Islamic factors in ex-USSR<\/p>\n
By Riza Sihbudi<\/p>\n
JAKARTA (JP): Chechnya, the lesser known mini-states in the
\nCaucasus region in the former Soviet Union (USSR) "may seem an
\nunimportant little place that few people in the West could find
\non a map even now", according to The Economist. However, Chechnya
\nhas grabbed media headlines since last month because of its
\ninvolvement in an imbalanced war against the Russian forces.<\/p>\n
One of the conflict sources is the struggle between "the
\nobsession" and "the ambition". That is, "the obsession" of the
\nChechnya nation to maintain their "independence" -- proclaimed in
\n1991 -- from the Russia federation, vis-a-vis the ambition of the
\nRussian President Boris Yeltsin who wants to maintain his
\ncountry's image as one of the former superpowers of the world.<\/p>\n
The Chechnya leadership took advantage of the 1991 Moscow's
\nstruggle for power, to proclaim their independence by the name of
\n"Republic of Checheno-Ingushetia", in the form of a confederation
\nwith their neighbor and "cultural brother", Ingushetia -- which
\nlater integrated itself back into the Russia federation.<\/p>\n
Russia did not want to see its breakdown and hence it did not
\nrecognize Chechnya independence. On the other hand, Chechnya saw
\nit as a good opportunity to follow the steps of six other former
\nSoviet Moslem republics which proclaimed their independence after
\nthe fall of the USSR.<\/p>\n
Both Chechnya and Ingushetia were predominantly Moslem. In
\ntheir history, the Moslems of Central Asia and the Caucasus have
\nbeen very difficult to control by the Moscow regime, both during
\nthe Czardom and the Soviet communism periods. Their fighters,
\nsuch as Ghazi Muhammad, Hamza Bek and Imam Shamil, have become
\nlegends. Shamil (1797-1871), for example, was the third and most
\nfamous and successful imam of the Moslem resistance--which was
\nknown as the Miuridzm Islamic movement against the Russian
\noccupation of the North-eastern Caucasus. Some historians
\nregarded him as "the greatest guerrilla leader in the history of
\nwarfare".<\/p>\n
For many years the communist regimes repressed the Moslem
\npeople. Islamic religious activities were very limited by the
\nregimes. There can be little doubt that communists were worried
\nabout the "Islamic problem". They realized that Islam was
\nbecoming increasingly difficult to control and that events in
\nAfghanistan and Iran had made the situation worse and that the
\nworsening situation could be exploited by foreign powers.<\/p>\n
The fall of the USSR gave the chance to Islamic revivalism
\namong the Turco-Iranian people of Central Asia and the Caucasus
\nregions. It is quite natural for the Moslems to return to their
\ncultural roots after more than 150 years of Russian colonialism.
\nThey are reverting to their Turkic and Persian languages and
\nabandoning the Cyrillic alphabet imposed on both tongues by
\nMoscow. The life-cycle rituals are being restored. In this
\ncontext, it seems certain that Islam will become a major factor
\nin shaping the future of this region.<\/p>\n
However, the spirit of returning to their cultural roots after
\nthe fall of the communist regime have faced new problems and
\nchallenges, such as internal conflicts, both in Central Asia and
\nthe Caucasus.<\/p>\n
Meanwhile, the West has also taken a confrontational stand on
\nIslam in the former USSR, especially in Central Asia. In 1991,
\nWestern officials, including former U.S. secretary of state
\ntoured the new Central Asian states in 1991 to urge them to
\nemulate secular Turkey rather than neighboring Islamic Iran
\nduring the transition to post-Soviet era. Although the U.S.
\nstressed human rights and pluralism in its talks with Central
\nAsian leaders, according to Robin Wright (1992), the real message
\nappears to be as much anti-Islam as pro-democracy.<\/p>\n
Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in 1979 had a strong impact on
\nthe Central Asian and the Caucasian Moslems. The (Soviet) Moslem
\nsoldiers sent by the Moscow regime to the Afghan war were instead
\ninfluenced by the Afghan mujahidin (defenders of the faith), not
\nvice versa. And since 1990, there have been strong indications of
\nIslamic revivalism in the former USSR. Some estimates claim that
\nup to ten new mosques have been set up daily in the region. The
\nnumber of madrasah (Islamic schools) is also rising, as is the
\nenrollment of new students.<\/p>\n
In Central Asia, the ex-communists argue that they must stay
\nin power to block the growth of Islamic political forces. Indeed,
\nmore important to the region's political evolution have been the
\nbirths of various branches of the Islamic Renaissance Party.
\nAlthough it finally managed to register as a legal party in 1991,
\nits activities were banned in four of the five Central Asian
\nstates because of the ex-communist fear of Islam as a political
\nforce.<\/p>\n
Unlike the inter-Sunni Moslems war in Afghanistan, political
\ncompetition in Central Asia has been going on between the ex-
\ncommunists, the Islamists and the nationalists. The Communist
\nParty is still the ruling group in the region, although it no
\nlonger calls itself such. The nationalists and the ex-communists
\nbasically are also Moslems. As one cleric from Uzbekistan once
\nput it, "Our communist leaders may have been nonbelievers, but no
\nUzbek was really a communist--a liar yes, but not a communist".<\/p>\n
Most of the ex-Soviet Moslem activists wish to develop their
\nown models of an Islamic democracy. The Islamic democracy,
\naccording to them, would allow the existence of other parties and
\nfree speech, but would impose strict penalties on un-Islamic
\npractices such as alcohol, prostitution and drugs. In the
\npolitical context, their Islamic versions vary widely. Some
\nsuggest borrowing democratic aspects from secular to Islamic
\ngovernment practices from Pakistan and Iran, although they say no
\ncountry provides an ideal model.<\/p>\n
The newly independent Moslem republics of the former Soviet
\nUnion, it was asserted, would choose either the Islamic secular
\nTurkish or the Iranian fundamentalistic model as a political
\nsystem. Turkey and Iran indeed increased their activities in the
\nregion. Language, religion and the economy are playing an
\nimportant role in this process. However, the situation is more
\ncomplex than what this suggests. Rather than compete for
\ninfluence, Iran has so far preferred cooperation, even with the
\ncurrent Central Asian leadership. And there is in fact little
\nevidence to support rumors that Iran is engaging itself in a
\nmassive clandestine effort to support Islamic fundamentalism in
\nthe region.<\/p>\n
Central Asian Islamists are not interested in imitating Iran.
\nIran, in turn, does not have the resources or even the will to
\nmeddle too much in Central Asia. After two wars in the Persian
\nGulf and Afghanistan, its interests are very specifically focused
\non domestic economic development to prevent the whole region from
\nbecoming a backwater.<\/p>\n
Therefore, Western outcry over Islamic activism in the former
\nUSSR also appears to be premature. As Robin Wright writes, the
\nWestern administrations are making the same mistakes in Central
\nAsia and Algeria that the Carter administration made in Iran by
\nbacking away from the unknown Islamists before even trying to
\ndeal with them. It will only serve to justify the Huntington's
\nthesis of "clashing civilizations" (between Islam and the West),
\neven more so if the West fails to help put an end to the
\ncontinuing conflict between Chechnya and Russia, as well as in
\nthe Balkan war.<\/p>\n
The writer is a researcher at the Indonesian Institute of
\nSciences, Jakarta.<\/p>",
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