Jakarta's strategy to deal with Papuan nationalism
Jakarta's strategy to deal with Papuan nationalism
Richard Chauvel, Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia
On June 8, 2000, the Director General of National Unity in the
Department of Internal Affairs, Ermaya Suradinata, held a meeting
with representatives of the military and intelligence community
in Jakarta.
Among the latter were the military's Strategic Intelligence
Agency (Bais), the State Intelligence Coordinating Board (Bakin),
the Army Strategic Reserves Command (Kostrad) and the army's
special forces (Kopassus). From the meeting emerged a framework
for Jakarta's response to the challenge posed by Papuan
nationalism. By mid November 2000, the report of the meeting was
circulating widely in Jayapura and its contents were summarized
in the weekly Tifa Papua.
The context for this meeting was the Papuan Congress held a
few days earlier. This was a critical juncture in the development
of the central government's policy towards Papua. Then president
Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dur) had made important symbolic gestures
to Papuan opinion during his visit for New Year.
He declined the invitation to open the congress, but he did
contribute Rp 1 billion to facilitate a meeting that was to
reiterate the Papuan demand for independence. In the first half
of 2000 the Papuan independence movement had gained significant
momentum. Through the congress and the earlier General Assembly
(Musyawarah Besar), the Papuan Presidium Council had acquired
legitimacy and been recognized by the Indonesian authorities in
Jakarta and Jayapura as the de facto leaders.
The document signed by Ermaya reveals much about how Jakarta
assesses developments in Papua. It observes that the atmosphere
down to the village level after the congress was euphoric about
the idea of independence. The "conspiratorial groups" supporting
the cry of independence (Merdeka!) were increasingly cohesive,
and were endeavoring to "socialize" the congress results
throughout Irian Jaya and beyond.
Nevertheless, despite this appreciation of the Papuan
enthusiasm for independence, the document estimates support at
only 10 percent to 20 percent.
Particularly revealing is the analysis of these
"conspiratorial groups". A diagram attached to the report,
entitled "Papuan political conspiracy", backgrounds the pro-
independence Papuan leaders. Besides well-known public figures
such as Theys Eluay and Tom Beanal, the diagram includes two
former governors, one ambassador and a couple of members of the
national parliament, one of the latter being the new governor
Jaap Solossa.
The people in the diagram represent a broad spectrum of
opinion within the Papuan political elite. It thus illustrates
one of Jakarta's most difficult problems: The "conspiracy"
contains many of the Papuans who have achieved most in the
Indonesian system. In an unintended manner, the document supports
the common assertion that all Papuans, even those who serve the
Indonesian state, in their heart of hearts are pro-"M" (Merdeka,
pro-independence).
The document recognizes that even some provincial officials
have been "contaminated" by the merdeka ideal, and recommends
"strong sanctions" against those who openly support independence.
In September 2000 the minister of home affairs followed this up
with an instruction to the governor to take unspecified action
against pro-independence officials.
This writer often saw one of those named in the report, Filip
Karma, in Jayapura dressed in his Indonesian bureaucratic attire,
proudly wearing a large Papuan flag pinned to his chest. These
senior Papuan officials are not the key leaders of the
independence movement, but their inclusion in Jakarta's version
of the "Papuan political conspiracy" highlights how fragile the
foundations of Indonesian authority in Papua are.
The Ermaya Suradinata memorandum to the minister of home
affairs argues for "immediate, concrete and appropriate" actions
to anticipate the burgeoning pro-independence climate. It
envisages graduated activities, both overt and clandestine,
targeting a broad spectrum of Papuan society.
The proposed covert activities include recruiting, training
and supporting pro-Indonesian militia at village level. The less
sinister means involve providing those leaders who support
Indonesia with government positions at all levels from the
village to the province. Honors for local leaders and the
elevation of "national heroes" from Irian Jaya are two further
suggestions.
The memorandum stresses the need for consistency in official
central government statements in order not to confuse provincial
officials -- no doubt a veiled criticism of Gus Dur and his
ministers.
At the provincial level, the draft strategy envisages creating
a more "conducive" environment by raising the level of material
welfare in Papuan society. This, it is hoped, will improve the
government's credibility and persuade people to support
Indonesia.
Some of the approach and several specific measures advocated
in Ermaya's memorandum appear to have been influential. A "crash
program" of economic aid is consistent with the objective of
raising welfare. It has so far distributed Rp 410 billion, nearly
the size of the provincial budget again, to the regency level
administration. Its aim is to support social and economic
development, human resources and places of worship.
Jakarta also clearly promotes regional autonomy, although
whether its implementation will meet Papuan expectations is yet
to be seen. Former president B.J. Habibie's policy of dividing
the province into three, rejected in the governor's draft special
autonomy legislation, seems to have been put on the backburner.
The detention and trial of some presidium leaders, and the
rapprochement with other members of the elite also reflects some
of the proposals. However, there is so far little evidence that
the memorandum's recommendation to minimize the use of force has
been widely heard by the security forces in Irian Jaya.
This article first appeared in Inside Indonesia magazine no.
66, July-September 2001, and is published courtesy of its Editor.