Megawati may be betraying her supporters

J. Soedjati Djiwandono, Political Analyst, Jakarta

Some cases have indicated that the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, the political party under President Megawati Soekarnoputri, has betrayed its supporters, not only among its own rank and file, but also its sympathizers outside the party (PDI Perjuangan). It has abandoned and betrayed the common people, the small and the downtrodden, which the party has claimed to represent.

There is little doubt that the main asset that had made its victory possible at the 1999 election was not the fact that she is the daughter of the late president Sukarno, the first and the most popular and charismatic president of the Indonesian republic since independence.

It was, rather, the fact that Megawati was seen by many as a rallying point of opposition to then president Soeharto's New Order. She was a silent symbol of Soeharto's victim of his authoritarian and repressive regime, particularly manifested in the so-called July 27 affair of 1996.

It is in that sense that Megawati represented the downtrodden, the small people alienated and marginalized by the Soeharto's New Order. After all, she had not proved herself to be a good political leader, let alone a competent and seasoned politician. Nor is she a great intellectual figure, which her late father was.

Her election as vice president clearly disappointed not only herself, but also her supporters, the rank and file of her party and many others in society of all walks of life, who most probably had voted for her party in the election. They found it hard to understand and to accept the outcome despite her electoral victory -- over 30 percent of the votes, making PDI Perjuangan the first winner of the 1999 election, though not successful in winning a single majority.

The system of electing the President and Vice President by the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), the supreme governing body in the Indonesian political system, relegated her to the post of vice president, ironically electing Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) president, a man who did not even contest the election as a representative of any political party, but rather an appointed member of the MPR representing one of the ill-defined "functional groups."

Together the Golkar Party, second winner of the election, and the "central axis", a loose coalition of Islamic-based political parties, which together formed a majority in the MPR, easily put Gus Dur in the presidential post, especially by using the issue of Megawati's gender, popular among Muslims, apparently even among mostly conservative Muslim women themselves.

Indeed, Megawati finally was elected President only following the impeachment of president Abdurrahman Wahid. Once she became President, however, which was naturally most welcomed by her voters, Megawati 's policies as well as those of her party have since given the impression that she has forsaken the very people that have voted her, though not directly, to the presidency.

To be sure, it is not easy to make a distinction between the policies she pursues as President and those she adopts as leader of PDI Perjuangan. In Indonesia, moreover, there is no distinction between party leader and party chairperson as in more advanced democracies as in the United Kingdom or the United States.

Contrary to the expectations of many, Megawati is strongly opposed to a direct election of president and vice president. A constitutional amendment on presidential election is reportedly to be shelved.

Such an attitude implies that she wants to maintain the existence of the MPR, regardless of amendments. That seems common among most of the politicians, although a direct presidential election should result in the abolishment of the MPR. And more than the rest of the political elite, Megawati seems even inclined to have the 1945 Constitution left basically as it is. She has been reported to entertain the idea of freezing the process of constitutional amendments altogether. Like most Indonesian politicians, she seems to regard the constitution as sacrosanct, particularly its preamble, which is supposed not to be open to any form of amendment.

Hers is a strange attitude, indeed. Her failure to be elected President by the MPR made many people, especially her supporters, disappointed with the mechanism of electing the President by the MPR. After all, many wondered, she was the chief winner of the 1999 election! One would wonder if she does not feel confident enough to run for the presidency through a direct election.

In such a case, she may hope to be president through an election by the MPR if she can foster close cooperation, even an coalition or an alliance, with other parties, particularly the Golkar party, to win the presidency.

This may explain her opposition to the idea of establishing a special House committee to investigate the Bulogate II involving Akbar Tandjung, House Speaker and chairman of the Golkar Party. The case refers to the embezzlement of "non-budgetary" funds under the State Logistics Agency (Bulog). Her party's approval would certainly have resulted in the establishment of such a special committee.

That may imply that she feels the likely need for the support and cooperation of Golkar in the next election in 2004. In fact, the findings of a similar special House committee on Bulogate I resulted in the impeachment of president Wahid. The difference is that Akbar's case is in due legal process, which was not the case with then president Gus Dur. Nevertheless, there seems to be a considerable degree of uncertainty in the present legal proceedings.

No less interesting has been the support that Megawati has pledged for the candidacy of Jakarta Governor Sutiyoso, for a second term in the next election later this year. Not only is Sutiyoso a controversial figure because of his bad records such as his failure in anticipating and later in dealing with the floods in the capital earlier this year; his policy regarding the becak (pedicab) drivers, street vendors, and those regarded as illegal occupants (squatters) of numerous land areas in the capital.

Megawati's reason for her support is the need to ensure security until general elections in 2004. And being an Army general, Sutiyoso is regarded as the right man for the job.

More importantly, however, Sutiyoso may be a controversial figure within the PDIP itself. During the riots accompanying the July 27 affair in 1996, Sutiyoso was the Jakarta military commander. As such, he was most probably also responsible for what happened on that day, although he once said that the affair was a national policy, meaning that former president Soeharto was primarily responsible for it.

In any case, Sutiyoso has been named one of the suspects. Megawati's support is an affront to the victims of the July 27 affair as well as to their families and relatives, despite the reported "reconciliation" between him and Megawati or her party.

Whatever the case, by seemingly abandoning the small people, Megawati is forsaking her roots. Her strategy could well be counterproductive. It would be an illusion on her part, if at the coming general election in 2004, she thinks she would be able to maintain her image that made her an impressive winner at the 1999 election.