Minority participation and democratization

Minority participation and democratization

Christine Susanna Tjhin, Jakarta

Since the legislative election in April, more Chinese-
Indonesians have undoubtedly been engaged in the country's
democratization, and this degree of enthusiasm is a new precedent
for their future participation.

In the past, the only "participation" expected concerned
economic activities. The reconstruction of the Chinese-Indonesian
identity was shaped much by such economic preferences, which led
to the stereotypical stigma that the ethnic group, which
comprises 2 percent of the Indonesian population, makes up 70
percent of the economy.

Although no valid proof exists to indicate the precise
economic power of Chinese-Indonesians -- nor any to calculate the
economic power of other ethnic groups in Indonesia -- this
"popular" stigma has stuck.

The notion of Chinese-Indonesians holding economic power has
held sway for as long as the nation's history, particularly since
the colonial era. However, this stigma was amplified in the late
1990s during the Asian financial crisis by the laziness and
bombastic tendencies of some former journalists, who quoted
incorrectly Michael Backman's 1995 work on Indonesian
conglomerates.

Backman investigated the market capitalization of 300
companies and found that 73 percent of the companies' total
market capitalization was owned by Chinese-Indonesian
conglomerates. Market capitalization, however, is not the
national economy, because it excludes state-owned enterprises,
multinationals and foreign companies that provide far greater
contributions. Still, the damage had been done and attempts to
rectify the fallacy were mostly futile, and the effect of this
long-held "popular" stigma peaked during the tragic events of May
1998.

In the context of the 2004 general elections, elites who
needed funds thought it would be profitable to lure the support
of Chinese-Indonesians with trivial promises of enforcing the
abolishment of the Chinese-specific Indonesian citizenship
certificate, or SBKRI, and of eradicating discrimination -- but
without appreciating the actual potential of the Chinese-
Indonesian community in contributing to democratization.

Speaking of the Chinese-Indonesian community and democratic
development in terms of the unproven sums of money they might
have and could donate is superficial and potentially damaging.
Why not look at Indonesians of Chinese descent with glasses of a
different shade?

Since the 1999 presidential election, Chinese-Indonesians have
relatively been more confident in expressing their political
aspirations. Some encouraging signs are: one, increasing
membership of Chinese in political parties; two, an increase in
the number of political discussions and seminars hosted by
Chinese-Indonesian associations with assertive members; and
three, informal presidential campaign teams that generated
various social activities in different localities.

Each of these activities showed the physical and public
presence of Chinese-Indonesians. This presence, at this early
stage of democratic consolidation, has been enough to erode the
apolitical stigma, and regular media coverage of their presence
has helped greatly in drawing a different picture of the Chinese-
Indonesian.

Even if it is not yet comprehensive -- at least to the general
public -- their political participation has increasingly become
evident.

However, this presence is not supported adequately at times by
quality substance. In an earlier piece (The Jakarta Post, March
29, 2004), I illustrated some drawbacks -- in particular the
participation of youths. Some of these drawbacks still exist, yet
improvements have also emerged, as was evident in an event hosted
on Aug. 22 by the Chinese-Indonesian Reform Party (PARTI), which
showed Chinese-Indonesian youths' increasing participation in
politics.

If the event covered in my March piece reflected the Chinese
community's mood toward the legislative election -- namely,
party-oriented debates -- the August event reflected their mood
toward the presidential election. Encouragingly, many legislative
candidates who had failed to win a seat were still willing to
campaign for presidential candidates.

In the August event, a pro-Megawati team and a pro-Susilo team
were engaged in a debate. Due to variety of factors, the Mega-
Hasyim team was bigger -- but this may not automatically mean
that the Chinese-Indonesian community favors Mega-Hasyim more.

There are issues far more complicated and critical than which
candidate Chinese-Indonesians prefer.

The most heated topic raised by youth representatives was the
Kalla factor and the possibility of affirmative action for
Chinese-Indonesians. This was even more hotly debated than the
SBKRI issue. That they are still complaining predominantly about
the antidiscrimination and SBKRI issues shows a limited ability
to link their arguments to mainstream human rights discourses
against all forms of discrimination. Additionally, the debates
often slipped into petty arguments over individual style,
gestures or word choice.

Beneath the surface of the hot topic of affirmative action is
an inherent rejection of all forms and shapes of discrimination.
However, most Chinese-Indonesian political figures are either not
very eloquent in translating this fundamental issue into their
debates and speeches, or are not fully aware of it.

If the first is the case, it is only a matter of experience --
of engaging more in and familiarizing themselves with mainstream
issues. If the latter is the case, however, then there is little
quality in the greater political participation of Chinese-
Indonesians.

Some Chinese-Indonesian may cast their votes this September
for the candidate who could ensure no more -- or the least --
discrimination against Chinese-Indonesians and/or who could
provide the stability necessary for better economic prospects.

This existing mindset is narrow, but perhaps at this point,
this is understandable, given the previous situation and
intimidation. Still, this critical lack must be changed.

A greater participation of youths in mainstream political
and/or social movements may be the only hope for change.

Fortunately, some of the above-mentioned signs also indicate
mainstreaming, in particular among the informal campaign teams --
which were initiated by Chinese-Indonesians and became more
diverse in the process. Some even have a structured cooperation
between different regions, although they are largely based in
Jakarta. Such inter-ethnic engagement brings about positive
developments in the quality of current and future political
participation.

Many issues remain for the Chinese-Indonesian community to
tackle, particularly women's political participation. This,
however, does not detract from their readily embracing a greater
role in the country's democratization.

Despite the shortcomings, the stereotypical accusations of
Chinese-Indonesians being apolitical will soon become invalid as
their participation continues to grow. Skepticism that rule their
political participation as insignificant because of their small
numbers will also soon become invalid. Chinese-Indonesian
participation will become one of the determining factors of
democratization, precisely because they are a minority.

While the country moves toward greater decentralization and
consequently, the increasing relevance of local politics,
Chinese-Indonesian participation in areas with a bigger
distribution of the minority group will provide worthy examples
for national politics.

Democratization is not a monopoly of the majority. Lessons
learned from minority participation are vital contributions to
the overall democratic engagement.

The writer is a researcher of the Department of Politics and
Social Change at the Centre for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS).