JP\/3\/HASBA2<\/p>\n
We must exhaust all non-military efforts for Aceh<\/p>\n
Hasballah M. Sa'ad<\/p>\n
The integrity of the republic for many, with regard to the
\nproblem of Aceh is not an issue; it is that of how one maintains
\nit. Some are for the shortcut way of a military approach while
\nothers refer to the experience of the 10-year military operation,
\nduring which the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) did not become
\nsignificantly weaker.<\/p>\n
This was because an entire generation with no previous
\naffinity toward GAM also became sympathetic to it because of
\ntheir anger, having become victims of the military operation.<\/p>\n
This is the main lesson referred to by leaders in Aceh; that
\nvarious past operations, whatever their names, such as Operasi
\nRencong, Operasi Cinta Meunasah and others which mainly involved
\nsignificant military engagements, have not quelled the
\nresistance.<\/p>\n
GAM could even become bigger because those who are not GAM so
\noften also became victims. Nowadays, the media reports two or
\nthree people killed on a daily basis and the perpetrators can
\nnever be found. They are always OTK (unidentified, orang tak
\ndikenal). So those who suffer most have been civilians and it is
\nthis trauma that haunts Acehnese in Aceh and elsewhere ...<\/p>\n
So what now? We are now racing against time, if before May 12
\nGAM gives no sign of complying to the government's ultimatum
\nthere will be no other choice apart from a military operation.<\/p>\n
Yet, however small the chance, we must seize it.<\/p>\n
If we can save the peace process, if the President and Cabinet
\ncan see the people's aspirations, they might be able to decide
\nsomething other than a military operation. I would suggest, in
\nthe search for a peace process, that the actors no longer only
\ncomprise just GAM and the TNI, for both sides are armed and can
\nprotect themselves, and each only speaks for their own interests.<\/p>\n
If there is some space to involve Aceh's leaders; who on one
\nside still retain pride of being cited as among the republic's
\npioneers but are in trauma and are even more prone to become
\nvictims than GAM members -- if there is such space the atmosphere
\nin the dialog might not merely (lead to answers) A or B but
\ninterests that can accommodate those who suffer most -- the
\npeople. Maybe their expressions would be able to touch the hearts
\non the side of GAM and TNI ...<\/p>\n
But the difficulties are, first, that civilians are divided,
\nas reflected in East and Central Aceh. There are civilian groups
\nsaid to be artificially manufactured just to resist others. For
\ninstance, in the attacks on the office of the Joint Security
\nCouncil in East Aceh, according to available information there, a
\nnumber of strange things were evident, but no proof has yet been
\nshown of \"engineering.\"<\/p>\n
Second, there are many civilian groups trying to interpret the
\nCessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA), in a way that suits
\ntheir needs. One is the Aceh Referendum Information Center (SIRA)
\nwhich claims that the agreement's phrase \"democratic and fair
\nelections in Aceh\", means a referendum (for self determination).
\nThat a neutral phrase in the Agreement can be interpreted loosely
\nfor a group's own interest is very chaotic in the absence of a
\nsingle authoritative interpretation ...<\/p>\n
In Aceh, they say that we cannot adopt the wrong policy or
\nelse the spirit of Aceh's pioneers of the republic will be angry;
\nand because we closed our eyes, our children will later curse
\nus ... for losing opportunities because of the degrading of
\nintellectuality, the loss of creativity, of culture ...<\/p>\n
If there is still no other option (than a military one), the
\nquestion remains: Is there an indicator to measure this choice? I
\nwould suggest that the indicator be whether casualties decrease.<\/p>\n
Ironically, whenever the TNI and police come to Aceh with the
\nnoble mission of saving the people from GAM, with all their
\nequipment, ammunition and large budget, casualties among the
\npeople increase.<\/p>\n
Both sides claim to act in the interest of the people -- yet
\nthey suffer the most. How does one explain that? Hence the need
\nfor an objective indicator -- whether a military operation can be
\ndone with minimum casualties. And whether there are still murders
\nby unidentified people; from May 2-6 there were still such cases.<\/p>\n
A second indicator would be a loss of property. Further, from
\nDec. 9 to Feb. 9 the intercity bus from Aceh to Medan was still
\noperating at night time, now it has stopped. Another indication
\nof safety is whether the coffee stalls stay open all along the
\nroad until 1 a.m. -- Acehnese can drink coffee up to eight times
\na day.<\/p>\n
Third, whether crimes such as armed robberies decrease.<\/p>\n
A legislator from East Aceh was one of the most recent victims
\nof an unidentified shooter.<\/p>\n
How much will we be spending for all this (military
\noperation)? What if all the funds were not spent on ammunition,
\nmilitary logistics, but for the operation to conquer the people's
\nhearts -- this is worth a try.<\/p>\n
And how long will this operation be? After what situation will
\nit stop? These must be answered or it will become out of control
\nand we will be like Palestine.<\/p>\n
Further, we have made a number of policies on Aceh such as a
\nnumber of presidential instructions; are they all still relevant,
\nand do the new policies complement the earlier ones?<\/p>\n
And in 2000, the People's Consultative Assembly had given two
\nmandates to the government: To settle the Aceh conflict with
\npeaceful means and to set up a truth and reconciliation
\ncommission for cases which cannot be resolved in court. Yet even
\nthe law on the commission does not exist yet.<\/p>\n
And various policies always get stuck at the regional level
\nmaybe because of lack of commitment or capability, or claims of
\nlack of security. This is why I see weaknesses; all government
\nefforts apart from the military approach have not been exhausted.<\/p>\n
We might still be able to delay a military option ... We could
\nform local truth and reconciliation teams ...<\/p>\n
The then coordinating minister for political and security
\naffairs had agreed to a national commission on the settlement of
\nthe Aceh issue which included civilian and military members and
\nalso non Acehnese such as (former foreign minister) Ali Alatas,
\n(former home affairs minister) Surjadi Soedirdja, (Islamic
\nscholar) Nurcholish Madjid and military figures who understood
\nAceh but who would seek a settlement within the framework of the
\nrepublic's integrity, so the commission could be balanced. ...<\/p>\n
But there has been no consistency for long term and
\nsystmematic planning.<\/p>\n
The (government) has said we'll set up refugee camps in the
\nevent of a military operation -- but for how long? How about the
\nchildren's schooling? I cried when I saw how in Maluku those who
\nfled (the conflict) returned and realized that they no longer had
\ncontrol over their own property ...<\/p>\n
So there is so much to be considered and if only the funds
\nwere used to conquer people's hearts, we might have a different
\nstory. So I'm optimistic as long as we have a little patience ...<\/p>\n
True, no nation can ignore an armed uprising against its
\nlegitimate government, but if we look back a little, and a little
\nbit beyond, maybe the decisions can be slightly altered.<\/p>\n
If we agreed to split up the nation, we wouldn't be here. I
\nwouldn't have joined in initiating the law on Aceh's special
\nautonomy. But I'm disappointed with the legislators. We discussed
\nthe law dozens of times but with an added comma here and a phrase
\nthere, the substance has been ruined. We agreed on a direct
\nelection of the governor but then it says this would be done five
\nyears after the law is passed, or in 2006 while the president can
\nbe directly elected in 2004. This law was meant for a settlement
\nfor Aceh!<\/p>\n
So this makes it clear about those who sincerely want the
\nissue resolved and those in are pursuit of their own interests.<\/p>",
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