JP//TNI

JP//TNI

Tiarma Siboro
The Jakarta Post
Jakarta

Although it has formally abandoned its much criticized dual
function (Dwifungsi) doctrine, the Indonesian Military (TNI) is
yet to shed its image as a "troublemaker".

Normally, the military's presence in an area of conflict will
raise hopes that peace and order will be restored.

But that is not always the case. Look at the heavy military
presence in areas of conflict in Maluku, North Maluku, Poso,
Aceh, Kalimantan and Irian Jaya.

Critics have long suspected that the military have no genuine
intention to put out communal and separatist conflicts in various
regions. Some have even charged that the military add fuel to the
fire.

Benefits they gain include selling arms to the warring
factions for monetary gain to the longer-term benefits of
'showing' that the military is still in high demand because the
country is unsafe. The speculation receives mere credence when
the communal conflicts in Poso, Aceh and Irian Jaya deteriorated
amid news that 50,000 troops had been deployed to the areas.

Military data shows that the largest troop deployments are in
Aceh and Maluku, where some 22,000 personnel are now stationed.
The remaining troops are deployed in several other regions such
as Kalimantan, Irian Jaya, and Poso in Central Sulawesi.

Syamsuddin Haris, a senior observer of the National Institute
of Sciences (LIPI), has cynically said that the existing
conflicts amount to constitute lucrative "projects" managed by
"those who don't want to see the struggle for reform and
democracy in this country a success".

Syamsuddin is pessimistic that the government is able to
settle the problems because otherwise there must be a deal that
would favor the military.

The fall of Soeharto's 32-year militaristic regime on May 21,
1998 rekindled hope for political reform that would allow the
civil society to flourish.

The winds of change following the dictator's fall had also
prompted the military to reform. The most important move was
probably dropping the dual function doctrine that allowed it both
a defense and political role.

The military liquidated its social and political affairs posts
in 1998 and created a territorial affairs post, which was then
scrapped in November.

Both the TNI's social and political roles, and later its
territorial roles, had been seen as hampering democracy because
they allowed the military to become deeply involved in civilian
affairs.

To support its role, the TNI has an extensive network:
Regional Military Commands (Kodam) in nearly all of Indonesia's
31 provinces, Military Resort Commands (Korem) in the smaller
provinces, District Military Commands (Kodim) in regencies and
mayoralties, Subdistrict Military Commands (Koramil) in
subdistricts and Military Representative Posts in villages.

Over the past year, the TNI internal reform remains
rhetorical. Its leadership does not seem to have a clear vision
on where the military is heading. The territorial post has been
dropped from the military's organization structure but not the
omnipresent supporting institutions used for so long to back the
Soeharto regime.

Many have also charged that after abolishing its territorial
function, the TNI established and trained civilian militias in
several conflict regions such as the Red-and-White Task Force in
Irian Jaya. The TNI has also been understood to have defended the
involvement of Laskar Jihad in sectarian conflicts in Maluku and
Poso.

The presence of these militias, of course, is only worsening
the conflict and makes all efforts to stop them futile.

A high-ranking military officer at the TNI Headquarters who
asked for anonymity once revealed that the military prefers to
use a strategy called "war by proxy".

"Supporting the militia is intended to cover up the military's
involvement in the conflicts," he said.

Friction in the military's top leadership is well-known. The
best-known conflict was probably that between former Army
Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad) chief, the late Lt. Gen.
Agus Wirahadikusumah, and the TNI's former chief of Territorial
Affairs Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo. Their rivalry broke into the open
when the two promoted a review of the TNI's territorial roles.

Wirahadikusumah, an outspoken general, insisted that the TNI
must abolish its territorial role and scrap its institutions at
the command level (from the village to provincial). Widjojo was
fiercely opposed to the idea. He proposed, instead, that the TNI
should transfer its territorial authority to local
administrations and the National Police.

Widjojo also said that should the TNI dissolve its
institutions at command level, it must be done in phases and
might take years.

The TNI chief Adm. Widodo A.S. later clarified Widjojo's
statement, saying that eliminating the TNI's territorial
functions did not mean dissolving its institutions at the command
level.

Speaking at a hearing with the House of Representatives'
Commission I on Political, Security, and Foreign Affairs, Widodo
said that the presence of the TNI's command level across the
country aimed to safeguard security.

But in fact many believe that the bottom line of the endless
debate among the top officers on the territorial issue is that
the military is reluctant to go back to its barracks as the
reformists demand.