JP\/\/TNI<\/p>\n
Tiarma Siboro
\nThe Jakarta Post
\nJakarta<\/p>\n
Although it has formally abandoned its much criticized dual
\nfunction (Dwifungsi) doctrine, the Indonesian Military (TNI) is
\nyet to shed its image as a \"troublemaker\".<\/p>\n
Normally, the military's presence in an area of conflict will
\nraise hopes that peace and order will be restored.<\/p>\n
But that is not always the case. Look at the heavy military
\npresence in areas of conflict in Maluku, North Maluku, Poso,
\nAceh, Kalimantan and Irian Jaya.<\/p>\n
Critics have long suspected that the military have no genuine
\nintention to put out communal and separatist conflicts in various
\nregions. Some have even charged that the military add fuel to the
\nfire.<\/p>\n
Benefits they gain include selling arms to the warring
\nfactions for monetary gain to the longer-term benefits of
\n'showing' that the military is still in high demand because the
\ncountry is unsafe. The speculation receives mere credence when
\nthe communal conflicts in Poso, Aceh and Irian Jaya deteriorated
\namid news that 50,000 troops had been deployed to the areas.<\/p>\n
Military data shows that the largest troop deployments are in
\nAceh and Maluku, where some 22,000 personnel are now stationed.
\nThe remaining troops are deployed in several other regions such
\nas Kalimantan, Irian Jaya, and Poso in Central Sulawesi.<\/p>\n
Syamsuddin Haris, a senior observer of the National Institute
\nof Sciences (LIPI), has cynically said that the existing
\nconflicts amount to constitute lucrative \"projects\" managed by
\n\"those who don't want to see the struggle for reform and
\ndemocracy in this country a success\".<\/p>\n
Syamsuddin is pessimistic that the government is able to
\nsettle the problems because otherwise there must be a deal that
\nwould favor the military.<\/p>\n
The fall of Soeharto's 32-year militaristic regime on May 21,
\n1998 rekindled hope for political reform that would allow the
\ncivil society to flourish.<\/p>\n
The winds of change following the dictator's fall had also
\nprompted the military to reform. The most important move was
\nprobably dropping the dual function doctrine that allowed it both
\na defense and political role.<\/p>\n
The military liquidated its social and political affairs posts
\nin 1998 and created a territorial affairs post, which was then
\nscrapped in November.<\/p>\n
Both the TNI's social and political roles, and later its
\nterritorial roles, had been seen as hampering democracy because
\nthey allowed the military to become deeply involved in civilian
\naffairs.<\/p>\n
To support its role, the TNI has an extensive network:
\nRegional Military Commands (Kodam) in nearly all of Indonesia's
\n31 provinces, Military Resort Commands (Korem) in the smaller
\nprovinces, District Military Commands (Kodim) in regencies and
\nmayoralties, Subdistrict Military Commands (Koramil) in
\nsubdistricts and Military Representative Posts in villages.<\/p>\n
Over the past year, the TNI internal reform remains
\nrhetorical. Its leadership does not seem to have a clear vision
\non where the military is heading. The territorial post has been
\ndropped from the military's organization structure but not the
\nomnipresent supporting institutions used for so long to back the
\nSoeharto regime.<\/p>\n
Many have also charged that after abolishing its territorial
\nfunction, the TNI established and trained civilian militias in
\nseveral conflict regions such as the Red-and-White Task Force in
\nIrian Jaya. The TNI has also been understood to have defended the
\ninvolvement of Laskar Jihad in sectarian conflicts in Maluku and
\nPoso.<\/p>\n
The presence of these militias, of course, is only worsening
\nthe conflict and makes all efforts to stop them futile.<\/p>\n
A high-ranking military officer at the TNI Headquarters who
\nasked for anonymity once revealed that the military prefers to
\nuse a strategy called \"war by proxy\".<\/p>\n
\"Supporting the militia is intended to cover up the military's
\ninvolvement in the conflicts,\" he said.<\/p>\n
Friction in the military's top leadership is well-known. The
\nbest-known conflict was probably that between former Army
\nStrategic Reserves Command (Kostrad) chief, the late Lt. Gen.
\nAgus Wirahadikusumah, and the TNI's former chief of Territorial
\nAffairs Lt. Gen. Agus Widjojo. Their rivalry broke into the open
\nwhen the two promoted a review of the TNI's territorial roles.<\/p>\n
Wirahadikusumah, an outspoken general, insisted that the TNI
\nmust abolish its territorial role and scrap its institutions at
\nthe command level (from the village to provincial). Widjojo was
\nfiercely opposed to the idea. He proposed, instead, that the TNI
\nshould transfer its territorial authority to local
\nadministrations and the National Police.<\/p>\n
Widjojo also said that should the TNI dissolve its
\ninstitutions at command level, it must be done in phases and
\nmight take years.<\/p>\n
The TNI chief Adm. Widodo A.S. later clarified Widjojo's
\nstatement, saying that eliminating the TNI's territorial
\nfunctions did not mean dissolving its institutions at the command
\nlevel.<\/p>\n
Speaking at a hearing with the House of Representatives'
\nCommission I on Political, Security, and Foreign Affairs, Widodo
\nsaid that the presence of the TNI's command level across the
\ncountry aimed to safeguard security.<\/p>\n
But in fact many believe that the bottom line of the endless
\ndebate among the top officers on the territorial issue is that
\nthe military is reluctant to go back to its barracks as the
\nreformists demand.<\/p>",
"url": "https:\/\/jawawa.id\/newsitem\/jptni-1447899208",
"image": ""
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