Nuclear treaty's significance unclear<\/p>\n
Ten Southeast Asian leaders signed a treaty in Bangkok over
\nthe weekend banning the production and acquisition of nuclear
\nweapons in the region. Political analyst J. Soedjati Djiwandono
\nlooks at the treaty's significance.<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): A treaty establishing Southeast Asia as a
\nnuclear-weapons-free zone (SEANWFZ) was signed by the ASEAN heads
\nof state and government at their fifth summit in Bangkok last
\nFriday. The possibility of establishing a nuclear free zone was
\nfirst considered in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration in 1971, when
\nASEAN's foreign ministers gathered to discuss the neutralization
\nof Southeast Asia, or ZOPFAN.<\/p>\n
However, it was not until the 1984 annual meeting of ASEAN
\nforeign ministers in Jakarta that the SEANWFZ idea was discussed.
\nThe ASEAN Working Group on ZOPFAN has since been given the
\nresponsibility of studying the SEANWFZ concept as a component of
\nZOPFAN.<\/p>\n
The nuclear-weapons-free zone would help implement the Nuclear
\nNon-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which was extended indefinitely
\nlast May. It would help \"horizontalize\" the non-proliferation of
\nnuclear weapons. But it remains unclear if it will help lead to
\nthe complete elimination of all nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n
Whether the nuclear powers, particularly the United States and
\nChina, will approve, recognize and respect the Treaty has yet to
\nbe determined and will depend on the strategic importance the
\nnuclear powers attach to the region.<\/p>\n
In a sense, the strategic significance of Southeast Asia is
\nderived from the super power relationship. Yet nuclear weapons
\nand their delivery systems might render geographic position
\nalmost meaningless in the event, however unlikely, of a nuclear
\nwar. However, Southeast Asia has strategic significance to the
\nnuclear powers in at least two respects.<\/p>\n
The first is the relative importance of the region in relation
\nto global balance. While the Russian (previously Soviet) nuclear
\narsenal has focused on land-based ICBMs, its SLBM component and
\nthe number of nuclear-weapons-carrying heavy bombers are not as
\nimportant to its overall deterrence capabilities as they are to
\nthe U.S. strategic triad.<\/p>\n
U.S. concern that a SEANWFZ could adversely affect its
\nposition is understandable. It needs greater strategic mobility
\nthan the rest of the nuclear powers.<\/p>\n
Secondly, the U.S. needs to secure transit for its warships
\nand safety of the sea lanes for its allies in Asia, particularly
\nJapan, for which the Southeast Asian waters serve as a link
\nbetween the Pacific and Persian Gulf through the Indian ocean, a
\nroute on which Japan heavily depends for survival. The U.S. also
\nplays a role in providing a nuclear umbrella for its allies in
\nthe region.<\/p>\n
Now that the Cold War is over and the possibility of a nuclear
\nconfrontation much reduced, logically it should be easier to
\nsecure the nuclear powers' acceptance of SEANWFZ. That, however,
\ndoes not seem to be the case. Officially, the present U.S.
\nposition seems to relate mostly to the application of the
\ninternational convention on the law of the sea and the
\ndelimitation of SEANWFZ.<\/p>\n
While strategic U.S. interests are duly accommodated by the
\nTreaty, the heart of the matter seems to be that the nuclear
\npowers do not want to give up their strategy of nuclear
\ndeterrence.<\/p>\n
This possibility might explain the continued nuclear testing
\nby the Chinese and the French in their attempt to catch up with
\nthe U.S.'s strategic capability before they are ready to sign a
\nCTBT, a step towards a \"vertical\" nuclear non-proliferation.<\/p>\n
It may be ruled out that Chinese objection to SEANWFZ is an
\nindication of their willingness to use nuclear weapons -- except
\nperhaps for blackmail -- to back up their claim to the Spratlys
\nand Taiwan. A state is not likely to destroy what it claims to be
\nits own territories.<\/p>\n
However, a CTBT makes no sense if nuclear deterrence is
\nmaintained. Logic demands the continued maintenance of
\ncredibility, which could mean the continued accumulation and
\nmodernization of nuclear arsenals, with the consequence of an
\nuncontrollable arms race.<\/p>\n
If that should be the case, the NPT would remain dis
\ncriminatory and gradually lose its value and credibility. Its
\nsurvival would be put in jeopardy. The value of SEANWFZ would be
\nno more than that of a declaratory nature, while perhaps
\nretaining its basically political and diplomatic message: The
\ndesire and aspiration to be free of external interference on the
\npart of the Southeast Asian nations, which in any event are not
\nlikely to develop their own nuclear weapons, but whose friendship
\nand cooperation should never be taken for granted.<\/p>\n
The writer is a member of the Board of Directors of the Centre
\nfor Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta.<\/p>",
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