Japan's Myanmar policy takes coutious approach

Japan's Myanmar policy takes coutious approach

By Jeff Kingston

Japan has shed its customary reticence and played a significant diplomatic role in dealing with the Myanmar problem. A more activist Japan willing to selectively use its clout to affect outcomes in the region will both help lay the ghosts of the past to rest and demonstrate that a quieter brand of diplomacy can work.

Is it ready for the prime time?

ASEAN has adopted a diplomacy of constructive engagement in its dealings with the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) of Myanmar. This approach is viewed uncharitably in the U.S. and Europe where human rights activists have called for governments to pressure SLORC to make way for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. ASEAN's policy of constructive engagement has been pilloried as a fig leaf for profitably investing in one of Asia's most backward and repressive nations.

Critics point out that there has been engagement mostly in terms of investment, rather than constructive results in terms of stemming widespread repression and nudging SLORC towards recognizing the results of the elections it sponsored six years ago. SLORC may think that the people gave the wrong answer, handing the National League for Democracy (NLD) a landslide victory, but Western activists have pressed for recognition of the results.

ASEAN has mixed feelings about SLORC but is certain that under current conditions constructive engagement remains the best bet. There are divergent views among ASEAN member states as to the best way to handle the Myanmar problem and one only needs to pick up the Nation from Thailand to recognize that regional critics of SLORC are also vociferous. But there is a consensus that the more confrontational approach of economic sanctions and public finger pointing would be counterproductive. For ASEAN, the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs is as important as are the potential risks of destabilizing the ruling junta.

ASEAN is trying to deal pragmatically and effectively with the neighborhood embarrassment. It remains to be seen whether this quiet diplomacy will bring results. While the West is anguished over the repression of the Myanmarese and have fixed on Aung San Suu Kyi as a symbol of hope and opposition, ASEAN sees an ethnic cauldron in a poor nation where political instability could have significant repercussions, a flood of refugees being the least of their worries.

Isolating Myanmar could alter the strategic environment in Asia in a manner potentially disadvantageous to ASEAN. China is already a major trading partner and supplier of arms. SLORC has not stinted on building up its military capabilities both to deal with various regional ethnic rebellions and to keep the lid on politics at the center.

ASEAN diplomats are wary of driving SLORC further into the arms of Beijing. If backed into a diplomatic and economic corner, SLORC could do far worse than reach an accommodation with China. A China fearing containment and lured by the prospects of direct naval access to the Indian Ocean would also be able to overcome any qualms it might have about SLORC. Thus, from the ASEAN perspective, the implications of squeezing SLORC look decidedly less attractive than they seem from a greater distance.

ASEAN diplomats quietly assert that the military will and should play a significant role in Myanmar. The military is said by some observers to be the most organized and advanced institution in a nation bereft of developed institutions and expertise. Looking at the Indonesian model, SLORC is carving out a central political role for the military and calculates that ASEAN will learn to live with a non-democratic neighbor as long as it is politically stable and economically open.

There is an inclination among ASEAN diplomats to bring Myanmar into the fold. An inclusive ASEAN of all 10 South-East Asian countries is desirable for a variety of political, economic and security reasons. Rather than demanding certain actions as a precondition for membership, ASEAN diplomats suggest that membership will generate subtle pressures to conform with regional norms.

Will isolating SLORC and a combination of economic and political sanctions lead to the desired result? ASEAN diplomats assert that the confrontational approach is at odds with established patterns of conduct. The U.S. wants sanctions and pressures applied to undermine SLORC and promote justice for the people of Myanmar and their chosen leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. ASEAN diplomats point to the hypocrisy of the U.S. position since some of the largest investors in Myanmar are from the U.S. In addition, the U.S. record in Latin America and its clandestine support for brutal regimes there contrasts starkly with its crusade for human rights and democracy in Asia.

Two wrongs do not make a right, but U.S. diplomats need to recognize that they do not speak with unquestioned moral authority.

Japan is often a cipher-like presence in global diplomacy, especially when hard decisions have to be made. However, in the case of Myanmar, Tokyo has quietly played a constructive role. When it appeared that SLORC was poised to arrest Daw Aung San Suu Kyi this past June, the Japanese government publicly and sternly warned that this would not be acceptable and that the consequences would be severe. With the crackdown on NLD supporters, the Japanese government put some teeth into constructive engagement. Previously, the Japanese Embassy in Yangon successfully lobbied for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's release from house arrest and has tried to play a mediating role and promote dialogue between the opposition leader and the military junta.

Despite misgivings about SLORC, until the recent spate of arrests and repression, the prospects of expanded Japanese economic assistance and investments were very good. With a pro-business LDP victory all but assured in next year's Diet elections, closer economic ties with Myanmar are likely. Juggling the competing agendas of business and human rights will test Japan's political leadership and commitment to a more resolute version of constructive engagement.

It is important that Japan has used its influence and threatened consequences for unacceptable policies. It has supported ASEAN's desire to nudge SLORC gently into accepting that certain practices and policies just won't pass muster in the region. But the situation demands more proactive policies. Proponents of constructive engagement need to demonstrate that their approach can do more than curb excesses.

Over the past two decades Japan and ASEAN have learned to work together in Indochina, cultivating incremental reforms with a significant cumulative impact. This relevant, and relatively successful, experience can be applied with positive effect on ASEAN's north-western flank. It is now time to put Myanmar and its long-suffering people at the top of the action agenda. They deserve no less.

Professor Jeff Kingston is Director, Institute for Pacific Rim Studies, Temple University, Japan.