Islamic factors in ex-USSR

Islamic factors in ex-USSR

By Riza Sihbudi

JAKARTA (JP): Chechnya, the lesser known mini-states in the
Caucasus region in the former Soviet Union (USSR) "may seem an
unimportant little place that few people in the West could find
on a map even now", according to The Economist. However, Chechnya
has grabbed media headlines since last month because of its
involvement in an imbalanced war against the Russian forces.

One of the conflict sources is the struggle between "the
obsession" and "the ambition". That is, "the obsession" of the
Chechnya nation to maintain their "independence" -- proclaimed in
1991 -- from the Russia federation, vis-a-vis the ambition of the
Russian President Boris Yeltsin who wants to maintain his
country's image as one of the former superpowers of the world.

The Chechnya leadership took advantage of the 1991 Moscow's
struggle for power, to proclaim their independence by the name of
"Republic of Checheno-Ingushetia", in the form of a confederation
with their neighbor and "cultural brother", Ingushetia -- which
later integrated itself back into the Russia federation.

Russia did not want to see its breakdown and hence it did not
recognize Chechnya independence. On the other hand, Chechnya saw
it as a good opportunity to follow the steps of six other former
Soviet Moslem republics which proclaimed their independence after
the fall of the USSR.

Both Chechnya and Ingushetia were predominantly Moslem. In
their history, the Moslems of Central Asia and the Caucasus have
been very difficult to control by the Moscow regime, both during
the Czardom and the Soviet communism periods. Their fighters,
such as Ghazi Muhammad, Hamza Bek and Imam Shamil, have become
legends. Shamil (1797-1871), for example, was the third and most
famous and successful imam of the Moslem resistance--which was
known as the Miuridzm Islamic movement against the Russian
occupation of the North-eastern Caucasus. Some historians
regarded him as "the greatest guerrilla leader in the history of
warfare".

For many years the communist regimes repressed the Moslem
people. Islamic religious activities were very limited by the
regimes. There can be little doubt that communists were worried
about the "Islamic problem". They realized that Islam was
becoming increasingly difficult to control and that events in
Afghanistan and Iran had made the situation worse and that the
worsening situation could be exploited by foreign powers.

The fall of the USSR gave the chance to Islamic revivalism
among the Turco-Iranian people of Central Asia and the Caucasus
regions. It is quite natural for the Moslems to return to their
cultural roots after more than 150 years of Russian colonialism.
They are reverting to their Turkic and Persian languages and
abandoning the Cyrillic alphabet imposed on both tongues by
Moscow. The life-cycle rituals are being restored. In this
context, it seems certain that Islam will become a major factor
in shaping the future of this region.

However, the spirit of returning to their cultural roots after
the fall of the communist regime have faced new problems and
challenges, such as internal conflicts, both in Central Asia and
the Caucasus.

Meanwhile, the West has also taken a confrontational stand on
Islam in the former USSR, especially in Central Asia. In 1991,
Western officials, including former U.S. secretary of state
toured the new Central Asian states in 1991 to urge them to
emulate secular Turkey rather than neighboring Islamic Iran
during the transition to post-Soviet era. Although the U.S.
stressed human rights and pluralism in its talks with Central
Asian leaders, according to Robin Wright (1992), the real message
appears to be as much anti-Islam as pro-democracy.

Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979 had a strong impact on
the Central Asian and the Caucasian Moslems. The (Soviet) Moslem
soldiers sent by the Moscow regime to the Afghan war were instead
influenced by the Afghan mujahidin (defenders of the faith), not
vice versa. And since 1990, there have been strong indications of
Islamic revivalism in the former USSR. Some estimates claim that
up to ten new mosques have been set up daily in the region. The
number of madrasah (Islamic schools) is also rising, as is the
enrollment of new students.

In Central Asia, the ex-communists argue that they must stay
in power to block the growth of Islamic political forces. Indeed,
more important to the region's political evolution have been the
births of various branches of the Islamic Renaissance Party.
Although it finally managed to register as a legal party in 1991,
its activities were banned in four of the five Central Asian
states because of the ex-communist fear of Islam as a political
force.

Unlike the inter-Sunni Moslems war in Afghanistan, political
competition in Central Asia has been going on between the ex-
communists, the Islamists and the nationalists. The Communist
Party is still the ruling group in the region, although it no
longer calls itself such. The nationalists and the ex-communists
basically are also Moslems. As one cleric from Uzbekistan once
put it, "Our communist leaders may have been nonbelievers, but no
Uzbek was really a communist--a liar yes, but not a communist".

Most of the ex-Soviet Moslem activists wish to develop their
own models of an Islamic democracy. The Islamic democracy,
according to them, would allow the existence of other parties and
free speech, but would impose strict penalties on un-Islamic
practices such as alcohol, prostitution and drugs. In the
political context, their Islamic versions vary widely. Some
suggest borrowing democratic aspects from secular to Islamic
government practices from Pakistan and Iran, although they say no
country provides an ideal model.

The newly independent Moslem republics of the former Soviet
Union, it was asserted, would choose either the Islamic secular
Turkish or the Iranian fundamentalistic model as a political
system. Turkey and Iran indeed increased their activities in the
region. Language, religion and the economy are playing an
important role in this process. However, the situation is more
complex than what this suggests. Rather than compete for
influence, Iran has so far preferred cooperation, even with the
current Central Asian leadership. And there is in fact little
evidence to support rumors that Iran is engaging itself in a
massive clandestine effort to support Islamic fundamentalism in
the region.

Central Asian Islamists are not interested in imitating Iran.
Iran, in turn, does not have the resources or even the will to
meddle too much in Central Asia. After two wars in the Persian
Gulf and Afghanistan, its interests are very specifically focused
on domestic economic development to prevent the whole region from
becoming a backwater.

Therefore, Western outcry over Islamic activism in the former
USSR also appears to be premature. As Robin Wright writes, the
Western administrations are making the same mistakes in Central
Asia and Algeria that the Carter administration made in Iran by
backing away from the unknown Islamists before even trying to
deal with them. It will only serve to justify the Huntington's
thesis of "clashing civilizations" (between Islam and the West),
even more so if the West fails to help put an end to the
continuing conflict between Chechnya and Russia, as well as in
the Balkan war.

The writer is a researcher at the Indonesian Institute of
Sciences, Jakarta.