Nuclear treaty's significance unclear

Nuclear treaty's significance unclear

Ten Southeast Asian leaders signed a treaty in Bangkok over
the weekend banning the production and acquisition of nuclear
weapons in the region. Political analyst J. Soedjati Djiwandono
looks at the treaty's significance.

JAKARTA (JP): A treaty establishing Southeast Asia as a
nuclear-weapons-free zone (SEANWFZ) was signed by the ASEAN heads
of state and government at their fifth summit in Bangkok last
Friday. The possibility of establishing a nuclear free zone was
first considered in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration in 1971, when
ASEAN's foreign ministers gathered to discuss the neutralization
of Southeast Asia, or ZOPFAN.

However, it was not until the 1984 annual meeting of ASEAN
foreign ministers in Jakarta that the SEANWFZ idea was discussed.
The ASEAN Working Group on ZOPFAN has since been given the
responsibility of studying the SEANWFZ concept as a component of
ZOPFAN.

The nuclear-weapons-free zone would help implement the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was extended indefinitely
last May. It would help "horizontalize" the non-proliferation of
nuclear weapons. But it remains unclear if it will help lead to
the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons.

Whether the nuclear powers, particularly the United States and
China, will approve, recognize and respect the Treaty has yet to
be determined and will depend on the strategic importance the
nuclear powers attach to the region.

In a sense, the strategic significance of Southeast Asia is
derived from the super power relationship. Yet nuclear weapons
and their delivery systems might render geographic position
almost meaningless in the event, however unlikely, of a nuclear
war. However, Southeast Asia has strategic significance to the
nuclear powers in at least two respects.

The first is the relative importance of the region in relation
to global balance. While the Russian (previously Soviet) nuclear
arsenal has focused on land-based ICBMs, its SLBM component and
the number of nuclear-weapons-carrying heavy bombers are not as
important to its overall deterrence capabilities as they are to
the U.S. strategic triad.

U.S. concern that a SEANWFZ could adversely affect its
position is understandable. It needs greater strategic mobility
than the rest of the nuclear powers.

Secondly, the U.S. needs to secure transit for its warships
and safety of the sea lanes for its allies in Asia, particularly
Japan, for which the Southeast Asian waters serve as a link
between the Pacific and Persian Gulf through the Indian ocean, a
route on which Japan heavily depends for survival. The U.S. also
plays a role in providing a nuclear umbrella for its allies in
the region.

Now that the Cold War is over and the possibility of a nuclear
confrontation much reduced, logically it should be easier to
secure the nuclear powers' acceptance of SEANWFZ. That, however,
does not seem to be the case. Officially, the present U.S.
position seems to relate mostly to the application of the
international convention on the law of the sea and the
delimitation of SEANWFZ.

While strategic U.S. interests are duly accommodated by the
Treaty, the heart of the matter seems to be that the nuclear
powers do not want to give up their strategy of nuclear
deterrence.

This possibility might explain the continued nuclear testing
by the Chinese and the French in their attempt to catch up with
the U.S.'s strategic capability before they are ready to sign a
CTBT, a step towards a "vertical" nuclear non-proliferation.

It may be ruled out that Chinese objection to SEANWFZ is an
indication of their willingness to use nuclear weapons -- except
perhaps for blackmail -- to back up their claim to the Spratlys
and Taiwan. A state is not likely to destroy what it claims to be
its own territories.

However, a CTBT makes no sense if nuclear deterrence is
maintained. Logic demands the continued maintenance of
credibility, which could mean the continued accumulation and
modernization of nuclear arsenals, with the consequence of an
uncontrollable arms race.

If that should be the case, the NPT would remain dis
criminatory and gradually lose its value and credibility. Its
survival would be put in jeopardy. The value of SEANWFZ would be
no more than that of a declaratory nature, while perhaps
retaining its basically political and diplomatic message: The
desire and aspiration to be free of external interference on the
part of the Southeast Asian nations, which in any event are not
likely to develop their own nuclear weapons, but whose friendship
and cooperation should never be taken for granted.

The writer is a member of the Board of Directors of the Centre
for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.