Japan's Myanmar policy takes coutious approach<\/p>\n
By Jeff Kingston<\/p>\n
Japan has shed its customary reticence and played a
\nsignificant diplomatic role in dealing with the Myanmar problem.
\nA more activist Japan willing to selectively use its clout to
\naffect outcomes in the region will both help lay the ghosts of
\nthe past to rest and demonstrate that a quieter brand of
\ndiplomacy can work.<\/p>\n
Is it ready for the prime time?<\/p>\n
ASEAN has adopted a diplomacy of constructive engagement in
\nits dealings with the State Law and Order Restoration Council
\n(SLORC) of Myanmar. This approach is viewed uncharitably
\nin the U.S. and Europe where human rights activists have called
\nfor governments to pressure SLORC to make way for Daw Aung San
\nSuu Kyi. ASEAN's policy of constructive engagement has been
\npilloried as a fig leaf for profitably investing in one of Asia's
\nmost
\nbackward and repressive nations.<\/p>\n
Critics point out that there has been engagement mostly in
\nterms of investment, rather than constructive results in terms of
\nstemming widespread repression and nudging SLORC towards
\nrecognizing the results of the elections it sponsored six years
\nago. SLORC may think that the people gave the wrong answer,
\nhanding the National League for Democracy (NLD) a landslide
\nvictory, but Western activists have pressed for recognition of
\nthe results.<\/p>\n
ASEAN has mixed feelings about SLORC but is certain that under
\ncurrent conditions constructive engagement remains the best bet.
\nThere are divergent views among ASEAN member states as to the
\nbest way to handle the Myanmar problem and one only needs to pick
\nup the Nation from Thailand to recognize that regional
\ncritics of SLORC are also vociferous. But there is a consensus that
\nthe more confrontational approach of economic sanctions and public
\nfinger pointing would be counterproductive. For ASEAN, the
\nprinciple of non-intervention in internal affairs is as important
\nas are the potential risks of destabilizing the ruling junta.<\/p>\n
ASEAN is trying to deal pragmatically and effectively with the
\nneighborhood embarrassment. It remains to be seen whether this
\nquiet diplomacy will bring results. While the West is anguished over
\nthe repression of the Myanmarese and have fixed on Aung San Suu
\nKyi as a symbol of hope and opposition, ASEAN sees an ethnic
\ncauldron in a poor nation where political instability could have
\nsignificant repercussions, a flood of refugees being the least of their
\nworries.<\/p>\n
Isolating Myanmar could alter the strategic environment in
\nAsia in a manner potentially disadvantageous to ASEAN. China is
\nalready a major trading partner and supplier of arms. SLORC has
\nnot stinted on building up its military capabilities both to deal
\nwith various regional ethnic rebellions and to keep the lid on
\npolitics at the center.<\/p>\n
ASEAN diplomats are wary of driving SLORC further into the
\narms of Beijing. If backed into a diplomatic and economic corner,
\nSLORC could do far worse than reach an accommodation with China.
\nA China fearing containment and lured by the prospects of direct
\nnaval access to the Indian Ocean would also be able to overcome
\nany qualms it might have about SLORC. Thus, from the ASEAN
\nperspective, the implications of squeezing SLORC look decidedly
\nless attractive than they seem from a greater distance.<\/p>\n
ASEAN diplomats quietly assert that the military will and
\nshould play a significant role in Myanmar. The military is said
\nby some observers to be the most organized and advanced
\ninstitution in a nation bereft of developed institutions and
\nexpertise. Looking at the Indonesian model, SLORC is carving out
\na central political role for the military and calculates that
\nASEAN will learn to live with a non-democratic neighbor as long
\nas it is politically stable and economically open.<\/p>\n
There is an inclination among ASEAN diplomats to bring Myanmar
\ninto the fold. An inclusive ASEAN of all 10 South-East Asian
\ncountries is desirable for a variety of political, economic and
\nsecurity reasons. Rather than demanding certain actions as a
\nprecondition for membership, ASEAN diplomats suggest that
\nmembership will generate subtle pressures to conform with
\nregional norms.<\/p>\n
Will isolating SLORC and a combination of economic and
\npolitical sanctions lead to the desired result? ASEAN diplomats
\nassert that the confrontational approach is at odds with
\nestablished patterns of conduct. The U.S. wants sanctions and
\npressures applied to undermine SLORC and promote justice for the
\npeople of Myanmar and their chosen leader, Aung San Suu Kyi.
\nASEAN diplomats point to the hypocrisy of the U.S. position since
\nsome of the largest investors in Myanmar are from the U.S. In
\naddition, the U.S. record in Latin America and its clandestine
\nsupport for brutal regimes there contrasts starkly with its
\ncrusade for human rights and democracy in Asia.<\/p>\n
Two wrongs do not make a right, but U.S. diplomats need to
\nrecognize that they do not speak with unquestioned moral
\nauthority.<\/p>\n
Japan is often a cipher-like presence in global diplomacy,
\nespecially when hard decisions have to be made. However, in the
\ncase of Myanmar, Tokyo has quietly played a constructive role.
\nWhen it appeared that SLORC was poised to arrest Daw Aung San
\nSuu Kyi this past June, the Japanese government publicly and
\nsternly warned that this would not be acceptable and that the
\nconsequences would be severe. With the crackdown on NLD
\nsupporters, the Japanese government put some teeth into
\nconstructive engagement. Previously, the Japanese Embassy in
\nYangon successfully lobbied for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's release
\nfrom house arrest and has tried to play a mediating role and promote
\ndialogue between the opposition leader and the military junta.<\/p>\n
Despite misgivings about SLORC, until the recent spate of
\narrests and repression, the prospects of expanded Japanese
\neconomic assistance and investments were very good. With a
\npro-business LDP victory all but assured in next year's Diet
\nelections, closer economic ties with Myanmar are likely. Juggling
\nthe competing agendas of business and human rights will test
\nJapan's political leadership and commitment to a more resolute
\nversion of constructive engagement.<\/p>\n
It is important that Japan has used its influence and
\nthreatened consequences for unacceptable policies. It has
\nsupported ASEAN's desire to nudge SLORC gently into accepting
\nthat certain practices and policies just won't pass muster in the
\nregion. But the situation demands more proactive policies.
\nProponents of constructive engagement need to demonstrate that
\ntheir approach can do more than curb excesses.<\/p>\n
Over the past two decades Japan and ASEAN have learned to work
\ntogether in Indochina, cultivating incremental reforms with a
\nsignificant cumulative impact. This relevant, and relatively
\nsuccessful, experience can be applied with positive effect on
\nASEAN's north-western flank. It is now time to put Myanmar and
\nits long-suffering people at the top of the action agenda. They
\ndeserve no less.<\/p>\n
Professor Jeff Kingston is Director, Institute for Pacific Rim
\nStudies, Temple University, Japan.<\/p>",
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