JP/3/HASBA2

We must exhaust all non-military efforts for Aceh

Hasballah M. Sa'ad

The integrity of the republic for many, with regard to the problem of Aceh is not an issue; it is that of how one maintains it. Some are for the shortcut way of a military approach while others refer to the experience of the 10-year military operation, during which the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) did not become significantly weaker.

This was because an entire generation with no previous affinity toward GAM also became sympathetic to it because of their anger, having become victims of the military operation.

This is the main lesson referred to by leaders in Aceh; that various past operations, whatever their names, such as Operasi Rencong, Operasi Cinta Meunasah and others which mainly involved significant military engagements, have not quelled the resistance.

GAM could even become bigger because those who are not GAM so often also became victims. Nowadays, the media reports two or three people killed on a daily basis and the perpetrators can never be found. They are always OTK (unidentified, orang tak dikenal). So those who suffer most have been civilians and it is this trauma that haunts Acehnese in Aceh and elsewhere ...

So what now? We are now racing against time, if before May 12 GAM gives no sign of complying to the government's ultimatum there will be no other choice apart from a military operation.

Yet, however small the chance, we must seize it.

If we can save the peace process, if the President and Cabinet can see the people's aspirations, they might be able to decide something other than a military operation. I would suggest, in the search for a peace process, that the actors no longer only comprise just GAM and the TNI, for both sides are armed and can protect themselves, and each only speaks for their own interests.

If there is some space to involve Aceh's leaders; who on one side still retain pride of being cited as among the republic's pioneers but are in trauma and are even more prone to become victims than GAM members -- if there is such space the atmosphere in the dialog might not merely (lead to answers) A or B but interests that can accommodate those who suffer most -- the people. Maybe their expressions would be able to touch the hearts on the side of GAM and TNI ...

But the difficulties are, first, that civilians are divided, as reflected in East and Central Aceh. There are civilian groups said to be artificially manufactured just to resist others. For instance, in the attacks on the office of the Joint Security Council in East Aceh, according to available information there, a number of strange things were evident, but no proof has yet been shown of "engineering."

Second, there are many civilian groups trying to interpret the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), in a way that suits their needs. One is the Aceh Referendum Information Center (SIRA) which claims that the agreement's phrase "democratic and fair elections in Aceh", means a referendum (for self determination). That a neutral phrase in the Agreement can be interpreted loosely for a group's own interest is very chaotic in the absence of a single authoritative interpretation ...

In Aceh, they say that we cannot adopt the wrong policy or else the spirit of Aceh's pioneers of the republic will be angry; and because we closed our eyes, our children will later curse us ... for losing opportunities because of the degrading of intellectuality, the loss of creativity, of culture ...

If there is still no other option (than a military one), the question remains: Is there an indicator to measure this choice? I would suggest that the indicator be whether casualties decrease.

Ironically, whenever the TNI and police come to Aceh with the noble mission of saving the people from GAM, with all their equipment, ammunition and large budget, casualties among the people increase.

Both sides claim to act in the interest of the people -- yet they suffer the most. How does one explain that? Hence the need for an objective indicator -- whether a military operation can be done with minimum casualties. And whether there are still murders by unidentified people; from May 2-6 there were still such cases.

A second indicator would be a loss of property. Further, from Dec. 9 to Feb. 9 the intercity bus from Aceh to Medan was still operating at night time, now it has stopped. Another indication of safety is whether the coffee stalls stay open all along the road until 1 a.m. -- Acehnese can drink coffee up to eight times a day.

Third, whether crimes such as armed robberies decrease.

A legislator from East Aceh was one of the most recent victims of an unidentified shooter.

How much will we be spending for all this (military operation)? What if all the funds were not spent on ammunition, military logistics, but for the operation to conquer the people's hearts -- this is worth a try.

And how long will this operation be? After what situation will it stop? These must be answered or it will become out of control and we will be like Palestine.

Further, we have made a number of policies on Aceh such as a number of presidential instructions; are they all still relevant, and do the new policies complement the earlier ones?

And in 2000, the People's Consultative Assembly had given two mandates to the government: To settle the Aceh conflict with peaceful means and to set up a truth and reconciliation commission for cases which cannot be resolved in court. Yet even the law on the commission does not exist yet.

And various policies always get stuck at the regional level maybe because of lack of commitment or capability, or claims of lack of security. This is why I see weaknesses; all government efforts apart from the military approach have not been exhausted.

We might still be able to delay a military option ... We could form local truth and reconciliation teams ...

The then coordinating minister for political and security affairs had agreed to a national commission on the settlement of the Aceh issue which included civilian and military members and also non Acehnese such as (former foreign minister) Ali Alatas, (former home affairs minister) Surjadi Soedirdja, (Islamic scholar) Nurcholish Madjid and military figures who understood Aceh but who would seek a settlement within the framework of the republic's integrity, so the commission could be balanced. ...

But there has been no consistency for long term and systmematic planning.

The (government) has said we'll set up refugee camps in the event of a military operation -- but for how long? How about the children's schooling? I cried when I saw how in Maluku those who fled (the conflict) returned and realized that they no longer had control over their own property ...

So there is so much to be considered and if only the funds were used to conquer people's hearts, we might have a different story. So I'm optimistic as long as we have a little patience ...

True, no nation can ignore an armed uprising against its legitimate government, but if we look back a little, and a little bit beyond, maybe the decisions can be slightly altered.

If we agreed to split up the nation, we wouldn't be here. I wouldn't have joined in initiating the law on Aceh's special autonomy. But I'm disappointed with the legislators. We discussed the law dozens of times but with an added comma here and a phrase there, the substance has been ruined. We agreed on a direct election of the governor but then it says this would be done five years after the law is passed, or in 2006 while the president can be directly elected in 2004. This law was meant for a settlement for Aceh!

So this makes it clear about those who sincerely want the issue resolved and those in are pursuit of their own interests.