Megawati may be betraying her supporters<\/p>\n
J. Soedjati Djiwandono, Political Analyst, Jakarta<\/p>\n
Some cases have indicated that the Indonesian Democratic Party
\nof Struggle, the political party under President Megawati
\nSoekarnoputri, has betrayed its supporters, not only among its
\nown rank and file, but also its sympathizers outside the party
\n(PDI Perjuangan). It has abandoned and betrayed the common
\npeople, the small and the downtrodden, which the party has
\nclaimed to represent.<\/p>\n
There is little doubt that the main asset that had made its
\nvictory possible at the 1999 election was not the fact that she
\nis the daughter of the late president Sukarno, the first and the
\nmost popular and charismatic president of the Indonesian republic
\nsince independence.<\/p>\n
It was, rather, the fact that Megawati was seen by many as a
\nrallying point of opposition to then president Soeharto's New
\nOrder. She was a silent symbol of Soeharto's victim of his
\nauthoritarian and repressive regime, particularly manifested in
\nthe so-called July 27 affair of 1996.<\/p>\n
It is in that sense that Megawati represented the downtrodden,
\nthe small people alienated and marginalized by the Soeharto's New
\nOrder. After all, she had not proved herself to be a good
\npolitical leader, let alone a competent and seasoned politician.
\nNor is she a great intellectual figure, which her late father
\nwas.<\/p>\n
Her election as vice president clearly disappointed not only
\nherself, but also her supporters, the rank and file of her party
\nand many others in society of all walks of life, who most
\nprobably had voted for her party in the election. They found it
\nhard to understand and to accept the outcome despite her
\nelectoral victory -- over 30 percent of the votes, making PDI
\nPerjuangan the first winner of the 1999 election, though not
\nsuccessful in winning a single majority.<\/p>\n
The system of electing the President and Vice President by the
\nPeople's Consultative Assembly (MPR), the supreme governing body
\nin the Indonesian political system, relegated her to the post of
\nvice president, ironically electing Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur)
\npresident, a man who did not even contest the election as a
\nrepresentative of any political party, but rather an appointed
\nmember of the MPR representing one of the ill-defined "functional
\ngroups."<\/p>\n
Together the Golkar Party, second winner of the election, and
\nthe "central axis", a loose coalition of Islamic-based political
\nparties, which together formed a majority in the MPR, easily put
\nGus Dur in the presidential post, especially by using the issue
\nof Megawati's gender, popular among Muslims, apparently even
\namong mostly conservative Muslim women themselves.<\/p>\n
Indeed, Megawati finally was elected President only following
\nthe impeachment of president Abdurrahman Wahid. Once she became
\nPresident, however, which was naturally most welcomed by her
\nvoters, Megawati 's policies as well as those of her party have
\nsince given the impression that she has forsaken the very people
\nthat have voted her, though not directly, to the presidency.<\/p>\n
To be sure, it is not easy to make a distinction between the
\npolicies she pursues as President and those she adopts as leader
\nof PDI Perjuangan. In Indonesia, moreover, there is no
\ndistinction between party leader and party chairperson as in more
\nadvanced democracies as in the United Kingdom or the United
\nStates.<\/p>\n
Contrary to the expectations of many, Megawati is strongly
\nopposed to a direct election of president and vice president. A
\nconstitutional amendment on presidential election is reportedly
\nto be shelved.<\/p>\n
Such an attitude implies that she wants to maintain the
\nexistence of the MPR, regardless of amendments. That seems common
\namong most of the politicians, although a direct presidential
\nelection should result in the abolishment of the MPR. And more
\nthan the rest of the political elite, Megawati seems even
\ninclined to have the 1945 Constitution left basically as it is.
\nShe has been reported to entertain the idea of freezing the
\nprocess of constitutional amendments altogether. Like most
\nIndonesian politicians, she seems to regard the constitution as
\nsacrosanct, particularly its preamble, which is supposed not to
\nbe open to any form of amendment.<\/p>\n
Hers is a strange attitude, indeed. Her failure to be elected
\nPresident by the MPR made many people, especially her supporters,
\ndisappointed with the mechanism of electing the President by the
\nMPR. After all, many wondered, she was the chief winner of the
\n1999 election! One would wonder if she does not feel confident
\nenough to run for the presidency through a direct election.<\/p>\n
In such a case, she may hope to be president through an
\nelection by the MPR if she can foster close cooperation, even an
\ncoalition or an alliance, with other parties, particularly the
\nGolkar party, to win the presidency.<\/p>\n
This may explain her opposition to the idea of establishing a
\nspecial House committee to investigate the Bulogate II involving
\nAkbar Tandjung, House Speaker and chairman of the Golkar Party.
\nThe case refers to the embezzlement of "non-budgetary" funds
\nunder the State Logistics Agency (Bulog). Her party's approval
\nwould certainly have resulted in the establishment of such a
\nspecial committee.<\/p>\n
That may imply that she feels the likely need for the support
\nand cooperation of Golkar in the next election in 2004. In fact,
\nthe findings of a similar special House committee on Bulogate I
\nresulted in the impeachment of president Wahid. The difference is
\nthat Akbar's case is in due legal process, which was not the case
\nwith then president Gus Dur. Nevertheless, there seems to be a
\nconsiderable degree of uncertainty in the present legal
\nproceedings.<\/p>\n
No less interesting has been the support that Megawati has
\npledged for the candidacy of Jakarta Governor Sutiyoso, for a
\nsecond term in the next election later this year. Not only is
\nSutiyoso a controversial figure because of his bad records such
\nas his failure in anticipating and later in dealing with the
\nfloods in the capital earlier this year; his policy regarding the
\nbecak (pedicab) drivers, street vendors, and those regarded as
\nillegal occupants (squatters) of numerous land areas in the
\ncapital.<\/p>\n
Megawati's reason for her support is the need to ensure
\nsecurity until general elections in 2004. And being an Army
\ngeneral, Sutiyoso is regarded as the right man for the job.<\/p>\n
More importantly, however, Sutiyoso may be a controversial
\nfigure within the PDIP itself. During the riots accompanying the
\nJuly 27 affair in 1996, Sutiyoso was the Jakarta military
\ncommander. As such, he was most probably also responsible for
\nwhat happened on that day, although he once said that the affair
\nwas a national policy, meaning that former president Soeharto was
\nprimarily responsible for it.<\/p>\n
In any case, Sutiyoso has been named one of the suspects.
\nMegawati's support is an affront to the victims of the July 27
\naffair as well as to their families and relatives, despite the
\nreported "reconciliation" between him and Megawati or her party.<\/p>\n
Whatever the case, by seemingly abandoning the small people,
\nMegawati is forsaking her roots. Her strategy could well be
\ncounterproductive. It would be an illusion on her part, if at the
\ncoming general election in 2004, she thinks she would be able to
\nmaintain her image that made her an impressive winner at the 1999
\nelection.<\/p>",
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