Malino peace process flawed

Malino peace process flawed

Prasetyohadi, Researcher in Conflict Transformation, Jakarta

It was indeed a show of good will on the part of the central
government to host a two-day reconciliatory meeting between the
conflicting parties in Poso, Central Sulawesi.

But the significance of the meeting, which began on Aug. 10 in
the Central Sulawesi capital of Palu, became questionable when
the Christian delegation, citing security and transportation
difficulties, did not show up. Perhaps, in an expression of
resentment toward the meeting.

Meanwhile, thousands of people in Poso have fled their homes.
The Malino I peace accord signed on Dec. 20, 2001, is seen as
seriously damaged, and its signatories can hardly see the light
at the end of the tunnel if the methods and procedures of the
talks are not significantly altered.

In the case of the Malino I accord for Poso, both parties'
denial of involvement in fresh attacks should have clearly
indicated the invalidity of the mediation and lack of trust on
the part of the mediators, who resumed the meeting only after the
recent outbreak of violence. So it is indeed futile and a waste
of time.

The process of the Malino meetings, either the first for Poso
or the second for Maluku, does not allow for the development of a
long-term program. The talks are designed to proceed for only two
days, with preparations of a few weeks. Indeed, the Malino talks
are designed to be held only once, involving all parties. This
cannot be the case in conflict resolution, given the usually deep
hatred and thirst for revenge on both sides.

Peace talks take a great deal of time, and the agenda for
talks should come from the participants -- not be imposed from
above. The short, condescending Malino meetings limit all
participants to the formality of a declaration. Thus no one can
adequately ensure their sincere implementation.

The identification of the actors in the conflicts also remains
weak, which can be seen in the insufficient representation of
participants at the talks.

The representation of the military, police and civilians
involved in the armed conflicts is indeed very low. Thus,
groupings along religious lines in the representation cannot be
considered adequate ground to assume reconciliation.

Peace talks that do not include the real actors in a conflict
are meaningless. It is worse if the signatories are expected to
implement the agreement and stop armed attacks. In the case of
Poso, indicators point to the involvement of skilled,
unidentified outsiders in a number of the attacks.

In fact, most of the Malino peace talk signatories, either for
Poso or Maluku, are local community leaders, the majority of whom
have no access to or contact with well-trained combatants and
snipers, carrying automatic weapons.

Again, the success of a peace deal assumes the willingness of
the parties to adopt viable deals. And to reach such a
precondition, mediators and/or facilitators should reroute the
process from scratch, embracing community organization
management.

If success is really the goal, mediators should bow to the
preferences of the conflicting communities and change the
procedures of the talks. If confrontation occurs, facilitators
should not shrink away. Keep them talking, whatever difficulties
they encounter.

In the violent incidents that have taken place after the peace
agreements in Poso and Maluku, there have been hardly any
attempts to seek justice. The security officers remain weak
beyond explanation, failing to do their jobs in an almost
criminal manner.

With recent major outbreaks of violence in Poso destroying the
peace deal, and once participants in the peace talks acknowledge
this situation, reconciliatory efforts which have so far been
"top down" should begin to involve civil society in advocating
human rights.

Who will do this if not the people themselves?