One Year of Dedi-Erwan: Strong Vision, Weak Administrative Machinery

It feels not long ago since Thursday, 20 February 2025, when President Prabowo inaugurated the Governor and Deputy Governor of West Java for the 2025–2030 term, Dedi Mulyadi (KDM) and Erwan Setiawan. From that moment until now and going forward, the author, as Chairman of Commission I of the West Java Provincial Parliament (DPRD), is duty-bound to offer a clear and responsible reflection.

I do not position myself as a critic standing outside the system. As Chairman of DPRD West Java’s Commission I for Government Affairs, the author sits within the same regional governance system. The primary task is to ensure the leadership energy of KDM-Erwan is translated into governance that is orderly, legally sound, and effective in implementation.

I openly acknowledge that the majority of KDM-Erwan’s policy direction favours ordinary people and is responsive to environmental issues—this demonstrates political courage worthy of appreciation. However, in practice over this first year, I also observe a gap between political vision and bureaucratic administrative readiness. This is where the DPRD’s oversight function becomes important—not to slow things down, but to strengthen them.

Housing Permit Moratorium

Let us begin with the moratorium on housing permit issuance, intended as a disaster risk mitigation measure. In principle, this has strong moral and policy rationale. West Java faces real ecological pressures, and the regional government must not allow spatial planning to proceed without control.

However, when the permit suspension is implemented through an administrative circular letter whose impact reaches the investment sector and crosses jurisdictional boundaries, questions of legal certainty arise.

Within the scope of Commission I’s duties covering governance, licensing, and legislation, I consider that policies with broad implications require stronger and more structured regulatory reinforcement.

For the author, this is not a matter of agreeing or disagreeing with the moratorium. The issue is how to ensure the policy stands on a strong legal foundation, so as not to create confusion at the level of regional apparatus organisations (OPD) or district and municipal governments. A policy that is morally sound will lose its support base if its legal instruments are weak.

Moreover, in the realm of public policy, Christopher Hood (2007) in The Tools of Government affirms that policy success depends greatly on the alignment between objectives and the instruments employed. Government possesses various tools, from formal regulation and economic incentives to administrative instruments. If the chosen instrument is not commensurate with the breadth of the policy’s impact, then the policy’s legitimacy and effectiveness may be eroded.

Tightening of Mining Permits

The move to regulate or suspend mining permits also stems from an intention to protect the environment and enforce natural resource governance. However, such a policy cannot stand alone. It is connected to material supply chains, regional economic stability, and field-level oversight.

Michael Lipsky (1980), through the concept of street-level bureaucracy, explains that public policy is ultimately implemented by officials at the lower levels. Those on the front lines of service delivery possess discretion and face resource constraints. If a policy is not accompanied by clear standard operating procedures, detailed operational guidelines, and solid cross-OPD coordination, then implementation will depend heavily on each implementer’s interpretation.

In our oversight experience, problems often arise not because policy objectives are wrong, but because there are insufficiently detailed technical guidelines for field apparatus to translate. The tightening of mining permits, for instance, requires integration of licensing data, strengthened enforcement by the Civil Service Police Unit (Satpol PP), coordination with relevant agencies, and clear transition mechanisms for the construction sector and local economies.

Without mature administrative design, a policy intended to bring order may instead create grey areas potentially exploitable by illegal practices. Therefore, as Commission I—which also covers public order and civil service affairs—I consider that strengthening implementation mechanisms is as important as affirming policy objectives.

Bureaucratic Readiness

The author also openly states that the speed of KDM’s policy steps has often not been fully matched by the technocratic readiness of the civil service (ASN). This is not personal criticism of any individual, but rather a reflection on a bureaucratic structure requiring systemic strengthening.

If policy moves quickly whilst institutions are not fully prepared, then tension between political will and administrative procedure repeatedly emerges. This is where the importance of streamlining work procedures and administrative governance lies—especially as Commission I also covers staffing, civil service apparatus, and apparatus education and training. The solutions we advocate are not merely policy evaluation, but improvement of work systems, enhancement of ASN capacity, and development of integrated SOPs.

There is thus a need to strengthen a culture of cross-OPD coordination. Policy must not run in sectoral silos; it must be integrated within a tidy governance system. Without this, political vision will struggle to be translated into consistent administrative outputs.

This aligns with the premise of Samuel P. Huntington (1968) in Political Order in Changing Societies, which emphasises that instability often occurs when political mobilisation outpaces institutionalisation. In the context of the West Java Provincial Government, strong leadership energy must be accompanied by strengthened procedures, organisational structures, and administrative discipline.

Communication and Synergy

Law Number 23/2014 states that regional government consists of the regional head and the DPRD. This means synergy is not optional but a constitutional structure. I do not view our oversight as opposition in practice. The author regards it as a balancing mechanism to ensure policy remains on the correct legal and governance track.

There should therefore be a communication space between the Governor, agency heads, and the DPRD that is strengthened systematically and sustainably—particularly for policies with broad impact such as licensing and mining.

With good communication, we can minimise the potential for administrative disruption whilst accelerating regulatory harmonisation.

I believe that West Java has enormous potential to become a progressive yet orderly province. Leadership energy already exists. Social commitment is visible. However, the next step is ensuring the machinery of government runs smoothly.

As Chairman of Commission I of the West Java DPRD, let us ensure that every policy is not only strong in rhetoric but also legally sound in licensing, orderly in administration, and effective in implementation.

If we are able to refine our instruments, strengthen the bureaucracy, and maintain healthy communication, then the vision for West Java’s development ahead will not only feel increasingly real but will also always have a tangible impact in daily governance practice—for the sake of upholding the dignity of public service.

Rahmat Hidayat Djati is Chairman of Commission I of the West Java Provincial Parliament (DPRD).