Megawati forced to tread lightly

Megawati forced to tread lightly

Derwin Pereira, The Straits Times, Asia News Network, Singapore

Jakarta is under pressure from Washington to get tougher with
Islamic militant groups operating freely in the country, but
domestic politics has much to do with the government's lack of
action.

President Megawati Soekarnoputri walks a tightrope on the
issue of militant Islam.

Her dilemma is this: Official inaction against religious
extremists would hurt foreign confidence in the government's
abilities but a crackdown on these elements would stir up a
hornet's nest among local politicians hoping to gain from playing
the Islamic card.

Already, government detractors have sounded warnings that if
the government should go after al-Qaeda-linked militants - the
way Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines did in recent weeks -
it would be branded as anti-Islamic and its actions trigger
unrest in the country, especially in Java.

Coming to grips with Islamic extremist groups while balancing
domestic and international considerations has become yet another
contentious issue for her seven-month-old coalition government.

To be sure, the 54-year-old leader was anything but ambiguous
in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York
and Washington.

She condemned the violence and declared her solidarity with
the Americans, supporting Washington's bold moves to launch a
global campaign against terrorists.

She was also the first foreign leader to visit President
George Bush after Sept. 11.

Underlying this, of course, were economic considerations.

But the visit was also significant because it produced a
special communique on religion and terrorism.

But back home, her government's response was equivocal.
Strangely enough, the special communique was not made public in
Indonesia itself.

Vice President Hamzah Haz, the leader of the largest Muslim
faction in Parliament, made matters worse by making negative
statements on the matter in response to growing pressure from
radical groups staging demonstrations outside the US Embassy in
Jakarta.

A few other Muslim politicians were quick to jump on the
bandwagon of protest, if only to score points with the militants
whose influence on Indonesian politics has grown significantly
since Soeharto's fall from power in 1998.

Behind their calls for an end to diplomatic ties with
Washington and threats of "sweeping" American citizens from
Indonesia lay a hidden agenda: toppling Ms Megawati from power.

Was the President swayed by such demands or did she carry out
a blitzkrieg against the militants on her return from the United
States?

Neither. If anything, she continued sending mixed signals to
both her domestic and foreign audience but veering somewhat
closer towards appeasing the Muslim ground.

Deliar Noor of the State Institute for Islamic Studies (IAIN)
notes: "It is hard for the government to take repressive measures
against several of these radical groups. It will be seen as an
attack on Islam as a whole."

Political concerns are central to the calculations of Ms
Megawati and her advisers.

The Muslim bloc in Parliament is the third-largest and could
easily rock her government if it goes on the offensive - the way
it did against her predecessor, Abdurrahman Wahid.

That is one reason why she has worked hard to cultivate the
Muslim ground by offering them key positions in Cabinet -
including the vice-presidency - when she was elected to power
last July.

A clampdown now would mean throwing the nationalist leader
back to her position in 1999 - her Islamic credentials questioned
and a repeat of the religious discourse that questioned her right
to the presidency because of her gender.

Palace sources disclose that she receives regular intelligence
reports on the activities of several of these groups but is
cautious about cracking the whip.

Notes a source: "She is in a difficult position. She feels
that it is dangerous to go around arresting Muslim clerics and
their followers because it could ignite more demonstrations and
violence.

"For now, she wants the security forces to just monitor the
activities of the militants until solid evidence surfaces. Then
it gives her grounds to act, but even then she has to be
careful..."

In effect, it means that no action would be taken against
militant leaders for the moment.

It is instructive to note that authorities here have yet to
arrest Abu Bakar Baashir of the Mujahideen Council of Indonesia
(MMI) despite his being on the Malaysian police wanted list.

The lack of action has drawn criticism from the political
elite in Washington.

U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz - a former
ambassador to Indonesia - told the New York Times that there were
areas in the country where the government was "extremely weak".

"You see the potential for Muslim extremists and Muslim
terrorists to link up with those Muslim groups in Indonesia and
find a little corner for themselves in a country that's otherwise
quite unfriendly to terrorism," he said.

An American analyst with a Jakarta-based international risk
consultancy firm was more blunt: "The Americans are keeping a
score card for what is being done in Asia. Singapore, Malaysia
and the Philippines are getting almost-perfect scores for reining
in the terrorists.

"The Indonesians have got a big fat goose egg for not trying
hard enough."

To be fair, the state intelligence agency BIN under Gen. A. M.
Hendropriyono has been keeping close tabs on the activities of
several of the extremists.

Some political observers believe that one reason why the
government has refused to talk openly about this matter is
because it did not want to compromise a delicate intelligence
operation under way.

Explains Jusuf Wanandi of the Jakarta-based think-tank Centre
for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS): "They are chasing
the bad guys. Why should they give them any leads by revealing
their operations to the press?"

Sources said that since Sept. 11, surveillance had stepped up
against several al-Qaeda-linked groups on the run.

Following their tracks was made difficult because of
Indonesia's porous borders and lack of funds to capture the
terrorists.

To compound matters, their prey are also believed to be better
equipped technology-wise and have been using that edge to evade
surveillance.

Another problem facing the security agencies here is to get
politicians to act on the intelligence they are providing them.

An intelligence source said: "We can't move if we do not get a
signal from the government."

One senior Cabinet minister, for example, is coming under fire
from certain quarters for not doing enough.

His critics charge that he is unwilling to move against the
militants because it could jeopardize his links with Muslim
groups and political parties that could be critical in his 2004
presidential bid.

A similar problem exists in the Indonesian Military (TNI). Not
everyone is bent on pursuing the militants with the same
intensity.

Fearful of seeing its central relevance decline in Indonesia,
some generals have worked hard at cultivating Islamic militias to
use them as a counterbalance against emerging leftist groups in
the country.

As the political and military elite sit on their hands and
provide no leadership, the vacuum is being filled by two of the
largest Muslim groups in the country - the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)
and the Muhammadiyah - both of which represent mainstream Islam
in Indonesia.

Despite the resurgence of an intolerant strain of Islam in
recent years, the broad direction is still one of moderation.

In an event of great political symbolism, NU's Hasyim Muzadi
and Muhammadiyah's Syafii Maarif met last November to adopt a
common stand on Islamic radicalism.

The leaders expressed concern that it would hijack the views
of the majority.

They agreed to set up a task force both at national and
provincial levels to deal directly with the militants, to get
them to back down on their threats.

Jusuf notes: "This is significant because they are throwing
their weight together to deal with militants who are only a
minority in Indonesia."

The key is whether the NU and Muhammadiyah can sustain such
cooperation in the long run.

Historically, both have been rivals and have at various points
been sucked into the power play by the elite in Jakarta.

The other consideration is whether they can buck the trend of
Islamic radicalism.

The rise of militancy in Indonesia is part of a broader
pattern in the breakdown of law and order in the country,
economic crisis and the rise of international terrorism in the
last decade.

Mob politics and links to foreign extremist elements have
always been prevalent in Indonesia but became more pronounced
with Soeharto's fall, as seen by the flowering of not just
Islamic militias but other groups across religious and ethnic
lines.

Only decisive political leadership - which is absent in
Indonesia today - can curb the growth of extremism.