants into Aceh, presumably to
aid recovery efforts.

And thus, we find an intriguing new dynamic: Relief efforts
have opened the door for increased U.S. influence in Indonesia,
while at the same time, the presence of militant groups has
expanded in Aceh.

These developments prompt questions of broad security
significance: How will the increased Western relief effort affect
the ongoing Acehnese struggle? What could be the consequence of a
growing Javanese militant presence on internationalist terrorist
activities launched from this part of Indonesia?

So far, these organizations have mainly passed out leaflets or
recovered dead bodies. Despite terrorism warnings, statements by
militants suggest an uneasy truce has emerged for now.

However, many of the militants' relief efforts are believed to
be covers for proselytizing activities, which have three possible
goals: Sowing radical ideologies amongst the local population,
discrediting the secular Indonesian government through
highlighting any inefficiency and corruption in the relief
effort, and infiltration of local mosques and NGOs. They may also
be positioning themselves to fight the Free Aceh Movement (GAM).
Radical Islamists deplore its ethno-nationalist, separatist
agenda (which runs counter to their desire to make Indonesia a
unified Islamic state), and Islamic practice, which they see as
insufficiently pure.

Many hope the tsunami tragedy will boost peace talks between
GAM and the government. Indeed, in February, rebel leaders
reportedly dropped a demand for independence.

Some analysts even suggest that the TNI may use militants as
proxies against GAM -- a possibility that could increase should
talks fail. Others view TNI facilitation of militants as
incompetence or inexperience amongst some generals, political
battles within the army, or as a hedge against foreign influences
and domestic charges of favoritism to foreign relief agencies.
Government spokesmen have downplayed these worries, contending
the groups are engaged in humanitarian activities.

Indonesian radical group Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) and al-Qaeda
have exploited other conflict and disasters in different parts of
the world to recruit, gain combat experience, spread ideology,
and reinforce propaganda suggesting that Muslims are under attack
worldwide.

Also, the presence of such groups at the Malacca Strait's
mould would pose a significant threat to vital global sea lanes.
al-Qaeda has been involved in several successful and attempted
maritime attacks -- most notably USS Cole in Aden -- and has a
doctrine of causing economic disruption through assaulting key
infrastructure and transport nodes.

If the U.S. and international community fail (or are perceived
to fail) to support long-term recovery efforts, and militant
groups step into the breach, then positive feelings generated in
the tsunami's immediate aftermath will fade. This might possibly
lend credence to conspiracy theories floating around the Islamic
world that the tsunami was punishment for Indonesian impiety and
assistance to U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

So far, however, the ripples emanating in the tsunami's wake
have increased security rather than strengthened the radicals.
The Javanese militants have met with antipathy. GAM calls them as
"criminal organizations." While student-led NGO Sentral Informasi
Referendum Aceh (formed in 1999 to call for a referendum similar
to the one held in East Timor) warned that militants "would steer
the conflict in Aceh into a religious one."
The militants are so overmatched by the international
community's capabilities that their efforts have had minimal
influence in Aceh and beyond. Their lack of capacity may actually
be undermining their credibility throughout Indonesia.

The United States, Australia, Japan, and Singapore seem
determined to follow through for the long-haul which could thus
sustain boosted images. So far, Acehnese seem to reject the
radicals questioning radical Islamists' ability to deliver and
challenging the validity of claims that there is a global war
against Muslims.

Initially, security off Aceh's waters improved after the
tsunami. It appears to have killed large numbers of pirates,
destroyed pirate bases and equipment, possibly changed water
depths in pirate operating areas, and brought international
scrutiny to the area. More recently, pirate activity off Sumatra
has resumed -- but it appears to be business as usual, rather
than acts by outside militants.

Allowing foreign forces into its territory was a major step
and a strong indication of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's
intention to improve the security relationship with the United
States.

IMET's resumption will, it is hoped, further boost relations
by exposing Indonesian officers to U.S. views (including human
rights) and opening new lines of dialogue between the countries'
militaries. The training and education provided should boost
Indonesia's capacity to fight terrorism and other transnational
threats.

The tsunami has created security threats and opportunities.
Currently the tide is running against terrorists and militants in
favor of the Indonesian government, United States, and its
allies. Whether this momentum is capitalized upon or squandered
over the long-term will be decided by the Indonesian government
and international partners.

The writer is a researcher at the Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii. Reprinted with permission
from YaleGlobal Online, (http://yaleglobal.yale.edu).