Japan's Myanmar policy takes coutious approach

Japan's Myanmar policy takes coutious approach

By Jeff Kingston

Japan has shed its customary reticence and played a
significant diplomatic role in dealing with the Myanmar problem.
A more activist Japan willing to selectively use its clout to
affect outcomes in the region will both help lay the ghosts of
the past to rest and demonstrate that a quieter brand of
diplomacy can work.

Is it ready for the prime time?

ASEAN has adopted a diplomacy of constructive engagement in
its dealings with the State Law and Order Restoration Council
(SLORC) of Myanmar. This approach is viewed uncharitably
in the U.S. and Europe where human rights activists have called
for governments to pressure SLORC to make way for Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi. ASEAN's policy of constructive engagement has been
pilloried as a fig leaf for profitably investing in one of Asia's
most
backward and repressive nations.

Critics point out that there has been engagement mostly in
terms of investment, rather than constructive results in terms of
stemming widespread repression and nudging SLORC towards
recognizing the results of the elections it sponsored six years
ago. SLORC may think that the people gave the wrong answer,
handing the National League for Democracy (NLD) a landslide
victory, but Western activists have pressed for recognition of
the results.

ASEAN has mixed feelings about SLORC but is certain that under
current conditions constructive engagement remains the best bet.
There are divergent views among ASEAN member states as to the
best way to handle the Myanmar problem and one only needs to pick
up the Nation from Thailand to recognize that regional
critics of SLORC are also vociferous. But there is a consensus that
the more confrontational approach of economic sanctions and public
finger pointing would be counterproductive. For ASEAN, the
principle of non-intervention in internal affairs is as important
as are the potential risks of destabilizing the ruling junta.

ASEAN is trying to deal pragmatically and effectively with the
neighborhood embarrassment. It remains to be seen whether this
quiet diplomacy will bring results. While the West is anguished over
the repression of the Myanmarese and have fixed on Aung San Suu
Kyi as a symbol of hope and opposition, ASEAN sees an ethnic
cauldron in a poor nation where political instability could have
significant repercussions, a flood of refugees being the least of their
worries.

Isolating Myanmar could alter the strategic environment in
Asia in a manner potentially disadvantageous to ASEAN. China is
already a major trading partner and supplier of arms. SLORC has
not stinted on building up its military capabilities both to deal
with various regional ethnic rebellions and to keep the lid on
politics at the center.

ASEAN diplomats are wary of driving SLORC further into the
arms of Beijing. If backed into a diplomatic and economic corner,
SLORC could do far worse than reach an accommodation with China.
A China fearing containment and lured by the prospects of direct
naval access to the Indian Ocean would also be able to overcome
any qualms it might have about SLORC. Thus, from the ASEAN
perspective, the implications of squeezing SLORC look decidedly
less attractive than they seem from a greater distance.

ASEAN diplomats quietly assert that the military will and
should play a significant role in Myanmar. The military is said
by some observers to be the most organized and advanced
institution in a nation bereft of developed institutions and
expertise. Looking at the Indonesian model, SLORC is carving out
a central political role for the military and calculates that
ASEAN will learn to live with a non-democratic neighbor as long
as it is politically stable and economically open.

There is an inclination among ASEAN diplomats to bring Myanmar
into the fold. An inclusive ASEAN of all 10 South-East Asian
countries is desirable for a variety of political, economic and
security reasons. Rather than demanding certain actions as a
precondition for membership, ASEAN diplomats suggest that
membership will generate subtle pressures to conform with
regional norms.

Will isolating SLORC and a combination of economic and
political sanctions lead to the desired result? ASEAN diplomats
assert that the confrontational approach is at odds with
established patterns of conduct. The U.S. wants sanctions and
pressures applied to undermine SLORC and promote justice for the
people of Myanmar and their chosen leader, Aung San Suu Kyi.
ASEAN diplomats point to the hypocrisy of the U.S. position since
some of the largest investors in Myanmar are from the U.S. In
addition, the U.S. record in Latin America and its clandestine
support for brutal regimes there contrasts starkly with its
crusade for human rights and democracy in Asia.

Two wrongs do not make a right, but U.S. diplomats need to
recognize that they do not speak with unquestioned moral
authority.

Japan is often a cipher-like presence in global diplomacy,
especially when hard decisions have to be made. However, in the
case of Myanmar, Tokyo has quietly played a constructive role.
When it appeared that SLORC was poised to arrest Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi this past June, the Japanese government publicly and
sternly warned that this would not be acceptable and that the
consequences would be severe. With the crackdown on NLD
supporters, the Japanese government put some teeth into
constructive engagement. Previously, the Japanese Embassy in
Yangon successfully lobbied for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's release
from house arrest and has tried to play a mediating role and promote
dialogue between the opposition leader and the military junta.

Despite misgivings about SLORC, until the recent spate of
arrests and repression, the prospects of expanded Japanese
economic assistance and investments were very good. With a
pro-business LDP victory all but assured in next year's Diet
elections, closer economic ties with Myanmar are likely. Juggling
the competing agendas of business and human rights will test
Japan's political leadership and commitment to a more resolute
version of constructive engagement.

It is important that Japan has used its influence and
threatened consequences for unacceptable policies. It has
supported ASEAN's desire to nudge SLORC gently into accepting
that certain practices and policies just won't pass muster in the
region. But the situation demands more proactive policies.
Proponents of constructive engagement need to demonstrate that
their approach can do more than curb excesses.

Over the past two decades Japan and ASEAN have learned to work
together in Indochina, cultivating incremental reforms with a
significant cumulative impact. This relevant, and relatively
successful, experience can be applied with positive effect on
ASEAN's north-western flank. It is now time to put Myanmar and
its long-suffering people at the top of the action agenda. They
deserve no less.

Professor Jeff Kingston is Director, Institute for Pacific Rim
Studies, Temple University, Japan.