JP//TNI

Tiarma Siboro The Jakarta Post Jakarta

Although it has formally abandoned its much criticized dual function (Dwifungsi) doctrine, the Indonesian Military (TNI) is yet to shed its image as a "troublemaker".

Normally, the military's presence in an area of conflict will raise hopes that peace and order will be restored.

But that is not always the case. Look at the heavy military presence in areas of conflict in Maluku, North Maluku, Poso, Aceh, Kalimantan and Irian Jaya.

Critics have long suspected that the military have no genuine intention to put out communal and separatist conflicts in various regions. Some have even charged that the military add fuel to the fire.

Benefits they gain include selling arms to the warring factions for monetary gain to the longer-term benefits of 'showing' that the military is still in high demand because the country is unsafe. The speculation receives mere credence when the communal conflicts in Poso, Aceh and Irian Jaya deteriorated amid news that 50,000 troops had been deployed to the areas.

Military data shows that the largest troop deployments are in Aceh and Maluku, where some 22,000 personnel are now stationed. The remaining troops are deployed in several other regions such as Kalimantan, Irian Jaya, and Poso in Central Sulawesi.

Syamsuddin Haris, a senior observer of the National Institute of Sciences (LIPI), has cynically said that the existing conflicts amount to constitute lucrative "projects" managed by "those who don't want to see the struggle for reform and democracy in this country a success".

Syamsuddin is pessimistic that the government is able to settle the problems because otherwise there must be a deal that would favor the military.

The fall of Soeharto's 32-year militaristic regime on May 21, 1998 rekindled hope for political reform that would allow the civil society to flourish.

The winds of change following the dictator's fall had also prompted the military to reform. The most important move was probably dropping the dual function doctrine that allowed it both a defense and political role.

The military liquidated its social and political affairs posts in 1998 and created a territorial affairs post, which was then scrapped in November.

Both the TNI's social and political roles, and later its territorial roles, had been seen as hampering democracy because they allowed the military to become deeply involved in civilian affairs.

To support its role, the TNI has an extensive network: Regional Military Commands (Kodam) in nearly all of Indonesia's 31 provinces, Military Resort Commands (Korem) in the smaller provinces, District Military Commands (Kodim) in regencies and mayoralties, Subdistrict Military Commands (Koramil) in subdistricts and Military Representative Posts in villages.

Over the past year, the TNI internal reform remains rhetorical. Its leadership does not seem to have a clear vision on where the military is heading. The territorial post has been dropped from the military's organization structure but not the omnipresent supporting institutions used for so long to back the Soeharto regime.

Many have also charged that after abolishing its territorial function, the TNI established and trained civilian militias in several conflict regions such as the Red-and-White Task Force in Irian Jaya. The TNI has also been understood to have defended the involvement of Laskar Jihad in sectarian conflicts in Maluku and Poso.

The presence of these militias, of course, is only worsening the conflict and makes all efforts to stop them futile.

A high-ranking military officer at the TNI Headquarters who asked for anonymity once revealed that the military prefers to use a strategy called "war by proxy".

"Supporting the militia is intended to cover up the military's involvement in the conflicts," he said.

Friction in the military's top leadership is well-known. The best-known conflict was probably that between former Army Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad) chief, the late Lt. Gen. Agus Wirahadikusumah, and the TNI's former chief of Territorial Affairs Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo. Their rivalry broke into the open when the two promoted a review of the TNI's territorial roles.

Wirahadikusumah, an outspoken general, insisted that the TNI must abolish its territorial role and scrap its institutions at the command level (from the village to provincial). Widjojo was fiercely opposed to the idea. He proposed, instead, that the TNI should transfer its territorial authority to local administrations and the National Police.

Widjojo also said that should the TNI dissolve its institutions at command level, it must be done in phases and might take years.

The TNI chief Adm. Widodo A.S. later clarified Widjojo's statement, saying that eliminating the TNI's territorial functions did not mean dissolving its institutions at the command level.

Speaking at a hearing with the House of Representatives' Commission I on Political, Security, and Foreign Affairs, Widodo said that the presence of the TNI's command level across the country aimed to safeguard security.

But in fact many believe that the bottom line of the endless debate among the top officers on the territorial issue is that the military is reluctant to go back to its barracks as the reformists demand.